11-5150-cv
Leng v. Pinnacle Performance Ltd.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,
2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 10th day of April, two thousand and twelve.
5
6 PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, JR.,
7 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
8 Circuit Judges,
9 SIDNEY H. STEIN,*
10 District Judge.
11
12
13 LAM YEEN LENG, ZHAO YUZHENG, NG SHOOK PHIN SUSAN, CHOH GEK
14 HONG JOHNSON, HO YU WAH PETER, NEO SAY HOE, ANG SOO CHENG,
15 LIM THIAN LOKE, BOEY CHERN YUE, YEO PENG CHYE, NI YAN AMY,
16 LI CHAN CHIH ERIC, SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT STAFF CREDIT
17 COOPERATIVE SOCIETY, LIMITED, LOH TUCK WOH PETER, CHUA HUI
18 LOO, PAN YUEN DAPHNE, CHO SIEW KONG DOUGLAS, GE DANDONG,
19
20 Plaintiffs-Appellees,
21
22 -v.- 11-5150-cv
23
24 PINNACLE PERFORMANCE LIMITED, MORGAN STANLEY ASIA
25 (SINGAPORE) PTE, MORGAN STANLEY & CO. INTERNATIONAL, PLC,
26 MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL SERVICES INCORPORATED, MORGAN STANLEY
27 & CO. INCORPORATED,
28
29 Defendants-Appellants.
30
*
Judge Sidney H. Stein of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
1 FOR APPELLANTS: BRUCE D. ANGIOLILLO (Jonathan K.
2 Youngwood, on the brief), Simpson
3 Thatcher & Bartlett LLP, New York, NY.
4
5 FOR APPELLEES: ANDREW M. MCNEELA (Daniel Hume, Ira M.
6 Press, on the brief), Kirby McInerney
7 LLP, New York, NY.
8
9 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
10 Southern District of New York (Sand, J.).
11
12 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
13 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
14 AFFIRMED as to Defendants-Appellants Morgan Stanley Asia
15 (Singapore) PTE, Morgan Stanley & Co. International, PLC,
16 Morgan Stanley Capital Services Incorporated, and Morgan
17 Stanley & Co. Incorporated. As to Defendant-Appellant
18 Pinnacle Performance Limited (“Pinnacle”), we REMAND for the
19 district court to make personal jurisdiction findings. The
20 injunction will remain in place as to Pinnacle while the
21 district court makes these findings.
22 Appellants, including Pinnacle, appeal from an order of
23 the United States District Court for the Southern District
24 of New York (Sand, J.) issuing a preliminary injunction.
25 The injunction prohibits Appellants from pursuing their own
26 anti-suit injunction from the High Court of the Republic of
27 Singapore (“Singapore Motion”) that would require Appellees
28 to litigate their claims exclusively in Singapore.
2
1 Appellants also seek interlocutory review of the district
2 court’s order denying their motion to dismiss Appellees’
3 complaint. Appellants ask this Court to consider their
4 argument made below that Appellees’ suit must be dismissed,
5 either on the basis of forum non conveniens or on the basis
6 of a Singapore forum selection clause contained in the
7 Pricing Statements for the credit-linked notes at issue in
8 this litigation. We assume the parties’ familiarity with
9 the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues
10 presented for review.
11 This Court reviews the issuance of an anti-suit
12 injunction for abuse of discretion, namely, the incorrect
13 application of legal standards or reliance on clearly
14 erroneous findings of fact. Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v.
15 Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 500 F.3d
16 111, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2007). This Circuit has suggested that
17 before issuing an anti-suit injunction, a court must (1)
18 “address[] the propriety of imposing an anti-suit
19 injunction” under the test established in China Trade & Dev.
20 Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1987)
21 (the “China Trade” test), and then (2) “make findings on
22 whether it is appropriate to enter a preliminary
3
1 injunction.” In re Millenium Seacarriers, Inc., 458 F.3d
2 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (emphasis removed).
3 The district court properly determined that Appellees
4 satisfied both of these tests. First, the district court
5 properly found that Appellees had satisfied the two
6 threshold elements of the China Trade test: (1) the parties
7 to both proceedings are the same, and (2) “resolution of the
8 case before the enjoining court [will] be dispositive of the
9 action to be enjoined.” China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35.
10 Appellees have also met their burden under the additional
11 China Trade factors. See Karaha Bodas Co., 500 F.3d at
12 119.1 Most importantly here, the district court found that
13 the enjoined Singapore Motion would threaten the district
14 court’s jurisdiction. See China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36
15 (“[I]f a foreign court is not merely proceeding in parallel
16 but is attempting to carve out exclusive jurisdiction over
17 the action, an injunction may . . . be necessary to protect
18 the enjoining court’s jurisdiction.”). Appellants’
1
These factors include whether the enjoined action would
“(1) frustrate . . . a policy in the enjoining forum; (2) . . .
be vexatious; (3) . . . threaten . . . the issuing court’s . . .
jurisdiction; (4) . . . prejudice other equitable considerations;
or (5) . . . result in delay, inconvenience, expense,
inconsistency, or a race to judgment.” Karaha Bodas Co., 500
F.3d at 119 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
4
1 Singapore Motion seeks a determination that Singapore is the
2 proper forum for Appellees’ suit. Faced with this clear
3 threat to its jurisdiction over the case, the district court
4 properly exercised its discretion in finding that this
5 factor weighed heavily against Appellants.
6 The district court also properly determined that
7 Appellees satisfied the traditional test for the issuance of
8 a preliminary injunction. Under that test, Appellees must
9 show (1) irreparable harm, (2) sufficiently serious
10 questions going to the merits, and (3) a balance of
11 hardships tipping decidedly towards them. See Citigroup
12 Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund
13 Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010). We agree with the
14 district court that Appellees have demonstrated irreparable
15 harm through the “actual and imminent possibility that
16 [they] will be enjoined from prosecuting their suit in this,
17 or in any other non-Singaporean, forum,” and that there are
18 sufficiently serious questions going to the merits. Dandong
19 v. Pinnacle Performance Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 8086, 2011 WL
20 6156743, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2011) (internal quotation
21 marks omitted). Finally, the district court properly found
22 that the balance of hardships “tips decidedly in favor of
5
1 [Appellees]” due to the timing of Appellants’ Singapore
2 Motion, the danger that Appellees will be enjoined from
3 proceeding in their chosen forum, and the potential expense,
4 delay, and inconvenience involved in requiring Appellees to
5 litigate in Singapore and possibly abandoning their case in
6 New York. Id.
7 However, the district court erred in enjoining Pinnacle
8 without first making any findings as to its jurisdiction
9 over that party. Where a challenge to personal jurisdiction
10 is interposed on an application for a preliminary
11 injunction, the district court must determine that the party
12 moving for the injunction has established “at least a
13 reasonable probability of ultimate success on the question
14 of the court’s in personam jurisdiction” over the non-moving
15 party. Weitzman v. Stein, 897 F.2d 653, 659 (2d Cir. 1990);
16 Visual Scis., Inc. v. Integrated Commc’ns Inc., 660 F.2d 56,
17 59 (2d Cir. 1981).
18 Here, Appellants initially moved to dismiss the
19 complaint on the grounds that Pinnacle was an indispensable
20 party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) and that the court did not
21 have personal jurisdiction over Pinnacle. In deciding that
22 motion, however, the district court focused solely on
6
1 whether Pinnacle was an indispensable party. Having
2 concluded that it was not, the court saw no need to resolve
3 the jurisdictional question.
4 Nor did the district court address whether it had
5 jurisdiction over Pinnacle during the preliminary injunction
6 hearing or in its subsequent memorandum and order granting
7 the preliminary injunction. Having determined that the
8 parties in the federal action were the “same” as the parties
9 involved in the Singapore Motion for the purposes of China
10 Trade, the district court seemed to think that Pinnacle’s
11 appearance and answer in this case permitted it to grant the
12 injunction. See Dandong, 2011 WL 6156743, at *4 (“Pinnacle,
13 having answered the complaint, is now a party to the suit in
14 New York. For this reason, the parties to both suits are
15 identical.”) (internal citation omitted). But Pinnacle’s
16 presence in the lawsuit did not provide the answer to the
17 jurisdictional question, which is necessary to enjoin
18 Pinnacle because Pinnacle raised jurisdictional objections
19 both in its answer and in the motion to dismiss.
20 In the absence of any jurisdictional determination as
21 to Pinnacle, this Court must remand to the district court to
22 “make factual findings adequate enough to permit intelligent
7
1 appellate review.” Visual Scis., 660 F.2d at 59. The
2 injunction will remain in place while the district court
3 makes this finding. See Millenium Seacarriers, 458 F.3d at
4 98 (keeping anti-suit injunction in place while remanding
5 for court to make China Trade findings).2
6 Finally, we decline to address whether the district
7 court properly ruled on Appellants’ forum non conveniens or
8 forum selection clause arguments. This Court may exercise
9 pendent jurisdiction to review any issue that is
10 “inextricably intertwined with a question that is the proper
11 subject of an immediate appeal, or . . . where review of a
12 jurisdictionally insufficient issue is necessary to ensure
13 meaningful review of a jurisdictionally sufficient one.”
14 LaForest v. Former Clean Air Holding Co., 376 F.3d 48, 51
15 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Two
16 rulings are “inextricably intertwined” when the “same
17 specific question” underlies both orders such that this
18 Court’s resolution of the question “will necessarily resolve
2
We express no view on the effect of a finding that
the court lacks personal jurisdiction over Pinnacle on the
court’s determination that the parties are the “same” or
“sufficiently similar” for the purposes of satisfying China
Trade’s first threshold element. See Paramedics
Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda v. GE Med. Sys. Info.
Techs., Inc., 369 F.3d 645, 652 (2d Cir. 2004).
8
1 the appeals from both orders at once.” Myers v. Hertz
2 Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 553 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
3 marks omitted).
4 While the issue of the district court’s anti-suit
5 injunction order is properly before this Court pursuant to
6 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), neither the issue of forum non
7 conveniens nor the applicability of the Singapore forum
8 selection clause involves the “same specific question” such
9 that the rulings are inextricably intertwined. Appellants’
10 argument that these issues all center on “whether New York
11 is an appropriate forum” is unpersuasive. Appellants’ Reply
12 Br. 19. Determining whether to issue an anti-suit
13 injunction involves assessing the harm caused, and the
14 jurisdictional threat imposed, by concurrent or superceding
15 proceedings in another forum. In contrast, the forum non
16 conveniens inquiry asks whether there is an adequate
17 alternative forum that would better serve the litigation.
18 And the applicability of a forum selection clause depends on
19 contract interpretation, not on harm to litigants, the
20 court, or international comity. It is not enough that
21 Appellants have shown some similarity between these issues:
22 [T]he pendent jurisdiction standard is not satisfied
23 when we are confronted with two similar, but
9
1 independent, issues, and resolution of the non-
2 appealable order would require us to conduct an inquiry
3 that is distinct from and broader than the inquiry
4 required to resolve solely the issue over which we
5 properly have appellate jurisdiction.
6
7 Myers, 624 F.3d at 553-54 (internal quotation marks
8 omitted).
9 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
10 court is hereby AFFIRMED as to Defendants-Appellants Morgan
11 Stanley Asia (Singapore) PTE, Morgan Stanley & Co.
12 International, PLC, Morgan Stanley Capital Services
13 Incorporated, and Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated. As to
14 Defendant-Appellant Pinnacle, we REMAND for the district
15 court to make personal jurisdiction findings. The
16 injunction will remain in place as to Pinnacle while the
17 district court makes these findings.
18 The motion by The Securities Industry & Financial
19 Markets Association, et al. for leave to file an amicus
20 curiae brief in support of Appellants is moot.
21
22 FOR THE COURT:
23 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
24
25
10