UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2063
ANITRA N. BOSTIC,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen,
Senior District Judge. (3:10-cv-00630-GCM-DSC)
Submitted: March 27, 2012 Decided: April 10, 2012
Before MOTZ, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charlotte Hall, CHARLES T. HALL LAW FIRM, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; Jason W. Valencia, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Boston, Massachusetts; Robert
J. Triba, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Boston, Massachusetts,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Anitra N. Bostic appeals the district court’s order
accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and
affirming the Commissioner’s denial of her application for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006). We must uphold the
decision to deny benefits if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence and the correct law was applied. 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653 (internal quotation marks
omitted). This court does not reweigh evidence or make
credibility determinations in evaluating whether a decision is
supported by substantial evidence; “[w]here conflicting evidence
allows reasonable minds to differ,” we defer to the
Commissioner’s decision. Id.
First, Bostic asserts that the administrative law
judge (“ALJ”) erred in failing to give controlling weight to the
opinion of Dr. Girmay, her primary care physician. The ALJ gave
little weight to the medical opinion of Dr. Girmay because his
opinion was inconsistent with other evidence in the record. The
ALJ concluded that the opinion of Dr. Thomason, another of
Bostic’s treating physicians, was entitled to special
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significance because it was supported by objective medical
evidence and it was consistent with other substantial evidence
in the record. The Commissioner generally gives controlling
weight to medical opinions of a treating physician, but only if
that opinion is consistent with the other evidence in the
record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). The opinions of Dr. Girmay
and Dr. Thomason do not reflect the same degree of limitation on
Bostic’s functionality and are therefore not consistent.
Further, Dr. Girmay’s conclusory determination of disability was
not supported by evidence in the record, nor was it explained by
references to any medical condition or by citation to any
medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e) (an opinion that
a claimant is disabled is not a “medical opinion”); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(3) (“The more a medical source presents relevant
evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and
laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that
opinion.”). We thus conclude that the ALJ did not err in
choosing not to give Dr. Girmay’s opinion controlling weight. *
*
Bostic also asserts error in the ALJ’s failure to consider
the opinion of Dr. Brens. Dr. Brens’ opinion is substantively
identical to that of Dr. Girmay. Further, Dr. Brens was not
Bostic’s primary physician. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
The ALJ permissibly chose not to give this opinion controlling
weight.
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Bostic next argues that the ALJ failed to accurately
assess her credibility. The ALJ determined that the medical
evidence and Bostic’s daily activities did not substantiate
Bostic’s subjective complaints of pain. When making a
disability determination, the Commissioner considers objective
medical evidence, evidence of a claimant’s daily activities,
efforts to work, a claimant’s description of pain, and any other
relevant information. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. The ALJ was
entitled to disagree with Bostic’s subjective view of her
physical limitations because the evidence in the record did not
conclusively establish that Bostic was unable to perform routine
functions, such as maintaining a household and serving as her
young daughter’s primary caregiver.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not
err in upholding the Commissioner’s denial of benefits.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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