UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-7540
WILLIE D. WORLEY, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALVIN KELLER, Secretary of Prisons; ROBERT LEWIS, Director
of Prisons; HATTIE B. PIMPONG, Chief Disciplinary Hearing
Officer; REGINALD E. MIGETTE, SR., Chairman of Inmate
Grievance Board,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:11-ct-03012-BO)
Submitted: March 22, 2012 Decided: April 11, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Willie D. Worley, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Willie D. Worley, Jr. appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his complaint and its denial of his motion to alter
judgment. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the district
court’s dismissal of Worley’s complaint and remand for further
proceedings.
Worley, a North Carolina prisoner, brought a pro se
civil complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) against certain
officials of the North Carolina Department of Corrections.
Worley’s complaint alleged that prison staff habitually falsely
charged him and other prisoners with misconduct and that the
hearings afforded by the prison were not fair and impartial. As
an aspect of the injury alleged, Worley cited the $10.00
administrative fee assessed against prisoners found guilty of
misconduct.
The district court reviewed Worley’s complaint and
dismissed it as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2006).
In its order, the court cast Worley’s complaint as a claim that
the $10.00 administrative fee is unconstitutional. Worley filed
a motion to alter judgment stating that the district court had
misunderstood the basis for his complaint. The motion, in fact,
expressly stated that “Plaintiff do[es] not dispute the
constitutionality of the Department of Correction[]s assessing a
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$10.00 administrative fee.” The district court denied the
motion.
A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be liberally
construed. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.
1978). Once construed liberally, however, a federal court must
dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time the court
determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Although not a
comprehensive definition, a suit is frivolous if it lacks an
arguable basis in law or fact. Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376 F.3d
252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2004). We review such dismissals for an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 254.
We find that the district court abused its discretion
in dismissing Worley’s suit as frivolous. To be sure, we
understand fully the inherent awkwardness faced by the district
court in examining a complaint alleging, in essence, the
existence of a pattern and practice of false allegations of
institutional violations. Nevertheless, by misstating Worley’s
claim — and failing to rectify the error in response to Worley’s
motion to alter judgment — the district court’s frivolous
determination is untenable. We therefore vacate the district
court’s dismissal and remand for further proceedings. In doing
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so, we express no view as to whether Worley’s complaint can be
sustained. We simply recognize that the claim the district
court professed to dismiss is not the claim contained in
Worley’s complaint. Worley’s motion for appointment of counsel
is denied as moot. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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