UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4947
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES ELBERT DANIELS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:11-cr-00540-RBH-1)
Submitted: April 3, 2012 Decided: April 11, 2012
Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant
United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Elbert Daniels appeals his conviction and
thirty-month sentence following a conditional guilty plea,
pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2006). On appeal, Daniels’ counsel filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there
are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether
the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress, the
adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing, and the reasonableness of the
sentence. Daniels was advised of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief but did not file one. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Daniels first questions whether the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress. In reviewing the
denial of a motion to suppress, “we review the district court’s
legal determinations de novo and its factual determinations for
clear error.” United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3374 (2010). When the district
court has denied a suppression motion, “we construe the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government.” Id.
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer
may conduct a brief investigatory stop “when the officer has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is
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afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). “In cases where an
informant’s tip supplies part of the basis for reasonable
suspicion, [the court] must ensure that the tip possesses
sufficient indicia of reliability.” United States v. Perkins,
363 F.3d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 2004). An anonymous tip can provide
a basis for reasonable suspicion if the tipster provides
substantial details and establishes a basis for his knowledge.
United States v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 318 (4th Cir. 2007).
Upon review, we conclude that the district court did not err in
finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to effect the
traffic stop, and in denying Daniels’ motion to suppress.
Next, Daniels questions whether the district court
complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting
his guilty plea. Our review of the plea hearing reveals that
the district court fully complied with Rule 11 in conducting the
plea colloquy, and thus committed no plain error in accepting
Daniels’ guilty plea. See United States v. General, 278 F.3d
389, 393 (4th Cir. 2002) (providing standard of review); United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (detailing plain error
standard).
Finally, Daniels questions whether his sentence was
procedurally and substantively reasonable. In reviewing a
sentence, we must first ensure that the district court did not
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commit any “significant procedural error,” such as failing to
properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, failing to
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or failing to
adequately explain the sentence. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Once we have determined that there is no
procedural error, we must then consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the
totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51. If the sentence
imposed is within the appropriate Sentencing Guidelines range,
we consider it presumptively reasonable. United States v.
Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). The
presumption may be rebutted by a showing “that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon review, we
conclude that the district court committed no procedural or
substantive error in sentencing Daniels to thirty months’
imprisonment, a sentence within the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines range. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577
(4th Cir. 2010) (providing standard of review); Olano, 507 U.S.
at 732.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
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requires that counsel inform Daniels, in writing, of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Daniels requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Daniels. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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