United States v. James Daniels

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4947

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

JAMES ELBERT DANIELS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:11-cr-00540-RBH-1)

Submitted: April 3, 2012 Decided: April 11, 2012

Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant
United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

James Elbert Daniels appeals his conviction and

thirty-month sentence following a conditional guilty plea,

pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

(2006). On appeal, Daniels’ counsel filed a brief pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there

are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether

the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress, the

adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing, and the reasonableness of the

sentence. Daniels was advised of his right to file a pro se

supplemental brief but did not file one. Finding no error, we

affirm.

Daniels first questions whether the district court

erred in denying his motion to suppress. In reviewing the

denial of a motion to suppress, “we review the district court’s

legal determinations de novo and its factual determinations for

clear error.” United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th

Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3374 (2010). When the district

court has denied a suppression motion, “we construe the evidence

in the light most favorable to the government.” Id.

Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer

may conduct a brief investigatory stop “when the officer has a

reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is

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afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). “In cases where an

informant’s tip supplies part of the basis for reasonable

suspicion, [the court] must ensure that the tip possesses

sufficient indicia of reliability.” United States v. Perkins,

363 F.3d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 2004). An anonymous tip can provide

a basis for reasonable suspicion if the tipster provides

substantial details and establishes a basis for his knowledge.

United States v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 318 (4th Cir. 2007).

Upon review, we conclude that the district court did not err in

finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to effect the

traffic stop, and in denying Daniels’ motion to suppress.

Next, Daniels questions whether the district court

complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting

his guilty plea. Our review of the plea hearing reveals that

the district court fully complied with Rule 11 in conducting the

plea colloquy, and thus committed no plain error in accepting

Daniels’ guilty plea. See United States v. General, 278 F.3d

389, 393 (4th Cir. 2002) (providing standard of review); United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (detailing plain error

standard).

Finally, Daniels questions whether his sentence was

procedurally and substantively reasonable. In reviewing a

sentence, we must first ensure that the district court did not

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commit any “significant procedural error,” such as failing to

properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, failing to

consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or failing to

adequately explain the sentence. Gall v. United States, 552

U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Once we have determined that there is no

procedural error, we must then consider the substantive

reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the

totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51. If the sentence

imposed is within the appropriate Sentencing Guidelines range,

we consider it presumptively reasonable. United States v.

Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). The

presumption may be rebutted by a showing “that the sentence is

unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.”

United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.

2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon review, we

conclude that the district court committed no procedural or

substantive error in sentencing Daniels to thirty months’

imprisonment, a sentence within the applicable Sentencing

Guidelines range. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577

(4th Cir. 2010) (providing standard of review); Olano, 507 U.S.

at 732.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court

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requires that counsel inform Daniels, in writing, of his right

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

review. If Daniels requests that a petition be filed, but

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Daniels. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED