UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4849
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
COREY NATHAN WALTERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:03-cr-00044-JAB-1)
Submitted: March 9, 2012 Decided: April 11, 2012
Before DAVIS, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis Carr Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Eagles Rand, United States
Attorney, Michael Francis Joseph, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Corey Nathan Walters was convicted of violating the
terms of his supervised release and was sentenced to twelve
months in prison. On appeal, Walters questions whether the
evidence supported a finding that he committed a Grade A
violation of the terms of his release and whether the sentence
is plainly unreasonable. We affirm.
We review a district court’s decision to revoke
supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir 1992). To revoke release,
the district court need only find a violation of a condition of
release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C.A. §
3583(e)(3) (West Supp. 2011). This burden “simply requires the
trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more
probable than its nonexistence.” United States v. Manigan, 592
F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We review for clear error factual findings underlying
the conclusion that a violation of supervised release occurred.
United States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003).
On May 6, 2011, a petition was filed alleging that
Walters violated the terms of his supervised release by testing
positive for cocaine on five occasions, and on March 22, 2011,
by being arrested and charged in North Carolina with possession
with intent to manufacture, sell, and/or deliver a Schedule II
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controlled substance, by being convicted in North Carolina of
misdemeanor possession of marijuana on January 20, 2011, and by
being arrested in North Carolina for a misdemeanor harassing
phone call.
Walters argues that the district court erred in
finding that he had committed a Grade A violation based on his
arrest for possession with intent to manufacture, sell, and
or/deliver a Schedule II controlled substance, seventeen
oxycodone hydrochloride pills. The Government counters that it
was not plain or clear error to find that Walters possessed
oxycodone hydrochloride with intent to distribute it, and that,
even if the court erred in making this finding, Walters’
undisputed positive drug tests for cocaine proved possession of
cocaine, which, it contends, is also a Grade A violation.
Walters admitted the violations at the revocation
hearing, with the exception of the violation concerning the
October 29, 2010 arrest for possession with intent to distribute
seventeen oxycodone hydrochloride pills. The Government argues
on appeal that Walters did not object to the district court’s
finding that he had committed a Grade A violation and therefore
the claim should be reviewed for plain error. However, as the
district court recognized, Walters specifically objected to the
ruling on the Grade A violation. Therefore we review the
district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion.
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After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude
that the district court’s finding that, more likely than not,
the seventeen oxycodone hydrochloride pills were possessed with
the intent to distribute and not simply for personal
consumption, is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
a Grade A violation and sentencing based on that provision.
As to Walters’ sentence, we hold the sentencing court
considered Walters’ sentencing arguments that his life may be
endangered in prison and his stated need for intensive drug
therapy, and that the twelve-month sentence was not plainly
unreasonable. See United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546
(4th Cir. 2010).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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