[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ JUNE 2, 2008
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 06-14191 CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00574-CV-T-24-MAP
TERMINIX INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, LP,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PALMER RANCH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
________________________
No. 06-14190
_________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00574-CV-T-24-MAP
IN RE:
TERMINIX INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, LP,
Petitioner.
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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
-------------------------------------
(June 2, 2008)
Before TJOFLAT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and MILLS,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
On remand, with our instructions to grant Terminix’s motion to compel
arbitration before it, see Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd.P’ship, 432 F.3d
1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2005) (Terminix I), the district court granted Palmer
Ranch’s motion to dismiss Terminix’s motion to compel arbitration for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Terminix appeals,1 and we reverse.
A trial court, upon receiving the mandate of an appellate court, may
not alter, amend, or examine the mandate, or give any further relief or
review, but must enter an order in strict compliance with the
mandate[,] . . . implement[ing] both the letter and the spirit of the
*
Honorable Richard Mills, United States District Court Judge for the Central District of
Illinois, sitting by designation.
1
Terminix also filed a petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
We consolidated Terminix’s petition, No. 06-14190, and appeal, No. 06-14191. The petition is
denied as moot.
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mandate, taking into account the appellate court’s opinion and the
circumstances it embraces. Although the trial court is free to address,
as a matter of first impression, those issues not disposed of on appeal,
it is bound to follow the appellate court’s holdings, both expressed
and implied.
Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1119 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added).
We are “obligated to inquire into subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte
whenever it may be lacking.” Chacon-Botero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 427 F.3d 954,
956 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Terminix
I, we noted without objection that Terminix had alleged federal subject matter
jurisdiction over its motion to compel arbitration “based on diversity of
citizenship.” Terminix I, 432 F.3d at 1329. We then held that “the decision of the
district court denying Terminix’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the
underlying state-court proceedings is reversed, and the case is remanded with
instructions to grant that motion and stay these proceedings.” Id. at 1333.
A necessary implication of our opinion in Terminix I, and therefore part of
our mandate, was that we fulfilled our obligation to consider federal subject matter
jurisdiction sua sponte. See Skillern’s Ex’rs v. May’s Ex’rs, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
267, 3 L. Ed. 220 (1810) (“It appearing that the merits of this cause had been
finally decided in this court, and that its mandate required only the execution of its
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decree, it is the opinion of this court that the circuit court is bound to carry that
decree into execution, although the jurisdiction of that court be not alleged in the
pleadings.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court was therefore
bound to deny a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction over an issue we had
expressly addressed, and comply with our mandate to grant Terminix’s motion to
compel arbitration.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court dismissing
Terminix’s motion to compel arbitration is REVERSED, and the case is
REMANDED with instructions to grant that motion and stay these proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
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