[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_____________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-11303 July 31, 2008
Non Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
_____________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-14002-CR-KMM
UNITED STATES OFAMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SHANE JOSEPH COFFINDAFFER,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________________________
(July 31, 2008)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-Appellant Shane Joseph Coffindaffer appeals his 180-month
concurrent sentences imposed for conspiring and attempting to manufacture at
least 5 but less than 50 grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. No
reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
Coffindaffer previously appealed his sentence; in that appeal, the panel
rejected Coffindaffer’s many sentencing arguments but remanded the case for
resentencing because the district court had not adequately articulated its reasons
for the given sentence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). United States v.
Coffindaffer, No. 05-13152 (11th Cir. Nov. 13, 2006) (unpub.).1 This case is back
on appeal after remand.
On appeal, Coffindaffer raises the identical arguments he raised in his
previous appeal that we already have rejected.2 Thus, the law-of-the-case doctrine
precludes us from addressing Coffindaffer’s claims.
Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the parties may not relitigate; and we
may not reconsider, issues that were decided in an earlier appeal of the same case.
1
The procedural history of this case is recited in the prior panel opinion. See id., No. 05-13152,
manuscript op. at 2, n.1.
2
These arguments include (1) whether the district court violated the Sixth Amendment by holding
Coffindaffer accountable for a higher drug quantity than that authorized by the jury’s verdict, (2)
whether the Guidelines range correctly was calculated, and (3) whether the sentencing disparity
between Coffindaffer’s sentence and that of a codefendant rendered his sentence vindictive.
2
See United States v. Jordan, 429 F.3d 1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 2005). The law-of-
the-case doctrine may be overcome when substantially different evidence is
produced, controlling authority has changed, or the prior decision was clearly
erroneous and application of it would result in manifest injustice. Jackson v. State
of Alabama State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2005). Here,
Coffindaffer does not argue that an exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine
applies and, in fact, concedes that he raised these issues in his first appeal; he also
does not argue that the district court failed to comply with the remand order. See
United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the
mandate rule obligates district courts to adhere to the dictates of the appellate
court’s opinion and not assert jurisdiction over matters that are outside the scope
of the mandate).
Accordingly, we affirm Coffindaffer’s sentence without addressing the
merits of his present appellate arguments.3
3
While Coffindaffer presently argues that his sentence is unreasonable based on the sentencing
disparity between him and his codefendant, the previous panel already addressed the disparity and
determined that it was not vindictive. See Coffindaffer, No. 05-13152, manuscript op. at 3-5. To
the extent Coffindaffer squarely has raised a reasonableness argument in this appeal, we conclude
that he has not carried his burden in showing that his 180-month sentence, which is within the
Guidelines range, is unreasonable. See United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005)
(the party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is unreasonable in the light
of both the record and the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); “ordinarily we would expect a sentence
within the Guidelines range to be reasonable”). In addition, Coffindaffer’s sentence was far less than
the 40-year statutory maximum. See United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir.
3
AFFIRMED.
2005) (comparing, as one indication of reasonableness, the actual prison term imposed against the
statutory maximum). On remand, the district court considered sufficiently the section 3553(a)
factors and arguments of the parties, including Coffindaffer’s disparity argument. See United States
v. Rita, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468-69 (2007) (a lengthy explanation is not necessarily required when a
judge decides to follow the Guidelines in a particular case, especially where a sentencing judge has
listened to the arguments of the parties, considered the supporting evidence, and was aware of the
special conditions of the defendant).
4