IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
July 28, 2008
No. 07-30024 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
DAVID MAHLER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BARON KAYLO, Warden, Avoyelles Correctional Center,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
JENNIFER W. ELROD, Circuit Judge:
David Mahler appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
petition challenging his manslaughter conviction. The district court granted
Mahler a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the State of
Louisiana violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to provide
him with certain pretrial witness statements that either contradicted or were
inconsistent with the trial testimony. Because we conclude that the State did
violate its Brady obligations, we reverse the district court’s denial of Mahler’s
writ of habeas corpus and remand with instructions to grant it.
No. 07-30024
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 30, 1997, Craig Zimmer attended the Venetian Isles Fishing
Rodeo. At about midnight, a fight broke out in which Nicholas Mahler punched
Zimmer. Later that night, Zimmer and several of his friends went to the Mahler
camp where they met not only Nicholas Mahler, but also his father, Christopher
Mahler, and his uncle, David Mahler. Shortly thereafter, Christopher Mahler
armed himself with a shotgun while David Mahler retrieved a .25 caliber pistol
from his truck. Ultimately, David Mahler shot Zimmer in the back.
After arriving at the scene, New Orleans Police Detective Beverly Gunter
learned from witnesses that the incident had involved two groups: Mahler family
members and Zimmer and his friends. Detective Daniel Wharton, Gunter’s
partner and the lead investigator of the shooting, arrived soon after and collected
evidence, directed photography of the location, and interviewed twelve
witnesses. At trial, Wharton identified pictures of the scene, the bullet retrieved
during Zimmer’s autopsy, Zimmer’s shirt with a bullet hole in the left back area,
the .25 caliber pistol that fired the fatal shot, and the shotgun confiscated from
Christopher Mahler.
Several of Zimmer’s friends testified at trial that they encountered
Nicholas Mahler, Christopher Mahler, and David Mahler upon arriving at the
Mahler camp. According to this testimony, after an exchange of words, Nicholas
Mahler punched Terrance John (T.J.) Willis, a friend of Zimmer’s, in the back of
the head and then ran behind his father, Christopher Mahler, who was armed
with a shotgun. At that point, while the shotgun was pointed at Willis, Zimmer
entered the fray and pushed the shotgun away from Willis. As Zimmer turned
away, David Mahler stepped forward and shot him in the back.
In contrast, Christopher Mahler testified that, after the punch was
thrown, Zimmer approached him, grabbed the shotgun, and attempted to wrest
it from him. It was during this struggle for the shotgun that, according to
Christopher Mahler, David Mahler shot Zimmer. David Mahler’s testimony
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No. 07-30024
corroborated his brother’s version of events. According to David Mahler, he fired
his gun in the direction where the struggle for control of the shotgun was taking
place and, thereafter, saw Zimmer on the ground.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted David Mahler of
manslaughter, and he received a sentence of twenty years in prison. After
exhausting his direct appellate remedies, he filed an application for post-
conviction relief with the state district court. The only claim at issue here is his
allegation that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by
failing to provide him with certain witness statements obtained by police
investigators. Mahler asserted that, prior to trial, he asked the prosecution to
disclose any exculpatory evidence and/or evidence favorable to his defense, but
the prosecution failed to disclose witness statements which (i) supported his
claim that he shot Zimmer in self-defense (and/or defense of others), and (ii)
could have been used to impeach the trial testimony of several prosecution
witnesses. He further asserted that several prosecution witnesses indicated in
their pretrial statements (i) that Zimmer was wrestling or struggling with
Christopher Mahler over the shotgun when the shooting occurred, and (ii) that
the scene was hostile and volatile.
David Mahler specifically pointed to pretrial statements taken from Brett
Schurr, Mark Schurr, T.J. Willis, James Amato, Brian McKean, and Damian
Burtlett, as well as to two supplemental police reports. These statements
indicate that Zimmer was either wrestling with Christopher Mahler over the
shotgun or attempting to get to Nicholas Mahler, who was standing behind
Christopher Mahler, at the time of the shooting. At trial, however, prosecution
witnesses stated that Zimmer’s interaction with Christopher Mahler had ended,
and that Zimmer was in the process of turning away from Christopher Mahler
when David Mahler shot him. David Mahler also asserted that, at trial, these
witnesses downplayed the hostile environment.
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After conducting an evidentiary hearing and reviewing the relevant parts
of the record, the state trial court denied the application for post-conviction relief
based on the following reasoning:
. . . [M]uch has been made of the idea of the presence of the
word ‘struggle’ in the pretrial preliminary statements given by
certain witnesses to the police, the word ‘struggle,’ the specific word,
and then the lack of that word during the transcripts at trial.
The question [is whether] the failure to present a statement
wherein initially someone described what they allegedly perceived
as being a struggle, and yet failed to use that word in describing
what they allegedly observed before the Jury, a violation of Brady
and the cases that follow, when what was offered at trial clearly
gave the Jury a sense that there was indeed a struggle.
I think the Jury left the room here at the end of this
proceeding clearly understanding that there was a struggle; clearly
understanding that a group of young men found themselves
continuing what originally was a minor misunderstanding, a minor
offensive action, perhaps, in the eyes of some of the parties, that
carried over.
****
. . . I think the Jury clearly understood that there was a great
deal of – of pushing, shoving, fighting, words that were said, verbal
assaults that were rendered on both sides, and physical contact
made between the parties from both sides,
I think clearly without having heard the word ‘struggle’
repeated by any of the witnesses who did testify at trial, who used
that specific word in their statements to the police, I think not
having heard that word did not cause the Jury to [fail to] conclude
that indeed a struggle or series of struggles and heated exchanges
did indeed occur.
Did the District Attorney withhold favorable evidence that
rises to a material level of importance? That’s the ultimate question
that the Court has to answer. That’s the only question the Court
has to be concerned with and is concerned with because that’s what
the law says I must be concerned with.
The law provides us with an instruction. It says that, ‘[t]he
evidence is material only if it’s reasonably probable that the result
of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been
disclosed to the Defense.’ . . .
A reasonable probability is one which is sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome of the case. And the Court is
ultimately called upon to conduct what the law requires and
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No. 07-30024
describes as a cumulative evaluation of all of the evidence and/or the
lack of evidence, including anything that was allegedly withheld,
anything that was not presented, anything that was not mentioned,
anything that was not put before the Jury.
Having attempted to do that in a fair and reasonable way, I
find that the defendant’s rights were in no way violated. I deny this
writ.
David Mahler’s state post-conviction proceedings ended when the Louisiana
Supreme Court, without setting forth supporting reasons, denied his writ
application.
Mahler then filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, wherein he
reiterated, among other claims, the same Brady arguments he made in his
application for post-conviction relief in state court. The magistrate judge issued
a report recommending denial of the petition with prejudice. Regarding the
Brady claim, the magistrate judge reviewed the state habeas trial court’s finding
that the testimony offered at trial left the unmistakable impression that a
struggle had preceded the fatal shooting and presumed the finding to be correct
as permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The magistrate judge ultimately
concluded that the suppressed pretrial statements were properly categorized as
cumulative evidence rather than as material evidence, and that, accordingly,
they did not violate Mahler’s due process rights.
Mahler objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations.
The district court overruled Mahler’s objections, adopted the report, and
dismissed his § 2254 petition with prejudice. Mahler then requested, and the
district court later granted, a certificate of appealability solely on his Brady
claim.
II. DISCUSSION
Mahler contends that the State violated his due process rights under
Brady by failing to provide him with certain pretrial witness statements that
were inconsistent with the trial testimony, and that as a result, the district court
erred in denying his § 2254 petition. Because Mahler filed his habeas petition
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No. 07-30024
after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, his petition is governed by
the procedures and the standards provided therein. Parr v. Quarterman, 472
F.3d 245, 251–52 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2974 (2007). The
AEDPA establishes a deferential scheme for use in reviewing claims in a state
prisoner’s habeas corpus application that were adjudicated on the merits in state
court proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d
481, 484–85 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining deferential scheme). Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1)–(2), a federal court may not grant habeas relief on such claims
unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.”
A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law if the state court “correctly identifies the governing legal
rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.”
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407–08 (2000). It is not enough that the state
court decision applied the law erroneously or incorrectly; rather, the application
of the principle must be “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409–11. Also, state
court factual determinations are “presumed correct absent clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The clearly established law at issue in this proceeding was first enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Under Brady,
“the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . .
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id.
at 87. This duty to provide favorable evidence includes impeachment evidence
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No. 07-30024
as well as exculpatory evidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676
(1985), and obligates the “individual prosecutor . . . to learn of any favorable
evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf . . . [,] including
the police.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). The duty applies,
moreover, even when the accused fails to specifically request such evidence.
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433;
Dickson v. Quarterman, 453 F.3d 643, 647 (5th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Dretke,
394 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, to prevail on his Brady claim, Mahler “must show that (1) the
prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence was favorable to the defense,
and (3) the evidence was material” to his guilt or punishment. Lawrence v.
Lensing, 42 F.3d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Drew v. Collins, 964 F.2d 411,
419 (5th Cir. 1992)). Of these three elements, the one at issue here, materiality,
is generally the most difficult to prove. Evidence is “material” only when there
exists “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Bagley, 473
U.S. at 682. The materiality determination is a mixed question of law and fact.
Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 878 (5th Cir. 2005).
The Supreme Court elaborated on this materiality standard in Kyles,
explaining that “[a] ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is . . . shown
when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial.’” 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678). As
such, the Court clarified, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would
more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence,” id., or
whether, “after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed
evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict.” Id. at 434–35. In
addition, the Court emphasized that the reviewing court applies the materiality
inquiry to the withheld evidence “collectively, not item by item,” id. at 436, and
that, if the evidence is material, “there is no need for further harmless-error
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review.” Id. at 435. Applying these principles to the present case, and with due
regard to the deferential standard of review required by the AEDPA, this court
holds that the state trial court unreasonably applied clearly established federal
law to the facts of Mahler’s case in determining that the witness statements at
issue were not material.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the state trial court correctly
articulated the standard for determining materiality under Brady, noting that
“‘evidence is material only if it’s reasonably probable that the result of the
proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the
Defense,’” and that “the Court is ultimately called upon to conduct what the law
requires and describes as a cumulative evaluation of all of the evidence and/or
the lack of evidence . . . .” In applying this standard, however, the state trial
court focused solely and unreasonably upon whether the trial testimony gave the
jury a sense that a “struggle” or a “series of struggles and heated exchanges” had
occurred at some point during the confrontation between the two groups. This
determination was inapposite to the question at the heart of Mahler’s
defense—namely, whether the struggle was ongoing at the time of the shooting
or whether the struggle had ended and Zimmer had turned away from Mahler
in the direction of the truck by the time the shooting occurred. Yet it is precisely
that question that several1 of the suppressed pretrial statements, in direct
contrast to the prosecution witnesses’ trial testimony, would have answered in
the negative.
Indeed, at trial Brett Schurr testified as follows:
Once [Christopher Mahler] had the gun on – on T.J. [Willis], Craig
[Zimmer] ran over there and shoved him away and as Craig was
turning back to the truck David Mahler came from behind him and
1
We agree with the State that Brian McKean’s and Damian Burtlett’s pretrial
statements, offered to support the existence of a hostile atmosphere at the time of the shooting,
are immaterial to the central question identified above; accordingly, we do not address those
statements.
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No. 07-30024
shot him in the back.
In his statement to police, however, Brett Schurr said that Zimmer was actively
wrestling with Christopher Mahler at the time of the shooting and made no
mention of Zimmer turning back to the truck:
And the man with the shotgun come up to Craig with the gun,
comin’ towards ‘im, and . . . . When Craig was wrestlin’ . . . like,
wrestlin’ with him with the gun, cause he came toward him . . . the
other man [David Mahler] came with the little black pistol and shot
him.
Q. So Craig was wrestlin’ with the guy with the shotgun?
A. The guy that approached him, was approachin’ him with it, and
Craig was tryin’ to break up the fight. And he started approachin’
Craig and then that other man jus’ came from nowhere and came
from like on the side of him. And jus’ . . . shot him.
****
And then Craigy went to break ‘em up, and the man with the
shotgun was approachin’ Craigy, and Craigy was, you know, pushin’
‘im back, like tryin’ to push him away and then the other man came
and shot him.
****
Q: So Craig was wrestlin’ with one guy and another guy came up
and shot ‘im?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Okay.
A. He was gettin’ the man off . . . tryin’ to get the man off . . . .
Mark Schurr also provided contradictory accounts of the shooting. At trial,
he provided this testimony:
And then Craigie [Zimmer] was next – Craigie was on the right. I
was on the left. I had moved around the bush already, so I am on
the left hand side, and that’s when Craigie pushed the shotgun in
the arms of Chris Mahler to get it pointed off of T.J. [Willis] and
when he pushed the gun off of him he turned and it looked like he
was headed towards his truck while he was turning. Then that’s
when Dave Mahler pointed the gun, walked up and shot Craigie.
Yet in his statement to police, Mark Schurr said that Zimmer had been walking
behind T.J. Willis toward Nicholas Mahler when the gun was fired; Mark Schurr
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No. 07-30024
never stated that Zimmer had turned around to head toward the truck prior to
the shooting:
. . . Craigy [Zimmer] and T.J. [Willis] walked towards Nicky
[Mahler] and then that’s when the man pulled out the gun . . . from
his side . . . not pulled it out, but jus’ . . . withdrew it, and shot
Craigy.
****
Q. So . . . was Craigy and uh, T.J. approachin’ [Nicholas Mahler]?
A. T.J. was approachin’ him and Craigie walked up to back . . . like
to back T.J. up, you know, to make sure that nothin’ happens to him
....
****
. . . because once that one punch was thrown, T.J. got mad, wanted
to fight [Nicholas Mahler] . . . Craigy was behind [T.J.] . . . the crowd
went forward, [David Mahler] pulled the gun and shot Craigy right
in the chest.
****
Q. Craig was approachin’ . . .
A. Craig was walking behind . . .
Q. Towards . . .
A. Like I was . . . I could’ve been shot . . .
Q. [Craig Zimmer] was walkin’ behind T.J.?
A. I was . . . on the left of T.J., Craigy was on the right of T.J.
Q. Sayin’ Craigy was walkin’ behind T.J. and T.J. was approaching
Nick?
A. T.J. was approachin’ Nick, because he jus’ got hit from Nick.
T.J. Willis likewise provided inconsistent statements regarding whether
Zimmer had turned away at the time of the shooting. In court, he testified,
“after Craig [Zimmer] pushed the gun down and away he turned to run and
David Mahler aimed the .25 caliber into his back and shot him.” But in his
earlier statement to police, Willis said that Zimmer was in the process of
confronting Nicholas Mahler when the gun fired, without any indication that
Zimmer had ever turned to run:
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No. 07-30024
. . . Craig [Zimmer] saw Nick Mahler [hit] me. So . . . he, he was
gonna confront Nick Mahler. And as he was gonna confront Nick
Mahler, his dad2 grabbed [Craig Zimmer] and shot him on the side
the uh, on shot . . . by his uh, rib area on the lungs.
Similarly, James Amato’s earlier statement to police described an ongoing
altercation at the time of the shooting; at no point did he say or imply that
Zimmer had ever turned away to run or head toward the truck:
Q. So Craig [Zimmer] wrestled with the man with the shotgun?
A. He was . . . I don’t . . . know if I’d call . . . it wrestlin’ . . . cause it,
it happened so fast. I mean . . . like, I think he was either pullin’ at
T.J. [Willis] or whatever. And [Craig Zimmer] grabbed . . . and they
grabbed the gun. As soon as I heard [Craig Zimmer] grab the gun,
I thought the shotgun went off.
****
Q. Both of ‘em [Craig Zimmer and T.J. Willis] had hold of the gun?
A. Yeah. Right.
Although Amato did not testify at trial, he could have been subpoenaed had his
statement been disclosed to the defense.
Finally, the supplemental police reports do not reflect that either Chad
Nichols or Jason Martin ever told police that Zimmer had turned away prior to
the shooting. Nevertheless, at trial Nichols testified as follows:
Q. . . . What happened once you saw Christopher Mahler with the
shotgun?
A. Well, he pointed it towards T.J. [Willis] and that’s when Craig
[Zimmer] left the side of his truck and went to go push the gun away
where he wouldn’t shoot T.J.
****
. . . after [Christopher Mahler] did that we walked towards the front
of the truck and that’s when David Mahler came and Craig was
turning away. As Craig turned, that’s when he got shot.
In addition, Martin testified at trial that:
2
In this statement, Willis mistakenly refers to David Mahler as Nicholas Mahler’s “dad”
instead of as his uncle.
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No. 07-30024
. . . [w]hen Chris [Mahler] had the shotgun on T.J. [Willis], Craig
[Zimmer] was standing in his doorway of his truck and walked over
there and stepped his self, his body in between the shotgun and T.J.
And he grabbed Christopher by the arms and shoved the shotgun
over. And at that time Craig turned his back to get away and that’s
when I – I seen the shotgun come up and it went off3 . . . .
Contrary to the state trial court’s conclusion, the withheld pretrial
statements do not merely reinforce the fact established at trial that a “struggle”
had occurred at some point before Mahler shot Zimmer.4 Rather, when
considered collectively, they suggest that Zimmer’s struggle with Christopher
Mahler for the shotgun was an ongoing event—the outcome of which remained
uncertain—when the shooting occurred. This stands in stark contrast to the
picture painted by the prosecution witnesses’ trial testimony that the struggle
had conclusively ended and Zimmer had already turned away to run or head
toward his truck before Mahler shot him. As a result, we hold that the
statements could have been used for impeachment purposes and that, given
their centrality to Mahler’s defense, there exists “a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
Factually similar Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent supports this
conclusion. In Giglio v. United States, for example, the Court reversed the
defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial under Brady because the
prosecutor failed to disclose a leniency promise to a principal witness. 405 U.S.
150, 152, 154–55 (1972). The Court noted that “[w]hen the ‘reliability of a given
3
Testing by firearms expert Officer Kenneth Leary proved conclusively that David
Mahler’s .25 caliber pistol, not Christopher Mahler’s shotgun, fired the bullet removed from
Zimmer’s body.
4
We thus reach our conclusion presuming, as we must under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), the
correctness of the state trial court’s factual finding that the trial testimony left the
unmistakable impression that a “struggle” preceded the fatal shooting. In the state habeas
proceeding, the trial court did not explicitly address whether Zimmer had turned away to head
toward his truck at the time of the shooting or whether he was still engaged in a struggle.
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No. 07-30024
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of
evidence affecting credibility falls within [the] general rule [of Brady].” Id. at
154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). The Court then
determined that because “the Government’s case depended almost entirely on
[the co-conspirator’s] testimony” and because his “credibility as a witness was
therefore an important issue in the case,” the suppression was material and “the
jury was entitled to know about it.” Id. at 154–55.
Similarly, in Kyles, the Court reversed a defendant’s conviction and
remanded for a new trial based on a Brady violation. 514 U.S. at 454. There,
the Court found it material that the prosecutor withheld statements of pivotal
witnesses and an informant (who were not called to testify) because those
statements had substantial impeachment value. Id. at 441. Given that “‘the
essence of the State’s case’ was the testimony of eyewitnesses,” the Court
observed, “[d]isclosure of the[] statements would have resulted in a markedly
weaker case for the prosecution and a markedly stronger one for the defense.”
Id.
Finally, in Graves v. Dretke, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s
denial of the petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus upon finding the materiality
standard satisfied in part because the State withheld two statements of a key
witness that were inconsistent with the witness’s trial testimony. 442 F.3d 334,
344 (5th Cir. 2006). The court emphasized that the statements were
“particularly important” given that the only physical evidence tying the
petitioner to the charged murder was inconclusive and that the State’s “case
depended on the credibility of [the witness]” and “on the jury accepting [his]
testimony.” Id. at 340–41, 344–45.
The State’s case against Mahler likewise depended on the reliability of the
very witnesses whose pretrial statements were suppressed. The parties did not
dispute that the .25 caliber pistol seized from Mahler on the night of the
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No. 07-30024
shooting fired the bullet retrieved from Zimmer’s body. Nor was the fact that
Mahler shot Zimmer in the back at issue. Rather, what the two sides contested,
and what was integral to Mahler’s defense, was whether Zimmer was still
struggling with Christopher Mahler at the time of the shooting or whether
Zimmer had stopped fighting and had turned away to head toward his truck
before he was shot.5 Given that the suppressed statements directly undermine
the prosecution witnesses’ testimony that the struggle had ended and that
Zimmer had turned toward his truck before David Mahler shot him, the jury was
entitled to know of the withheld evidence in making its credibility
determinations.
In reaching this conclusion, moreover, we note the weight placed by the
magistrate judge’s report, adopted by the district court, on the fact that the
bullet entered Zimmer’s back. Based on this physical evidence, the magistrate
judge reasoned that “regardless of exactly when a struggle took place in
proximity to when the shooting occurred, it is clear that at some point prior to
the shooting the victim had, in fact, turned away from the shooter.” Again,
however, this focus misapprehends the relevant inquiry. The pertinent point is
not whether Zimmer had turned his body away at some time before the shooting;
the pertinent point is whether, as the prosecution witnesses testified, Zimmer
had intentionally turned away as though he were headed back to his truck, or
whether, as the withheld statements indicate, he had remained engaged in a
continuing struggle when he was shot. It was the defense’s inability to make
that distinction to the jury through the suppressed impeachment evidence that
5
This is not a case, therefore, in which the nondisclosed impeachment evidence was
immaterial because corroborating evidence rendered it merely cumulative. See Kyles, 514 U.S.
at 451 (noting that “[i]t is significant . . . that the physical evidence [apart from the withheld
statements] would . . . hardly have amounted to overwhelming proof that [the defendant] was
the murderer”); cf. Dickson v. Quarterman, 462 F.3d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the
state court’s determination of immateriality regarding the prosecutor’s failure to disclose
potential impeachment evidence was not an “unreasonable application” of federal law under
the AEDPA in light of the “other probative evidence” offered at trial).
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No. 07-30024
undermines our confidence in the outcome of the case.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is REVERSED and
the case is REMANDED with instructions to GRANT the writ of habeas corpus
unless the State of Louisiana proceeds to retry Mahler within a reasonable time.
15