IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
July 8, 2008
No. 07-30607 Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 07-31128 Clerk
HEALTH NET, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
JAMES C. PERCY;
JONES, WALKER, WAECHTER, POITEVENT, CARRERE & DENEGRE,
Appellants,
v.
J. ROBERT WOOLEY,
Former Commissioner of Insurance for the State of Louisiana
in His Capacity as Liquidator of AmCare Health Plans of Louisiana, Inc.;
MARLON HARRISON,
as Receiver of AmCare Health Plans of Louisiana, Inc.;
KIM HOLLAND, Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner,
as the Receiver of AmCare Health Plans of Oklahoma, Inc.;
JEAN JOHNSON,
Special Deputy Receiver of AmCare Health Plans of Texas, Inc.,
and AmCare Management, Inc.;
JAMES J. DONELON, Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance,
as Successor-in-Interest to and in the Capacity
as Liquidator of AmCare Health Plans of Louisiana, Inc.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
After a trial in state court, Health Net, Inc. (“Health Net”), sued in federal
court to block the enforcement of the state court’s judgments. Relying on Louisi-
ana state law, Health Net alleged that the judgments were null because of im-
proper ex parte communication between the defendants and the state court
judge. The defendants argued the federal court lacked jurisdiction and that the
suit was frivolous. The district court agreed with the defendants, dismissed for
want of jurisdiction, and sanctioned Health Net’s counsel, Jones, Walker, Waech-
ter, Poitevent, Carrere, & Denegre, and James Percy, a Jones Walker partner
(collectively “Jones Walker”).
Health Net appeals the dismissal. Jones Walker appeals the sanctions.
We affirm the dismissal and vacate the sanctions.
I.
In June 2003, the Louisiana receiver of AmCare Health Care Plans of
Louisiana (“AmCare-Louisiana”), a defendant-appellee in this suit, sued Health
Net in state court to enforce a parental agreement between AmCare-Louisiana
and Health Net. The receiver alleged, inter alia, that Health Net had breached
its fiduciary duty, committed fraud, participated in a conspiracy, and deepened
AmCare-Louisiana’s insolvency. In October 2004, the respective receivers of
AmCare Health Plans of Texas and AmCare Health Plans of Oklahoma inter-
vened. Judge Clark held a trial, with the Texas claims tried to a jury and the
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Nos. 07-30607, 07-31128
Oklahoma and Louisiana claims tried to the court.
The jury returned a verdict for the Texas receiver and awarded $52.4 mil-
lion in compensatory and $65 million in exemplary damages. Clark reduced the
awards to $36.6 million and $45.5 million, respectively. She awarded the Okla-
homa receiver approximately $17.1 million in compensatory damages and the
Louisiana receiver approximately $9.5 million in compensatory damages. The
Oklahoma and Louisiana receivers unsuccessfully sought attorneys’ fees.
While preparing its appeal, Health Net discovered billing statements from
the Louisiana receiver that indicated the receiver had communicated ex parte
with Clark before, during, and after trial. Health Net alleges that the Texas and
Oklahoma receivers also communicated with her ex parte; alternatively, Health
Net contends the receivers benefited from the Louisiana receiver’s communica-
tions, because Clark approved an agreement among the three receivers to share
equally in any recovery from Health Net.
Health Net asserts that the awards granted to the Oklahoma and Louisi-
ana receivers were the result of the improper ex parte communication and that
Clark dismissed the Louisiana and Oklahoma receivers’ request for attorneys’
fees sua sponte to moot the issue and thereby thwart Health Net’s efforts to un-
cover the improper communications. Health Net contends Clark has issued oth-
er orders to prevent it from learning the content of certain ex parte communica-
tions. The receivers acknowledge that there have been ex parte communications
and the transmittal of privileged work product to Clark, but only because this
suit involves the receivership and liquidation of an insurer, and state laws and
regulations authorize, even require, such communication.
Though Health Net appealed the verdicts and awards to the Louisiana
Court of Appeal, it also sought an injunction in the federal district court declar-
ing the verdicts a nullity under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2004,
because the judgments were obtained by fraud or ill practices. Health Net filed
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Nos. 07-30607, 07-31128
the same motion, on the same day, in Clark’s court. The federal district court,
adopting a report of the magistrate judge (“MJ”), dismissed the suit, holding that
it did not have jurisdiction because Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
2006 dictates that the exclusive venue for an action brought under article 2004
is the trial court that rendered the judgment. The district court, through the
MJ’s report, also noted that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, might de-
prive it of jurisdiction.
The MJ recommended sanctioning Health Net and its counsel because it
was so obvious that article 2006 precluded this suit. She concluded that the
plaintiff had violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2)’s requirement that
its “claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing
law or for establishing new law.” The MJ recommended monetary sanctions in
the amount of the receivers’ attorneys’ fees and court costs. The district court
adopted the MJ’s report but modified it so that only Jones Walker was sanc-
tioned. The court referred the matter to the MJ to determine the receivers’ at-
torneys’ fees.
The MJ reviewed evidence of the receivers’ attorneys’ fees, adjusted the
reasonable hourly fee downward for all three receivers, and added a ten-percent
increase to the lodestar under Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), because of the undesirability of defending against this
action and the distraction from the other litigation in this case. The court adopt-
ed the MJ’s report and awarded the Texas receiver $16,360 and the Oklahoma
and Louisiana receivers together $50,737.50.
II.
We review de novo a dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Le-
Clerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 2005). Health Net claims the district
4
Nos. 07-30607, 07-31128
court erred, because it has jurisdiction over this suit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
and 1332. The district court, though briefly mentioning the federal question,
presumed diversity of citizenship and concluded that Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 2006 deprived it of jurisdiction.
A.
It is not contested that complete diversity exists among Health Net and
the defendants. Health Net attempted to invoke diversity jurisdiction to exercise
its state-law cause of action to annul a judgment obtained by fraud or ill practic-
es. The district court held that article 2006 deprived it of jurisdiction by man-
dating an exclusive venue, the trial court that rendered the judgment, for rela-
tive nullity actions1 brought under article 2004. The court supported its conclu-
sion in part by drawing a negative inference from Moviefone, Inc. v. Target Ad,
Inc., 1999 WL 319209 (E.D. La. May 19, 1999) (unpublished). There, in a one-
page order, the court concluded it had jurisdiction because the allegation was
1
Although article 2006 does not draw a distinction between “relative” and “absolute”
nullity, Louisiana jurisprudence has established an exception to article 2006 for absolutely null
judgments, see Knight v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 566 So. 2d 135, 137 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 571 So. 2d 628 (La. 1990). A judgment is an absolute nullity when there exists a vice
of form as provided exclusively in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2002. Hebert v.
Hebert, 700 So. 2d 958, 959 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997). Article 2002 provides that a final judg-
ment shall be annulled if it is rendered (1) against an incompetent person not represented as
required by law; (2) against a defendant who has not been served with process as required by
law and who has not waived objection to jurisdiction, or against whom a valid judgment by
default has not been taken; or (3) by a court which does not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2002.
A person with an interest may show an absolute nullity in a judgment in collateral pro-
ceedings at any time and before any court, because absolutely null judgments are not subject
to the venue and delay requirements provided in article 2006. Knight, 566 So. 2d at 137. A
judgment obtained by fraud or ill practices is a relatively null judgment and must be brought
in a direct action, not a collateral attack. Id. A direct action requires the party seeking the
annulment to file a petition, and the adverse party must be cited to appear, as in ordinary
suits. Id. In contrast, a collateral attack is an attempt to impeach the decree in a proceeding
not instituted for the express purpose of annulling it, that is, in another proceeding on a sepa-
rate cause of action. Id.
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Nos. 07-30607, 07-31128
that the state court proceeding was an absolute nullity, thereby exempting the
action from the article 2006 venue requirement. Id. The Moviefone court did not
address federal jurisdiction over relative nullity actions brought under article
2004 and shed no light on the instant question.
The court also relied on Dulien Steel Products, Inc. v. Connell, 252 F.2d
556, 559 (5th Cir. 1958), in which, in addressing the statutory forerunners of ar-
ticles 2004 and 2006, we held that the district court lacked subject matter juris-
diction. At the time, Louisiana law did not permit a party to seek an annulment
from the trial court if the judgment had been affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme
Court, as the judgment in Dulien had been. Id. at 558-59. Because the plaintiff
could not seek an annulment under state law, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), forbade the district court from offering such an opportunity
in federal court. Dulien, 252 F.2d at 558-59.
Louisiana law has changed since then. Article 2006 pellucidly offers the
opportunity to annul a judgment in the trial court “even though the judgment
sought to be annulled may have been affirmed on appeal, or even rendered by
the appellate court.” LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2006. Applying the Dulien rationale,
we would reach a conclusion opposite to that of the district court. Because an-
nulment is available in state court, Erie suggests the same opportunity is avail-
able in federal courts exercising their diversity jurisdiction. Whether Erie actu-
ally makes available, in federal court, the opportunity to annul a judgment for
“ill practices” depends, however, on whether article 2006 is a matter of substance
or procedure, an issue the district court did not address and need not have ad-
dressed, because the Anti-Injunction Act controls.
The district court’s reliance on Moviefone and Dulien was misplaced, and
its conclusion that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction was erroneous. In
a footnote, however, the court held that the Anti-Injunction Act also justified dis-
missal by depriving the court of jurisdiction to enjoin a state court proceeding.
6
Nos. 07-30607, 07-31128
Though the district court is incorrect that the Anti-Injunction Act deprives it of
jurisdiction,2 the act is the proper ground for dismissing Health Net’s state law
claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
“The Anti-Injunction Act generally prohibits federal courts from interfer-
ing with proceedings in state court.” Vines v. Univ. of La., 398 F.3d 700, 704 (5th
Cir. 2005) (citing § 2283). The statute states, “A court of the United States may
not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments.” § 2283. The statute is strictly construed,
and only the three exceptions contained in the text are recognized. See Atl.
Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970); Vines,
398 F.3d at 704.
Health Net seeks to have a federal court enjoin the enforcement of the
judgments rendered by the state trial court by declaring them a nullity, even
though proceedings are currently pending in the Louisiana Court of Appeal. The
federal district court is barred from issuing such an injunction unless it fits
within one of the three exceptions.3
Health Net does not invoke any of the exceptions but instead cites a myri-
ad of cases from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and tries to
find space for their continued validity in the wake of Atlantic Coast Line. Health
Net’s reliance on the old, long-superseded cases is unavailing.
In Atlantic Coast Line, the Court rejected the argument that “a federal
2
“It must be remembered that the anti-injunction act limits federal remedies without
ousting federal subject-matter jurisdiction.” 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER
& EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4469 at 82 n.19 (2d ed. 2002).
3
See also id. at 81-82 (citing § 2283) (“More complex problems are presented by efforts
to secure relief on grounds that arguably would be available in the state court. The more per-
suasive argument, and the weight of authority, are that the anti-injunction act prohibits a fed-
eral court from enjoining enforcement of a state court judgment as ‘proceedings in a State
court’ even on grounds that are available in the state court.”).
7
Nos. 07-30607, 07-31128
court may enjoin state court proceedings even if that action cannot be justified
by any of the three exceptions.” 398 U.S. at 286-87. The Court held, instead,
that the Anti-Injunction Act “is an absolute prohibition against enjoining state
court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of three specifically de-
fined exceptions.” Id. at 286. “Proceedings in state courts should normally be
allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal courts, with
relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and ultimately this
Court.” Id. at 287. Though the district court had jurisdiction over Health Net’s
state-law claim under § 1332, article 2004 does not fall within the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act’s three exceptions, so the act mandates the dismissal of Health Net’s
state law claim under rule 12(b)(6).
B.
Health Net avers in its complaint that the ex parte communication be-
tween the court and state-appointed receivers deprived it of its Fourteenth
Amendment due process right to a fair trial. Although the complaint does not
cite § 1983, the allegation of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is suffi-
cient to raise a federal question. The district court has subject-matter juris-
diction over Health Net’s § 1983 claim under § 1331, and the Anti-Injunction Act
does not mandate its dismissal.4
The defendants contend that even if the court had federal question juris-
diction over Health Net’s claim, the doctrines of Younger and Burford abstention
require the court to decline to exercise it. Although Younger abstention origin-
ally applied only to criminal prosecutions, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), following Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1987), it also ap-
plies “when certain civil proceedings are pending, if the State’s interests in the
4
See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972) (holding that § 1983 falls within
the “expressly authorized” exception of § 2283).
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Nos. 07-30607, 07-31128
proceeding are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power would dis-
regard the comity between the States and the National Government.” In Pennz-
oil, Texaco filed a § 1983 suit claiming Texas’s post-judgment proceedings violat-
ed its constitutional rights. Texaco argued that Younger abstention did not ap-
ply because the district court’s jurisdiction did not implicate an important state
interest. The Court disagreed, holding that “[s]tates have important interests
in administering certain aspects of their judicial systems,” including “enforcing
the orders and judgments of their courts.” Id. at 12-13.
Health Net, like Texaco, has filed a § 1983 claim implicating Louisiana’s
post-judgment proceedings, namely, the appellate process and the trial court’s
authority to annul a judgment obtained through fraud or ill practices. Addition-
ally, to the extent that the ex parte communications were permitted under state
insurance receiver laws and regulations,5 Health Net has averred that Louisi-
ana’s insurance receivership statutes violate due process. Thus, Health Net’s
claims implicate important state interests similar to those in Pennzoil, suggest-
ing that the district court ought to abstain.
Younger abstention also allows federal courts to avoid interpreting state
laws that would result in the “unwarranted determination of federal constitu-
5
Louisiana’s receivership and liquidation statutes grant the insurance commissioner
and/or a receiver broad powers. Only the approval of the court is necessary to exercise many
of those powers, creating situations in which the commission or receiver would seek the court’s
approval ex parte. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:737 (granting the insurance commission-
er, upon approval of the court, broad authority to, inter alia, “sell or otherwise dispose of the
real and personal property, or any part thereof, and sell or compromise all doubtful or uncol-
lectible debts or claims . . . .”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:740 (granting the commissioner author-
ity, with the court’s approval, to borrow money to facilitate the “rehabilitation, liquidation,
conservation, or dissolution” of the insurer; additionally, the commissioner is authorized, sub-
ject to the approval of the court, “to take any and all other action necessary and proper to con-
summate any such loans and to provide for the repayment thereof”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:750 (authorizing the commissioner to make a report to the court setting forth the value
of the assets of the insurer, the insurer’s probable liabilities, and probable assessments neces-
sary to pay all claims and expenses). We leave it to the Louisiana courts to decide whether the
alleged ex parte communication was appropriate or whether it may have affected Health Net’s
due process rights.
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Nos. 07-30607, 07-31128
tional questions.” Id. at 11. This is important, because the federal court’s inter-
pretation of state law “‘is not binding on state courts and may be discredited at
any timeSSthus essentially rendering the federal-court decision advisory and the
litigation underlying it meaningless.’” Id. (quoting Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
428 (1979)). This second rationale is especially important where the state pro-
vides a forum for the claim and might be able to resolve the issue on state law
grounds, thereby avoiding the federal constitutional issues. See id. at 11-12.
Applying this principle, the Court concluded in Pennzoil that Texas ought to
have the opportunity to resolve any federal questions implicated by its post-judg-
ment proceedings; thus, “so long as those challenges relate to pending state
proceedings, proper respect for the ability of state courts to resolve federal ques-
tions presented in state-court litigation mandates that the federal court stay its
hand.” Id. at 14.
Similarly, Health Net’s claim implicates the constitutionality of Louisi-
ana’s insurance receivership regulations. Louisiana offers a forum for Health
Net’s challenge and ought to have the opportunity to interpret its liquidation
and receivership laws to determine whether they infringe on the right to a fair
trial by necessitating ex parte communication. Louisiana should have the chance
to interpret those requirements so as to avoid the constitutional question. For
these reasons, the doctrine of Younger abstention directs the federal district
court to abstain from exercising its federal question jurisdiction and allow
Health Net to pursue its claim in the state courts.
Burford abstention,6 on the other hand, is appropriate in two circumstanc-
es: first, when a case involves “difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result
in the particular case at bar,” and second, when “the exercise of federal jurisdic-
6
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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Nos. 07-30607, 07-31128
tion over the question in the case would disrupt state efforts to establish a co-
herent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.” Barnhardt
Marine Ins., Inc. v. New England Int’l Surety of Am., Inc., 961 F.2d 529, 531 (5th
Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). This doctrine has typically been applied
where a suit for money damages is filed against an insurance company in receiv-
ership, on the ground that states have primary responsibility for regulating the
insurance industry and have comprehensive receivership and liquidation regula-
tions.7
In Munich American Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 589-90
& n.2, (5th Cir. 1998), we recognized that for Burford abstention to apply, even
in these typical cases, Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716-
18 (1996), requires that the court have discretion to grant or deny relief. Thus,
in Crawford, 141 F.3d at 590, we held that the court erred in exercising Burford
abstention because it did not have discretion under the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”) to deny the appellants their right to an order compelling arbitration.
Nonetheless, we concluded that the Oklahoma Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act
reverse pre-empted the FAA under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, because the Ok-
lahoma laws were enacted to regulate the business of insurance, and the FAA
impaired those laws. Id. at 590, 594-95.
Quackenbush does not preclude Burford abstention in this case, because
it is left to the sound discretion of the trial court whether to annul a judgment
for ill practices. See State v. Batchelor, 597 So. 2d 1132, 1135 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 604 So. 2d 964 (La. 1992). And although the instant matter is not
the typical insurance case in which we apply Burford abstentionSSbecause
7
See Barnhardt, 961 F.2d at 531; Martin Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Prudential Reins. Co., 910
F.2d 249, 254-55 (5th Cir. 1990) (listing examples of the typical case); Brown v. Link Belt Div.
of FMC Corp., 666 F.2d 110, 112, 115 (5th Cir. 1982); Anshutz v. J. Ray McDermott Co., 642
F.2d 94, 95 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) (per curiam).
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Nos. 07-30607, 07-31128
Health Net is not seeking a money judgment against the receiversSSthis case
does involve Louisiana’s comprehensive receivership and liquidation scheme,
and we have previously held that Burford abstention is appropriate where that
scheme is at issue. See Barnhardt Marine, 961 F.2d at 531.
The rehabilitation or liquidation of insolvent insurers is a matter of public
concern, and Louisiana has created a coherent policy to address this situation.
This policy grants the insurance commissioner and overseeing court broad pow-
ers that could entail ex parte communication between the two. The involvement
of the federal courts in this process would needlessly disrupt Louisiana’s treat-
ment of insolvent insurers, especially where there is a state forum available to
hear Health Net’s claim.
Though Younger and Burford abstention do not normally both apply, they
do in this case: Younger abstention, because the federal courts should not inter-
fere with the important interest Louisiana has in effecting its system of review-
ing judgments, on appeal and through nullity actions, as in Pennzoil; and Bur-
ford abstention, because the receivership of an insurer is an area of law left for
the states to establish a coherent policy. The district court should have recog-
nized it had jurisdiction but then should have abstained from exercising that
jurisdiction.
III.
The district court imposed rule 11 sanctions on Jones Walker for filing its
nullity suit in federal court “when the relevant statutory law and jurisprudence
clearly reflects that the action should have been filed in the state trial court.”
We review rule 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion and factual findings for clear
error. Whitehead v. Food Max, Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(internal citations omitted).
Rule 11 permits sanctions against a party that signs a pleading that is not
12
Nos. 07-30607, 07-31128
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for its extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal or the creation of new law. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2), (c). Rule 11
also permits sanctions where the factual allegations are unsupported or are not
likely to be supported after a reasonable opportunity for further discovery. Id.
The signing attorney has a duty of reasonable inquiry, but his signature is not
a guarantee of the correctness of the legal theories argued, City of El Paso, Tex.
v. City of Socorro, Tex., 917 F.2d 7, 8 (5th Cir. 1990), nor is it a guarantee of all
alleged facts, especially if the matter is not easily discovered by extrinsic evi-
dence, see Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 960 F.2d 439, 446 (5th Cir.
1992).
The sufficiency of Jones Walker’s factual inquiry is not at issue; rather, the
court found its legal inquiry deficient and sanctioned it because it “ignore[d] a
mandatory venue provision under state law that has been applied consistently
in Louisiana and Fifth Circuit jurisprudence.” We disagree with the precedent
on which the district court relied, and we conclude that although that court had
jurisdiction, but, as we have explained, it ought to have abstained from exer-
cising that jurisdiction.
We cannot affirm rule 11 sanctions for deficient legal inquiry and reason-
ing where the district court was incorrect. Jones Walker made colorable argu-
ments regarding Burford abstention; it was not frivolous to suggest that Health
Net’s defensive action could be distinguished from the typical suit in which Bur-
ford abstention applies, where there is a claim against the receiver for assets.
Jones Walker’s argument to the district court, that Younger abstention did not
apply because Health Net had not raised a constitutional claim, contradicts its
assertion to this court that it did raise a § 1983 claim. Nonetheless, Jones Wal-
ker argued persuasively that Younger abstention cannot apply in the absence of
a constitutional challenge, citing, among others, precedent from a sister circuit,
see Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2002).
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Nos. 07-30607, 07-31128
With respect to the Anti-Injunction Act, Jones Walker asserted that the
act only “limits the ability of federal courts to grant equitable relief based on
federal law.” It cites no authority. Still, a leading treatise acknowledges that it
is a “[m]ore complex problem” where, as here, relief that is available in state
court is sought from a federal court, and that it is not conclusive that the Anti-
Injunction Act applies, although the “more persuasive argument, and the weight
of the authority,” is that it does apply. 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, supra, §4469. Jones Walker’s argument is not
sanctionable.
In the end, the district court sanctioned Jones Walker for not coming to
the same erroneous conclusion that the court reached. It is true that Jones Wal-
ker’s support for not applying article 2006SSone unpublished district court opin-
ionSSwas flimsy, but the district court’s support for applying article 2006 was al-
so unpersuasive. The other arguments presented by Jones Walker were not so
bad as to justify sanctions. Because the court relied on its own erroneous view
of the law to sanction Jones Walker, it abused its discretion.
In summary, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Health Net’s state law claim,
because the Anti-Injunction Act bars action by the federal courts with respect to
that claim. We AFFIRM the dismissal of Health Net’s federal claim, because it
is proper to abstain in this case, and we VACATE the sanctions imposed.
14