NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 18 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JEHAN ZEB MIR, M.D., No. 20-56403
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-03960-SVW-SK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 15, 2022**
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Jehan Zeb Mir, M.D., appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his action alleging federal and state law claims stemming from denial
of Mir’s insurance claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2003). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Mir’s claims for
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing because Mir’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations,
and Mir failed to establish any basis for tolling. See Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2(i)(2)
(“Any arbitration instituted pursuant to this section shall be concluded . . . [w]ithin
five years from the institution of the arbitration proceeding.”); id. § 11580.2(k)
(providing for tolling if the insurer fails to provide written notice of the applicable
statute of limitations “at least 30 days before the expiration”); see also id.
§ 11580.2(i)(3) (excusing a party’s noncompliance with the statute of limitations
on the basis of estoppel, waiver, impossibility, impracticality, and futility).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mir’s motion for
reconsideration because Mir failed to establish any basis for such relief. See Sch.
Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th
Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendant’s
application to quash the deposition subpoena of Rosenwasser because Mir failed to
demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
342 F.3d 1080, 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that a district court’s “decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed
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except upon the clearest showing that the denial of discovery results in actual and
substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
We reject as without merit Mir’s contention that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction or that the September 24, 2012 letter was fabricated.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Mir’s motion for judicial notice is denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
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