NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 28 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 21-10089
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:19-cr-00141-KJM-1
v.
ADAM JUSTIN FULLER, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kimberly J. Mueller, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 7, 2022
San Francisco, California
Before: HURWITZ and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and ERICKSEN,** District
Judge.
Adam Fuller is charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b) by
allegedly striking a federal Court Security Officer at the United States Courthouse
in Sacramento, California. The district court found that Fuller’s schizophrenia
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
renders him incompetent to stand trial. The court subsequently issued an order
authorizing the government to administer medication—against Fuller’s will, if
necessary—to restore his competency. Fuller appeals that order.
We have jurisdiction to review an order for involuntary medication under the
collateral order exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. United States v. Onuoha, 820 F.3d
1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2016); Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003). The
only issue in this appeal is whether the government has shown “important
governmental interests” in prosecuting this case, as required for an order of
involuntary medication to restore trial competency. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. This
issue is “primarily a legal question,” so we review the district court’s order de
novo. United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 693 (9th Cir. 2010). We
affirm.
Fuller first argues that the district court overstated the importance of the
government’s interests by misjudging the seriousness of the alleged offense. We
use the length of a sentence the defendant likely would face under the federal
Sentencing Guidelines as the “starting point” for analyzing whether a crime is
sufficiently serious to give rise to important government interests in prosecution,
and then consider other relevant factors. United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513
F.3d 908, 919 (9th Cir. 2008); Onuoha, 820 F.3d at 1055 (observing that relevant
considerations include “the specific facts of the alleged crime as well as the
2
defendant’s criminal history”).1 The parties agree that the most likely Guidelines
range is 30 to 37 months. In Onuoha, we held that an alleged offense was
sufficiently serious for a strong governmental interest in prosecution even though
the likely Guidelines range was only 27 to 33 months. 820 F.3d at 1055. As in
that case, the alleged conduct here threatened “the basic human need for security.”
Id. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 180). And by prosecuting an assault on a federal
employee, the government seeks to protect “the very integrity of our system of
government.” See United States v. Gillenwater, 749 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir.
2014) (recognizing an important governmental interest in prosecuting threats of
violence against federal officials and employees). Although the district court
misstated the likely Guidelines range in its written order, it noted the correct range
during the hearing, and we agree with its conclusion that the seriousness of the
alleged crime supported an important governmental interest in prosecution.
Second, Fuller argues that the government lacks sufficiently important
interests in prosecution because, according to Fuller, a conviction has little value
where the public already understands that assault is a crime, and where the
defendant’s indictment has been publicized. We reject this argument. We never
1
We adopted this approach in 2008, after the Sentencing Guidelines already
had become merely advisory. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d at 919. Despite their
advisory nature, we recognized that the likely Guidelines range is the “best
available predictor” of the length of a defendant’s incarceration—albeit “not,
however, the only factor that should be considered.” Id.
3
have suggested that the government has an important interest in general deterrence
only where the alleged offense is poorly understood. The government maintains an
interest in showing that a serious crime “will result predictably in conviction and a
serious penalty of incarceration.” Onuoha, 820 F.3d at 1055 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the government’s interests in securing a conviction extend beyond any
general deterrence that an indictment already may have achieved. For example, a
conviction and resulting sentence could incapacitate Fuller from assaulting
government officers in the future. See id. at 1056.
Third, Fuller contends that the length of his pretrial confinement is a special
circumstance that erodes the government’s interest in continuing to prosecute this
case. Where a defendant already has been confined for a significant period of time
that would be credited toward any sentence ultimately imposed, this fact “affects,
but does not totally undermine, the strength of the need for prosecution.” Sell, 539
U.S. at 180. Fuller has now been in custody for more than 29 months. If we
affirm the district court’s order, by the time criminal proceedings resume Fuller
will have been in custody for a duration that already falls within the likely
Guidelines range. But the government also has an interest in securing a conviction
in order to obtain a term of supervised release, which could help prevent Fuller
from continuing to assault public employees. Onuoha, 820 F.3d at 1056 (noting
that the possibility of supervised release preserved governmental interests in
4
prosecution even where the defendant already had served more time than the lower
end of the likely Guidelines range); Gillenwater, 749 F.3d at 1101–02. Fuller’s
pretrial custody has not eliminated the government’s important interests in
prosecuting him.
Fourth, Fuller argues that the district court improperly considered Fuller’s
possible dangerousness when considering whether involuntary medication was
appropriate under Sell. We have stressed that district courts should “take care to
separate” their analysis of whether involuntary medication is justified to restore
trial competency from their analysis of whether involuntary medication is justified
to reduce dangerousness. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d at 919. But here, the
district court properly noted that prosecution—rather than medication per se—
could reduce the chance of a repeat offense related to Fuller’s mental disorder, and
expressly stated that it considered Fuller’s possible general dangerousness
irrelevant to the Sell analysis.
Fifth, Fuller argues that the district court inadequately considered the
possibility that he will face civil commitment if the charges against him are
dismissed. Potential civil commitment can reduce the government’s interests in
prosecution. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. But Fuller never requested an evaluation of his
eligibility for civil commitment. The evidence in the record did not support a
finding that civil commitment was likely, and in that situation the district court had
5
no obligation to speculate about the possibility of civil commitment. See
Gillenwater, 749 F.3d at 1101. The district court correctly concluded that the
hypothetical possibility of civil commitment did not diminish the government’s
interests in prosecution.
We are mindful that orders to involuntarily medicate a defendant in order to
attain competency to stand trial are “disfavored” and should be granted “only in
rare circumstances.” Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 687–88. But the government has
established important interests in prosecuting this case, and no special
circumstances negate those interests. We affirm the district court’s order.
AFFIRMED.
6