Appellate Case: 21-6088 Document: 010110652219 Date Filed: 03/03/2022 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 3, 2022
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 21-6088
(D.C. No. 5:10-CR-00053-PRW-1)
JASON CHRISTOPHER LUJAN, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, KELLY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.**
_________________________________
Defendant-Appellant Jason Christopher Lujan, a federal inmate, appeals from
the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Lujan, No. CR-10-00053, 2021 WL 3204492
(W.D. Okla. July 28, 2021). On appeal, Mr. Lujan challenges the district court’s
conclusion that the waiver contained in his plea agreement is enforceable. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellate Case: 21-6088 Document: 010110652219 Date Filed: 03/03/2022 Page: 2
Background
In June 2010, Mr. Lujan pled guilty to a two-count superseding information
charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm and conspiracy to
distribute a controlled substance. 1 R. 44–54. Mr. Lujan’s plea agreement contained
the following waiver: “[D]efendant . . . knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to
. . . [a]ppeal, collaterally challenge, or move to modify under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
or some other ground, his sentence as imposed by the Court . . . provided the
sentence is within or below the advisory guideline range . . . .” 1 R. 51–52. In
January 2011, the court sentenced Mr. Lujan within the guideline range to 324
months’ imprisonment with each count to be served concurrently. 1 R. 122–23.
In August 2019, Mr. Lujan filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to
§ 3582(c)(2). 1 R. 136. Mr. Lujan argued that his sentence should be reduced based
on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which applies retroactively and
reduces the base offense levels assigned to drug quantities under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. 1
R. 136. The government opposed the motion, conceding that Mr. Lujan was eligible
for a sentence reduction but arguing that the court must enforce the appeal waiver in
his plea agreement. 1 R. 138–52. The district court enforced the waiver and denied
the motion. Lujan, 2021 WL 3204492, at *1.
Discussion
We review de novo whether a defendant’s appeal waiver as stated in his plea
agreement is enforceable. United States v. Lonjose, 663 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir.
2011). This court uses the following three-factor test to determine an appeal waiver’s
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enforceability: “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver
of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage
of justice.” United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(per curiam). A miscarriage of justice results only in situations where: (1) the
sentencing court “relied on an impermissible factor”; (2) “ineffective assistance of
counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid”;
(3) “the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum”; or (4) “the waiver is otherwise
unlawful.” Id. at 1327 (quoting United States v. Elliot, 264 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th
Cir. 2001)). A waiver is “otherwise unlawful” where it “seriously affect[s] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
On appeal, Mr. Lujan argues that to enforce his waiver would result in a
miscarriage of justice. Aplt. Br. at 4. Mr. Lujan claims that the waiver is “otherwise
unlawful” because it “prevent[s] [him] from pursuing a statutory right consistent with
the Sentencing Commission’s goals of achieving consistency and uniformity.” Aplt.
Br. at 6. However, our precedent squarely rejects this argument, and one panel may
not overrule another. This court has enforced a nearly identical waiver in the context
of a § 3582(c)(2) motion based on Amendment 782. United States v. Amado, 841
F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 2016). “[A] defendant’s waiver of the legal consequences of
unknown future events are commonplace and enforceable. . . . To rule otherwise
would make Defendant’s promise not to seek relief under § 3582(c)(2) purely
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illusory.” Id. The district court correctly concluded that Mr. Lujan’s appeal waiver
is enforceable.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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