Filed 3/4/22 P. v. Toro CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E075818
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1804068)
BRYAN CARRANZA TORO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark Mandio, Judge.
Affirmed with directions.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Britton B.
Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Bryan Carranza Toro of infliction of
corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition. (Pen. Code,1 § 273.5, subd. (a).)
The trial court placed him on felony probation for a period of three years.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) his term of probation should be reduced to
two years pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1950 (Assem. Bill 1950); and (2) the
probation condition requiring him to report any law enforcement contacts within 48
hours is constitutionally vague and overbroad. We agree that the probation condition
is vague and overbroad and remand the matter for modification consistent with this
opinion. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
Defendant and his ex-girlfriend (the victim) went to the fair, and after they
returned, got into an argument. During the argument, defendant punched the victim in
the face, causing her nose to bleed and swell.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant’s Offense is Exempted from Assembly Bill 1950
Defendant contends his probation term should be reduced from three years to
two years under Assembly Bill 1950, which he argues applies retroactively to him.
1 All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2 Because the facts of the offense are not relevant to the issues on appeal, we
will only provide a brief recitation of the facts.
2
The People do not dispute the retroactive applicability of Assembly Bill 1950 but
contend that defendant is not entitled to its benefits since his crime had a specified
probation term. We agree with the parties that Assembly Bill No. 1950 operates
retroactively here. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-745.) We also agree with
the People and conclude that defendant is exempt from Assembly Bill No. 1950’s
ameliorative benefits.
Assembly Bill No. 1950 amended section 1203.1 to restrict the length of most
probation terms. (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, §§ 1 & 2.) Effective January 1, 2021, felony
probation terms are generally limited to two years. (§ 1203.1, subd. (a); People v
Saxton (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 428, 431 (Saxton).) Exempt from this limit are offenses
that “include[ ] specific probation lengths within its provisions.” (§ 1203.1,
subd. (l)(1); see Saxton, at p. 431.) Whether defendant’s case falls within this
exemption in 1203.1, subdivision (l)(1), presents an issue of statutory interpretation for
our independent review. (Saxton, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 431.) “As with any
issue of statutory interpretation, ‘[o]ur fundamental task is to ascertain the
Legislature’s intent when it enacted’ Assembly Bill 1950. [Citation.] ‘We begin with
[Assembly Bill 1950’s] words, giving them their plain, commonsense meanings.’
[Citation.] ‘We construe the words in context of related statutes, harmonizing them
whenever possible.’ [Citation.] ‘We presume the Legislature “was aware of existing
related laws” when it enacted [Assembly Bill 1950], and that it “intended to maintain a
consistent body of rules.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 432.)
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Here, defendant was convicted of violating section 273.5 (inflicting corporal
injury). Section 1203.1, subdivision (a), provides that felony probation terms are
generally limited to two years unless the offense contains “specific probation lengths
within its provisions.” (§§ 1203.1, subds. (a) & (l)(1).) Section 273.5 provides that
“[i]f probation is granted to any person convicted under subdivision (a), the court shall
impose probation consistent with the provisions of Section 1203.097.” (§ 273.5, subd.
(g).) Section 1203.097, in turn, provides that “[i]f a person is granted probation for a
crime in which the victim is a person defined in Section 6211 of the Family Code, the
terms of probation shall include . . . [¶] (1) A minimum period of probation of 36
months, which may include a period of summary probation as appropriate.”
(§ 1203.097, subd. (a)(1).) Section 6211, subdivision (c), includes: “A person with
whom the respondent is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship.”
Defendant specifically contends his probation term should be reduced to two
years because section 273.5 does not specify a longer period of probation within its
provisions, but instead “refers to another statute that does.” The People argue that a
violation of section 273.5 is a crime with specific probation lengths, and therefore
defendant is exempted from Assembly Bill 1950’s probation term reduction. Giving
the words of the statutes their plain, commonsense meanings (Saxton, supra, 68
Cal.App.5th at p. 432), we agree with the People that defendant’s conviction and grant
of probation for inflicting corporal injury on his ex-girlfriend meant he was “granted
probation for a crime in which the victim is a person defined in Section 6211 of the
Family Code.” (§ 1203.097, subd. (a).) Therefore, under the mandates of section
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1203.097, which section 273.5 incorporates, his probation must be a minimum of three
years. (§§ 1203.97, subd. (a)(1) & 1203.1, subd. (l)(1).)
II. The Probation Term at Issue is Vague and Overbroad
The trial court imposed the following probation term: “Report any law
enforcement contacts to the Probation Officer within 48 hours.” Defendant contends
that this probation condition is unconstitutionally vague because it “fails to put [him]
on notice of what events he must report to his probation officer.” He also argues the
condition is overbroad because it burdens his right to free association and “does not
delineate between casual contact unrelated to criminality, and contact warranting some
further investigation by a probation officer.”3 The People agree that the condition is
facially unconstitutional as written and should be modified to sufficiently inform
defendant of what type of contact requires reporting. We agree.
“[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of
‘fair warning.’ [Citation.] The rule of fair warning consists of ‘the due process
concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to
potential offenders.’ ” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) “A probation
condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of
him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to
3 Defendant recognizes that since defense counsel made no objection to this
probation condition, he forfeited any challenge under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d
481, 486. However, he did not forfeit his claims on appeal since they are facial
constitutional challenges that do not require scrutiny of the individual facts and
circumstances of his case. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887-889
(Sheena K).)
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withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness. [Citation.] A probation condition
that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those
limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as
unconstitutionally overbroad.” (Ibid.)
In People v. Relkin (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188 (Relkin), the court considered a
condition of mandatory supervision that required the defendant “to ‘report to the
probation officer, no later than the next working day, any arrests or any contacts with
or incidents involving any peace officer.’ ” (Id. at p. 1196.) The defendant argued that
the phrases “ ‘contacts with’ and ‘incidents involving’ peace officers are uncertain
because one cannot determine whether those terms include occasional conversation[s]
with a police officer who lives down the street, answering an officer’s questions as a
witness to a crime, or participation in a demonstration where officers are present.” (Id.
at pp. 1196–1197.) The defendant also contended that “the condition is vague because
it is subject to the ‘ “whim of any police or probation officer,” ’ and unconstitutionally
infringes on his rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.”
(Id. at p. 1197.)
The court in Relkin concluded that the condition was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad, in part. It explained that “the portion of the condition requiring that
defendant report ‘any contacts with . . . any peace officer’ is vague and overbroad and
does indeed leave one to guess what sorts of events and interactions qualify as
reportable.” (Relkin, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1197.) The court disagreed with the
People’s argument that the condition “[was] clearly not triggered when defendant says
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‘hello’ to a police officer or attends an event at which police officers are present, but
would be triggered if defendant were interviewed as a witness to a crime or if his
‘lifestyle were such that he is present when criminal activity occurs.’ ” (Ibid.) The
court held that, “[t]he language does not delineate between such occurrences and thus
casts an excessively broad net over what would otherwise be activity not worthy of
reporting.” (Ibid.) The court thus remanded the matter to the trial court with
directions to modify the condition to address the concerns expressed. (Id. at p. 1198.)
Here, the court ordered defendant to “report any law enforcement contacts to
the Probation Officer within 48 hours.” This probation condition, like the one in
Relkin, is vague and overbroad because it fails to put defendant on notice of what
interactions he needs to report and does not delineate between casual contact with
officers and contact involving criminal activity. (Relkin, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1197.) The probation condition should specify the type of law enforcement contacts
that must be reported—for example, those in which defendant “is questioned by law
enforcement officers and is required to give identifying information, such as when he
has been a witness to a crime or is suspected of possible involvement in a crime.”
(People v. Brand (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 861, 871.)
Because it is unclear in this case what contacts require reporting, we conclude
the condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and we will remand the
matter for the trial court to make appropriate modifications.
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DISPOSITION
We remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to modify the
probation condition that requires defendant to “report any law enforcement contacts to
the Probation Officer within 48 hours” to address the concerns expressed in this
opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
McKINSTER
J.
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