IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JOSHUA GAGE and SARAH GAGE, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
) C.A. No. N19C-10-268 CLS
TOM NYAGAKA NYABIOSI, )
TRINITY FREIGHT LOGISTICS, )
INC. and PENSKE TRUCK LEASING )
CO., L.P., )
)
Defendants. )
Date Submitted: January 11, 2022
Date Decided: March 2, 2022
Upon Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification. DENIED.
ORDER
Jimmy Chong, Esquire, Chong Law Firm, Wilmington, Delaware, 19808, Attorney
for Plaintiffs, Joshua and Sarah Gage.
Daniel P. Bennett, Esquire, Mintzer, Sarowitz, Zeris, Ledva & Meyers, LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware, 19801, Attorney for Defendants Tom Nyagaka Nyabiosi,
Trinity Freight Logistics, Inc., and Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.
SCOTT, J.
1
Dear Counsel:
The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ Joshua and Sarah Gage’s Motion for
Reconsideration/Clarification and Defendants Tom Nyagaka Nyabiosi, Trinity
Freight Logistics, Inc., and Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.’s (“Defendants”)
Opposition thereto. For the reasons stated herein, the Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED.
On October 31, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the original Complaint seeking damages
for an automobile accident between Mr. Nyabiosi and Mr. and Ms. Gage. Mr.
Nyabiosi was driving a company commercial vehicle for his employer, Trinity, who
rented the commercial vehicle from Penske. Count I of the complaint was
Negligence claim, Count II was Loss of Consortium, Count III was Negligent
Entrustment, and Count IV was Vicarious Liability/Respondent Superior.
On July 26, 2021, Plaintiffs moved to amend the Complaint to add new counts
stemming from the original cause of action due to additional evidence retained
through discovery relating to Mr. Nyabiosi’s “competency and fitness to be a
commercial driver” and Trinity’s hiring and employment practices. Defendants
opposed the amendment on ground it would unfairly prejudice the defendants as they
would have to defend “baseless” allegations. The Court denied the Motion to
Amend without prejudice on August 16, 2021.
2
On November 30, 2021, Plaintiffs moved to amend the Complaint again to
include a cause of action for recklessness and negligence per se in Count I, expand
Count III to include claims for negligent hiring and retention – which is already
contained within the original complaint, with a demand for punitive damages for
claims in Counts I, III, and IV. Plaintiffs’ reasoning for amendment primarily rested,
again, on additional evidence retained through discovery relating to Mr. Nyabiosi’s
“competency and fitness to be a commercial driver” and Trinity’s hiring and
employment practices. The Court reviewed the Motion to Amend and Defendants’
opposition and denied the Motion to Amend on December 9, 2021.
In a Motion to Amend, Superior Court Civil Procedure Rule 15(a) states that,
after responsive pleadings are filed, a party may amend a party's pleading “only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires.”1 Therefore, the trial court has broad discretion in
permitting or refusing an amendment to a complaint. Generally, absent a showing
of substantial prejudice or legal insufficiency, the court “must exercise its discretion
in favor of granting leave to amend.”2
1
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 15(a).
2
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2008 WL 555919, at *1
(Del.Super.Feb.29, 2008).
Several factors the court can consider in determining whether to permit
amendments to pleadings are: [T]he legal sufficiency of an order concerning an
amendment if obvious on the face of the pleading; whether the proposed claim is
3
Additionally, the proposed amendment must be legally sufficient, meaning,
that it must survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).3 Therefore, “all the
allegations in the amended complaint must be accepted as true, and the proposed
amendment will not be dismissed unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover
under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.”
In Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend, punitive damages would be a valid remedy if
Plaintiffs alleged a prima facie case that Mr. Nyabiosi driving exhibited willful and
wanton disregard of others' safety.4 Inadvertence, mistake, or errors of judgment are
considered acts of mere negligence and do not rise to the level required for claims
of punitive damages.5 Punitive damages are awarded to punish outrageous conduct
and to deter such conduct in the future.6 To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
Plaintiffs must allege Mr. Nyabiosi behavior reflected a “conscious indifference” or
“I don't care” attitude.7 Where the evidence supports a reasonable inference the
narrow; the delay in presentation; whether the amendment will add to the
complexity of the trial; and ... whether there will be undue prejudice to the
nonmoving party. Timblin v. Kent Gen. Hosp., 1995 WL 44250, at *1
(Del.Super.Feb.1, 1995).
3
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 2008 WL 555919, at *1.
4
Porter v. Turner, 954 A.2d 308, 312 (Del.2007).
5
Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 529 (Del. 1987) citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 908, comment b (1979).
6
Id.
7
Cloroben Chem. Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887, 891 (Del.1983) (quoting
Eustice v. Rupert, 460 A.2d 507, 509 (Del.1983)).
4
conduct meets the standard for recovering punitive damages, the question of punitive
damages is typically for the trier of fact. The Plaintiffs did not allege such a claim
and therefore are not entitled to punitive damages.
On December 16, 2021, Joshua and Sarah Gage filed their Motion for
Reconsideration/Clarification (“Motion”) pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule
59(e). Their sole argument in their Motion is the “Court misapprehended the fact
that there was no assertion by Defendants that the other amendments, most
particularly those contained in Count III, somehow failed to meet the requirements
of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 15 or were in any other way improper or prejudicial to
Defendants.” Ultimately the argument mainly hinges on the Motion to Amend being
unopposed, so according to Plaintiffs the Court should have granted the amendment.
On January 11, 2022, the court heard argument on Plaintiffs’ Motion.
The case law regarding Rule 59(e) is well-established. A proper Motion for
Reconsideration will establish that the Court “overlooked a controlling precedent or
legal principles, or the Court has misapprehended the law or facts such as would
have changed the outcome of the underlying decision.”8 A “motion for
reconsideration or reargument is not an opportunity to rehash arguments already
8
Bd. of Managers of the Del. Criminal Justice Info. Sys. v. Gannet Co., 2003 WL
1579170, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 17, 2003).
5
decided by the Court, or to present new arguments that were not previously raised.”9
Pursuant to Rule 59(e), the “movant must demonstrate newly discovered evidence,
a change in the law, or manifest injustice.”10
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Court overlooked controlling
precedent or legal principles or misapprehended the law or the facts. Plaintiffs have
only claimed, inaccurately, that amendment should have been granted because there
was no opposition from Defendants. Rule 15 gives discretion to this Court on the
granting of an amendment after amendment as of right has been time-barred.
Plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate newly discovered evidence, a change in the law,
or manifest injustice. Additionally, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate newly discovered
evidence, a change in the law, or manifest injustice pursuant to Rule 59(e).
NOW THEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Calvin L. Scott
Judge Calvin L. Scott
9
Patterson-Woods & Associates, LLC v. Independence Mall, Inc., 2019 WL
6329069, at *1 (Del. Super. Nov. 26, 2019) (citations omitted)
10
Id. (citation omitted)
6