NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0985-20
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK,
N.A.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SPEECH AND LANGUAGE
CENTER, LLC and
CHRYSSOULA ARSENIS,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
GEORGE J. ARSENIS and
SPYRIDON M. ARSENIS,
Defendants.1
______________________________
Argued March 7, 2022 – Decided March 16, 2022
Before Judges Fasciale and Vernoia.
1
Defendants George and Spyridon Arsenis did not actively participate in this
appeal.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-0035-16.
Chryssoula Arsenis, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
Shawn D. Edwards argued the cause for respondent
(Maselli Warren, PC, attorneys; David Fornal, of
counsel; Shawn D. Edwards, of counsel and on the
brief; Barbara J. Boyd, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Speech and Language Center, LLC (Borrower) and Chryssoula Arsenis
(Chryssoula)2 (collectively defendants) appeal from an October 16, 2020 order
denying their motion "to release [plaintiff's] judgment lien."3 Judge Douglas H.
Hurd entered the order and rendered an oral opinion with which we substantially
agree. The judge correctly determined there was no basis to "release" plaintiff's
lien. We affirm.
In 2015, the Borrower executed and delivered to plaintiff a Line of Credit
Note and Credit Agreement (Contract) for $300,000. Chryssoula, George, and
2
To avoid confusion between Chryssoula, George, and Spyridon Arsenis, we
refer to them using their first names. We mean no disrespect in doing so.
3
This is the only order identified by defendants in their Notice of Appeal
(NOA). If a matter is not designated in a party's NOA, it is not subject to the
appeal process. W.H. Indus., Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins, Ltda, 397 N.J. Super.
455, 458 (App. Div. 2008); see also R. 2:5-1(e)(3)(i) (stating that an NOA "shall
designate the judgment, decision, action or rule, or part thereof appealed from").
A-0985-20
2
Spyridon signed the Contract as members of the Borrower entity. The terms of
the Contract provided:
If any of the following events occurs, the [n]otes shall
become due immediately, without notice, at [plaintiff]'s
option:
A. Any [o]bligor fails to pay when due any of the
[l]iabilities or any other debt to any [p]erson, or any
amount payable with respect to any of the [l]iabilities,
or under any [n]ote, any other [r]elated [d]ocument, or
any agreement or instrument evidencing other debt to
any [p]erson.
....
At any time after the occurrence of a default, [plaintiff]
may do one or more of the following: . . . (c) declare
any of the [n]otes and/or of the [r]elated documents to
be immediately due and payable, without notice of
acceleration, presentment and demand or protest or
notice of any kind, all of which are hereby expressly
waived.
The Borrower defaulted, which led plaintiff to file this complaint seeking a
judgment for the balance due.
In 2016, plaintiff filed an unopposed motion seeking summary judgment.
The parties then entered into settlement agreements. Defendants consented to
the entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiff reflecting the balance due under the
Contract but with a payment schedule. Plaintiff agreed to forbear collection
A-0985-20
3
under the judgment if defendants made the requisite payments to satisfy the
balance owed.
In August 2018, the parties entered into a third settlement and forbearance
agreement (Third Agreement), which required defendants to pay the remaining
balance before July 2019. By not making the required payments, defendants
breached the Third Agreement, which entitled plaintiff to docket the judgment
as a lien without further notice to defendants:
[Defendants]' failure to timely make even one
[p]ayment as required in this [a]greement is a breach of
this [a]greement. In other words, if [plaintiff] does not
receive the full amount of each [p]ayment by the due
date indicated in Section 2(a) above, [defendants] are
in breach of this [a]greement, at which point [plaintiff]
may send [defendants] notice (a "Default Notice"). If
[plaintiff] elects to send a Default Notice, it will do so
by Federal Express or a similar overnight delivery
service to the address provided for . . . . No delay in
sending a Default Notice shall be deemed a waiver or
release of any of [plaintiff]'s rights to enforce this
[a]greement.
....
If [defendants] fail to cure a breach of this [a]greement,
[plaintiff] may docket the [j]udgment at the Judgment
Section of the New Jersey Office of the Superior Court
Clerk and enter it on the New Jersey Statewide Civil
Judgment and Order Docket. [Plaintiff] will not
provide further notice before docketing the [j]udgment.
A-0985-20
4
Before docketing the lien, plaintiff was willing to negotiate a fourth agreement
to give defendants more time, but defendants eventually stopped responding to
plaintiff's counsel and ended negotiations. In February 2020, plaintiff docketed
its lien. On motion, the court then permitted plaintiff to garnish Spyridon's
wages.
On appeal, defendants argue:
[POINT] I
THE TRIAL [JUDGE] ERRED IN GRANTING
[JUDGMENT] LIEN(S) BECAUSE PLAINTIFF
BREACHED THE SIGNED (FORBEARANCE
AGREEMENT SECTIONS 3[B] AND 4[B]). (Raised
below).
[POINT] II
THE TRIAL [JUDGE] ERRED IN GRANTING THE
WAGE EXECUTION 4 WITHOUT "DEFAULT
NOTICE" AS PER THE FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNES[S] RULES OF COURT. (Raised below).
[POINT] III
EVEN IN THE CASE OF . . . DEFENDANTS'
DEFAULT . . . THE SECOND FUNDAMENTAL
PURPOSE OF THE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED FOR THOSE
WITH MATERIAL INTEREST IN THE ACTION.
(Raised below).
4
Defendants have not referenced in their NOA any wage execution order.
A-0985-20
5
[POINT] IV
AS PER THE THIRD FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE
OF THE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE[,] THE
ENTRY OF [ORDER] ON [JUNE 5, 2020] WAS NOT
DONE ON THE MERITS BUT DUE TO A COURT
PROCESSING ERROR (EFFICIENCY AND THE
AVOIDANCE OF WASTE AND THE REDUCTION
OF DELAY)[.] (Raised below).
[POINT] V
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ARE PRESENT
AS PER [RULE] 4:50-1(b) NEW[LY] DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE AFFORD RELIEF. "CERTIFICATION
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT STRIKING DEFENDANTS['] ANSWER
DEFEN[S]ES AND COUNTERCLAIM["] SIGNED
BY [PLAINTIFF'S ASSOCIATE] ([PLAINTIFF'S]
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS DO NOT SHOW
DEFAULT[)]. (Not raised below).
[POINT] VI
[RULE 4:50-1(c)] AND [RULE] 4:50-[(f)] ARE MET
BECAUSE DUE TO FRAUD AND
MISREPRESENTATION . . . DEFENDANT(S) DID
NOT HAVE AN ACTUAL NOTICE OF ACTION
THEREFORE THE GRAVE INJUSTICE FOR
RELIEF UNDER [RULE] 4:5[0]-1(f) IS MET. (Not
raised below).
[POINT] VII
THE JUDGMENT AS PER [RULES] 4:50-1 AND
SUBDIVISIONS 4:5[0]-1[(d)] AND [(f)]. PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO SUPPORT THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
FOR THE WAGE EXECUTION OF A GUARANTOR
A-0985-20
6
WHICH CONFLICTS WITH ESTABLISHED LAW
AND IS VOIDABLE.5 (Raised below).
[POINT] VIII
THE HEARING OF JULY 24, 2020 DID NOT
ADJUDICATE THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE
JUDGMENT. ON THE CONTRARY, THE WAGE
EXECUTION WAS ADJUDICATED DESPITE THE
COURT'S PROCESSING ERROR AND AGAINST
THE COURT RULES OF FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS. (Raised below).
[POINT] IX
THE MOTION IS NOT BARRED BY THE "LAW OF
THE CASE" DOCTRINE BECAUSE [RULE] 4:5[0]-
1[(c)] FRAUD AND EGREGIOUS
MISREPRE[S]ENTATION IS THE GENESIS OF THE
DEFAULT [JUDGMENT]. "CERTIFICATION IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY . . .
[JUDGMENT] STRIKING DEFENDANTS[']
ANSWER DEFENSES AND COUNTERCLAIM
SIGNED BY [PLAINTIFF'S ASSOCIATE]
[PLAINTIFF'S] FINANCIAL STATEMENTS DO
NOT SHOW ANY DEFAULT[."] (Not raised below).
We reject defendants' contentions and conclude they are without sufficient merit
to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add the
following brief remarks.
5
Defendants did not identify the underlying judgment in their NOA.
A-0985-20
7
Contrary to defendants' arguments, N.J.S.A. 2A:17-50(a) and the Third
Agreement provide no basis to "release" them from plaintiff's docketed lien.
Neither one required the judge to do anything other than enter the order under
review. N.J.S.A. 2A:17-50(a) states:
When a judgment has been recovered in the Superior
Court, and where any wages, debts, earnings, salary,
income from trust funds, or profits are due and owing
to the judgment debtor, or thereafter become due and
owing to him, to the amount of $48.00 or more a week,
the judgment creditor may, on notice to the judgment
debtor unless the court otherwise orders, apply to the
court in which the judgment was recovered, or to the
court having jurisdiction of the same, and upon
satisfactory proofs, by affidavit or otherwise, of such
facts, the court shall grant an order directing that an
execution issue against the wages, debts, earnings,
salary, income from trust funds, or profits of the
judgment debtor.
The plain text of N.J.S.A. 2A:17-50(a) does not address releasing a party from
a judgment lien. Rather, it only applies to execution against wages, debts,
earnings, salary, income from trust funds, or profits of the judgment debtor.
N.J.S.A. 2A:17-50(a) is therefore inapplicable. Defendants also point to the
Third Agreement, arguing it required plaintiff to provide notice of defendants'
A-0985-20
8
default before plaintiff docketed the lien. But the Third Agreement imposes no
such obligation.6
Defendants also summarily contend—without any basis—that Rule 4:50-
1(b)-(d), and (f) required the judge to "release" them from the judgment lien.
On this record, there are no facts whatsoever supporting defendants' argument
that they are entitled to relief from the October 16, 2020 order under Rule 4:50-
1, which provides that a judge
may relieve a party or the party's legal representative
from a final judgment or order for the following
reasons: . . . (b) newly discovered evidence which
would probably alter the judgment or order and which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial under [Rule] 4:49; (c) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (d) the judgment or order is void; . . . or (f) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment or order.
Relief under Rule 4:50-1 is "granted sparingly." DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield,
198 N.J. 242, 261 (2009) (quoting F.B. v. A.L.G., 176 N.J. 201, 207 (2003)).
"The decision granting or denying an application to open a [final order such as
6
Even if the Third Agreement required plaintiff to notify defendants before
docketing the judgment, which is entirely not the case, defendants had actual
notice since plaintiff attempted—for several months—to negotiate a fourth
agreement giving them more time before docketing the judgment lien.
A-0985-20
9
the one under review] will be left undisturbed unless it represents a clear abuse
of discretion." Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994);
see also U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012) (a trial
judge's determination under Rule 4:50-1 "warrants substantial deference, and
should not be reversed unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion"). There is
no such abuse here.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed defendants' remaining
arguments, we reiterate that they are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-0985-20
10