Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed March 16, 2022.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D21-331
Lower Tribunal Nos. 13-10056 SP & 20-279 AP
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United Automobile Insurance Company,
Appellant,
vs.
Millennium Radiology, LLC d/b/a
Millennium Open MRI, a/a/o William Thonday,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Ayana
Harris, Judge.
Michael J. Neimand, for appellant.
David B. Pakula, P.A., and David B. Pakula (Pembroke Pines); Marks
& Fleischer, P.A., and Gary Marks (Fort Lauderdale), for appellee.
Before SCALES, HENDON and MILLER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant United Automobile Insurance Company, an insurer,
challenges a final summary judgment in favor of Millennium Radiology, LLC,
a medical provider and assignee of the insured, William Thonday, in a first-
party personal injury protection action.
Below, United Auto disputed the reasonableness of Millennium
Radiology’s charge for an MRI procedure. The trial court granted summary
judgment to Millennium Radiology on the basis of collateral estoppel, finding
that in a prior PIP lawsuit between the parties, a jury had made the
determination that the amount charged for the MRI procedure was
reasonable. On appeal, United Auto argues that the parties in the respective
lawsuits are not identical because Millennium Radiology received
assignment from different insureds, and thus, the “identity” element of the
collateral estoppel doctrine is not satisfied.
We recently decided this issue in United Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Millennium Radiology, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D175, 2022 WL 107604 at *3 (Fla.
3d DCA Jan. 12, 2022), where we held that Millennium Radiology’s identity
is not the same from case to case, as it draws its identity from the insured,
its assignor. We recognize that the trial court did not have the benefit of this
opinion at the time it entered judgment in the instant case; nevertheless, we
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reverse the final summary judgment because the identity of the parties did
not exist to warrant the application of collateral estoppel.
Reversed and remanded.
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