NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MAR 17 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ALFREDO RUIZ MENDEZ, No. 17-70983
Petitioner, Agency No. A205-023-255
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 15, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, GOULD, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Alfredo Ruiz Mendez (“Mendez”) petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal from an
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for withholding of removal
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In Mexico,
Mendez was involved in one physical altercation with his uncle, who did not
contact or look for him again after the incident. Mendez fears that, if he returns to
Mexico, cartels will try to recruit him, extort him, and kill him if he does not
cooperate.
The IJ denied Mendez’s applications for withholding of removal and
protection under CAT, but granted his application for voluntary departure.
Mendez based his application for withholding of removal on three proposed
particular social groups (“PSG”): (1) his immediate family; (2) “young males
between 18–40 years of age . . . living in a gang-controlled neighborhood, who
oppose gang practices”; and (3) young “male deportees from the United States.”
As to the first, the IJ held that Mendez had not established nexus because there was
no “pattern in which the family is being targeted because of their membership in
this specific family.” As to the second and third proposed groups, the IJ found
both PSGs not cognizable. Further, the IJ found that, “even if the localized risk of
persecution was established to be on account of one or more of the protected
grounds and at the more likely than not level,” Mendez’s applications failed
nonetheless because he did not establish that he could not reasonably relocate
within Mexico.
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The BIA dismissed Mendez’s appeal. It affirmed each of the IJ’s findings,
including the finding that Mendez could reasonably relocate within Mexico.
We have jurisdiction to review Mendez’s petition for review under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1). We review agency factual findings for substantial evidence. Wang
v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017).
“To secure withholding of removal, a petitioner must demonstrate that his
‘life . . . would be threatened in [his country of origin] because of [his] race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.”’ Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2019) (second
alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)). In the withholding of
removal context, this nexus standard requires only that the applicant show that “a
reason,” rather than “one central reason,” for persecution is a protected ground.
Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017). An applicant
“cannot demonstrate that his or her life or freedom would be threatened if . . . the
applicant could avoid a future threat to his or her life or freedom by relocating to
another part of the proposed country of removal and, under all the circumstances, it
would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2).
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Mendez did not establish
a nexus between his family membership and either past persecution or a reasonable
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fear of future persecution. Mendez’s personal dispute with his uncle and the
random incidents of violence Mendez’s immediate family members have
experienced do not compel the conclusion that Mendez will be persecuted because
of his family membership. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.
2010) (“[D]esire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or
random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”).
We conclude that the BIA’s finding that Mendez can reasonably relocate
within Mexico is supported by substantial evidence. Many of Mendez’s family
members continue to reside in Mexico unharmed, and Mendez has not established
that he cannot avoid persecution by relocating in Mexico. See Tamang v. Holder,
598 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] petitioner’s fear of future persecution is
weakened, even undercut, when similarly-situation family members living in the
petitioner’s home country are not harmed.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
Substantial evidence supports the finding that Mendez has not demonstrated
eligibility for relief under CAT because he has not established likelihood of future
torture at the hands of either his uncle or gangs. Non-particularized, speculative
testimony and evidence that gang violence is prevalent in Mexico is insufficient to
compel a finding of a likelihood that Mendez will be tortured if returned to
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Mexico. See Lopez v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2018); Gonzalez-
Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 894–95 (9th Cir. 2018); Zheng v. Holder, 644
F.3d 829, 835–36 (9th Cir. 2011).
PETITION DENIED.
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