NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 25 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ERIC ROBINSON, No. 21-55599
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00396-TJH-KES
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KAIRN BORZAKIAN, individual capacity;
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Terry J. Hatter, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2022**
Before: SILVERMAN, MILLER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Eric Robinson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging his criminal conviction. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to
state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1112 (9th Cir. 2012). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.
Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Robinson’s claims challenging his
conviction as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success
on these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence, and Robinson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his conviction
had been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (if “a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . .
. the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”).
Dismissal of Robinson’s excessive force claim was proper because Robinson
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Smith v. City of Hemet, 394
F.3d 689, 700-04 (9th Cir. 2005) (standard for § 1983 excessive force claim).
The district court properly dismissed Robinson’s claims against defendant
judges and prosecutors as barred by judicial and prosecutorial immunity,
respectively, and against Robinson’s appointed counsel because court-appointed
attorneys are not state actors under § 1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
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312, 317-19 (1981) (a private attorney or a public defender does not act under
color of state law within the meaning of § 1983); Garmon v. County of Los
Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining the application of
absolute prosecutorial immunity); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th
Cir. 1986) (en banc) (explaining the application of judicial immunity).
Robinson’s motion for discovery (Docket Entry No. 8) is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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