UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
VONNISHA JAMES,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civ. Action No. 20-335
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., (EGS)
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Vonnisha James (“Ms. James”) brings this lawsuit
against Defendants the District of Columbia, (the “District”);
Lewis Ferebee, (“Dr. Ferebee”), Chancellor of the District of
Columbia Public Schools, in his individual capacity; and Kerri
Larkin, (“Ms. Larkin”), Senior Deputy Chief of Specialized
Instruction, in her individual capacity, under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et
seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; alleging that Defendants have failed
to provide Ms. James with a free appropriate public education by
failing to authorize independent speech services for her. See
generally Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 29.
Pending before the Court are Dr. Ferebee’s Motion to
Dismiss, Ferebee Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 38; and Ms. Larkin’s
Motion to Dismiss, Larkin Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 32. Upon
careful consideration of the motions, oppositions, replies, the
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applicable law, and for the reasons explained below, Dr.
Ferebee’s motion is GRANTED, and Ms. Larkin’s motion is GRANTED.
I. Background
A. Factual
The Court assumes the following facts alleged in the
complaint to be true for the purposes of deciding this motion
and construes them in Ms. James’s favor. See Baird v. Gotbaum,
792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Ms. James is a 21-year-
old student enrolled in the D.C. Public Schools (“DCPS”) who is
eligible for special education and related services as a student
with an intellectual disability. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 29 ¶
9. On August 15, 2016, to resolve a remand ordered in Theresa
James v. District of Columbia, No. 14-CV-2147 (APM), the
District of Columbia Office of the State Superintendent of
Education, Office of Dispute Resolution issued an administrative
order concerning Ms. James. Id. ¶ 10. The administrative order
required DCPS, among other things, to “authorize funding for
[Ms. James] to receive 360 hours per calendar year of
independent speech-language services until a speech-language
evaluation . . . [is] reviewed and considered by [Ms. James]’s
IEP team, [and the evaluation] shows that [Ms. James]’s speech-
language disability is no more than two standard deviations
below the mean[.]” Id. ¶ 11. The administrative order further
clarified that “calendar year,” in this context, “runs from
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August 15 of a given year through August 14 of the following
year.” Id. ¶ 12. Ms. James alleges that, before June 28, 2018,
her Individualized Education Program (IEP) team did not review
and consider any speech-language evaluation showing Ms. James’s
speech-language disability to be within two standard deviations
of the mean. Id. ¶ 13. Ms. James also alleges that since August
2016, DCPS has not authorized funding for any independent
speech-language service for Ms. James pursuant to the
administrative order. Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
Ms. James alleges that at all relevant times, Dr. Ferebee
has been responsible for: (1) taking the actions necessary to
put DCPS into compliance with the administrative order; (2)
supervising DCPS personnel with regard to compliance with the
administrative order; (3) training DCPS personnel to comply with
the administrative order and similar orders; and that he has
failed to: (1) ensure that that DCPS complies with the
administrative order; and (2) adequately train and supervise
DCPS personnel to ensure they comply with the administrative.
Id. ¶¶ 17-22.
Ms. James further alleges that at all relevant times, Ms.
Larkin has been responsible for: (1) taking the actions
necessary to put DCPS into compliance with the administrative
order; (2) supervising DCPS personnel with regard to compliance
with the administrative order; (3) training DCPS personnel to
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comply with the administrative order and similar orders; and
that she has failed to: (1) ensure that that DCPS complies with
the administrative order; and (2) adequately train and supervise
DCPS personnel to ensure they comply with the administrative.
Id. ¶¶ 23-28.
As relief, Ms. James seeks the following: a declaratory
judgment declaring that the Defendants violated the IDEA and
denied her a free appropriate public education by failing to
authorize independent speech-language services; an order
compelling that each Defendant provide her with compensatory
education, or, in the alternative, that each Defendant ensure
DCPS’s compliance with the administrative order; and an award of
$50,000 in compensatory damages. Id. ¶ 29.
B. Procedural
On October 16, 2020, Dr. Ferebee filed his Motion to
Dismiss. See Ferebee Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 38. Ms. James
filed her Opposition brief on October 27, 2020, see Opp’n, ECF
No. 39; and Dr. Ferebee filed his Reply brief on November 3,
2020, see Reply, ECF No. 43. On September 25, 2020, Ms. Larkin
filed her Motion to Dismiss. See Larkin Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No.
32. Ms. James filed her Opposition brief on October 8, 2020, see
Opp’n, ECF No. 35; and Ms. Larkin filed her Reply brief on
October 15, 2020, see Reply, ECF No. 43. The motions are ripe
and ready for the Court’s adjudication.
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II. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.
Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A
complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555, (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Despite this liberal pleading standard, to survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially
plausible when the facts pled in the complaint allow the court
to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Id. The standard does not amount to
a "probability requirement," but it does require more than a
"sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.
"[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss [pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6)], a judge must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint." Atherton v.
D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “In determining whether a
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complaint fails to state a claim, [the Court] may consider only
the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either
attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of
which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis
Xavier Parochial Schl., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In
addition, the court must give the plaintiff the "benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Kowal v.
MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
III. Analysis
A. The Complaint Fails to State a Section 1983 Against Dr.
Ferebee and Ms. Larkin
Dr. Ferebee and Ms. Larkin move to dismiss the individual
capacity claims against them, arguing that to state a claim
against a government official in his or her individual capacity
under § 1983, the complaint must allege personal, direct
involvement by the official in the events giving rise to the
alleged federal violations. Ferebee Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 38
at 6-7; 1 Larkin Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 32 at 6-7. Ms. James,
citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) (a complaint in a
civil action must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); as well
1 When citing to electronic filings throughout this Memorandum
Opinion, the Court generally cites to the ECF header page
number, not the original page number of the filed document.
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as the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, argues that, pursuant to § 1983,
she has stated a claim for failure to supervise or train
subordinates adequately. See Opp’n to Ferebee Mot. to Dismiss,
ECF No. 38 at 3-5; Opp’n to Larkin Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 35
at 3-5. Dr. Ferebee and Ms. Larkin respond that Ms. James’s
allegations amount to nothing more than respondeat superior
liability. Ferebee Reply, ECF No. 43 at 1-3; Larkin Reply, ECF
No. 37 at 1-3.
“Section 1983 creates a private cause of action against a
‘person’ who violates an individual’s constitutional rights
while acting ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State … or the District of Columbia.’”
Hampton v. Comey, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4, (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable
to … § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-
official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
In other words, “An individual may be personally liable under
Section 1983 only if it is shown that he or she directly
participated in the wrongful acts.” Waker v. Brown, 754
F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Cameron v.
Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Elkins v.
District of Columbia, 610 F. Supp. 2d 52, 64 (D.D.C. 2009).
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“It is well established that a governmental officer may be
held liable in damages for constitutional wrongs engendered by
his failure to supervise or train subordinates adequately. This
responsibility is not premised on the notion of vicarious
liability; rather, it is bottomed on the principle that in some
contexts failure of an official to safeguard against
constitutional transgressions by those under his control
constitutes an actionable wrong under Bivens and Section 1983.”
Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
That occurs
“where responsibility is predicated on
inattentiveness rather than affirmative
misconduct, the plaintiff must establish a
high degree of fault in order to implicate the
supervisor in the constitutional infractions
of his subordinates.” Haynesworth, 820 F.2d at
1261. That high degree of fault is not
satisfied by a negligence standard; a showing
of “mere negligence” is insufficient to state
a claim of supervisory liability under Section
1983. Id. at 1260. A supervisor who merely
fails to detect and prevent a subordinate's
misconduct, therefore, cannot be liable for
that misconduct. “The supervisor[ ] must know
about the conduct and facilitate it, approve
it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear
of what they might see.” Jones v. City of
Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir.1988)
(Posner, J.). We conclude that plaintiffs'
inaction theory fails to provide an adequate
basis for establishing the violation of a
constitutional right by these appellants. We
hold that absent an allegation that the MPD
supervisors had actual or constructive
knowledge of past transgressions or that the
supervisors were responsible for or aware of
“clearly deficient” training, the supervisors
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did not violate any constitutional right
through inaction or failure to supervise.
International Action Center v. United States, 365 F.3d 20, 28
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
Ms. James’s allegations against Dr. Ferebee and Ms. Larkin
are identical: she alleges that each failed to ensure that DCPS
complies with the administrative order and that they failed to
adequately train and supervise DCPS personnel to ensure they
comply with the administrative order. These allegations fail to
state a failure to train or supervise claims against Dr. Ferebee
and Ms. Larkin for a number of reasons. She does not allege that
either Dr. Ferebee or Ms. Larkin had any personal, direct
involvement in the events giving rise to her allegations. She
has not alleged—nor alleged facts from which the Court could
infer—that the Dr. Ferebee and Ms. Larkin “knew about the
[alleged unconstitutional] conduct and facilitate[d] it,
approve[d] it, condone[d] it, or turn[ed] a blind eye for fear
of what they might see.” Jones, 856 F.2d at 992. Finally, she
has not alleged that Dr. Ferebee and Ms. Larkin “had actual or
constructive knowledge of past transgressions or that [they]
were responsible for or aware of ‘clearly deficient’ training .
. . .” International Action Center, 365 F.3d at 28. Accordingly,
Ms. James’s “effort to hold [Dr. Ferebee and Ms. Larkin]
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personally liable fades into respondeat superior or vicarious
liability, clearly barred under Section 1983.” Id. at 27.
Ms. James argues that a complaint need only contain “enough
to give a defendant fair notice of the claims against him,” and
that the complaint provides Dr. Ferebee and Ms. Larkin with
“notice of the general nature of the case and the circumstances
or events upon which it is based.” Opp’n, ECF No. 39 at 3, 5.
This argument, however, is misplaced in view of the “high degree
of fault” a plaintiff must allege to implicate supervisory
personnel in the constitutional infractions of his or her
subordinates. Haynesworth, 820 F.2d at 1261.
Because Ms. James has failed to state a § 1983 claim
against Dr. Ferebee and Ms. Larkin, the court need not reach
whether these two defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
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IV. Conclusion and Order
Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, it is hereby
ORDERED that Dr. Ferebee’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 38,
is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Ms. Larkin’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 32 is
GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to DISMISS Dr. Ferebee and
Ms. Larkin from this case.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
March 30, 2022
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James v. District of Columbia
Combined Opinion