SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
CRAIG A. KARSNITZ 1 The Circle, Suite 2
RESIDENT JUDGE GEORGETOWN, DE 19947
March 30, 2022
Raul Marquin-Mendoza
SBI #00822318
Sussex Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 500
Georgetown, DE 19809
Daniel A. Strumpf, Esquire
Office of Defense Services
14 The Circle, Second Floor
Georgetown, DE 19947
Nichole Gannett, Esquire
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice
13 The Circle
Georgetown, DE 19947
Re: State of Delaware v. Raul Marquin-Mendoza
Def. ID No. 2007008766
Motion for Postconviction Relief (R-1)
Motion for Postconviction Counsel
Dear Mr. Marquin-Mendoza and Counsel:
On September 14, 2021, I accepted a guilty plea from Raul Marquin-Mendoza
(“Movant”) to one felony charge: Child Sex Abuse in the above-referenced case.
That same day, I sentenced Movant to twenty-five (25) years of incarceration at
Level 5 (with credit for 423 days previously served), suspended after twelve (12)
years for ten (10) years at Level 3, and I imposed numerous other conditions.
Movant did not take a direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, and has
filed no other motions or petitions seeking relief from the judgment in state or federal
court.
On March 15, 2022, Movant filed a Motion for the Appointment of
Postconviction Counsel (“PCC”) (the “PCC Motion”) and his first pro se Motion for
Postconviction Relief (the “Rule 61 Motion”) (collectively, the “Motions”).
PCC Motion
Rule 61 provides that I shall appoint postconviction counsel for Movant for
his first timely Rule 61 Motion if it seeks to set aside, inter alia, a judgment of
conviction after a trial that has been affirmed by final order upon direct appellate
review and is for a crime designated as a class A, B, or C felony under 11 Del. C.
§4205(b).1 In this case, although this is Movant’s first Rule 61 Motion, and is
timely filed within one year,2 there was no judgment of conviction, after a trial,
1
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2)(i).
2
In this case, under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1), Movant’s conviction became final for purposes
of Rule 61 thirty (30) days after I imposed sentence on September 14, 2021, because he did not
file a direct appeal. Movant filed his pro se Rule 61 Motion on March 15, 2022, well within the
one-year period thereafter.
2
affirmed by direct appellate review, notwithstanding the class of the felony. Thus,
I am not obligated to appoint postconviction counsel for Movant.
Rule 61 further provides that I may appoint counsel for Movant for his first
timely Rule 61 Motion if it seeks to set aside a judgment of conviction that resulted
from a guilty plea (as in this case) only if I determine that: (i) the conviction has
been affirmed by final order upon direct appellate review; (ii) the Rule 61 Motion
sets forth a substantial claim that Movant received ineffective assistance of his trial
counsel in relation to his guilty plea; (iii) granting the Rule 61 Motion would result
in vacatur of the judgment of conviction for which Movant is in custody; and (iv)
specific exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment of postconviction
counsel.3 In this case, although this is Movant’s first timely Rule 61 Motion, there
was no direct appellate review, Movant’s claims about the ineffective assistance of
his trial counsel are insubstantial, and there are no other exceptional circumstances
that warrant the appointment of postconviction counsel. The Motion to Appoint
Postconviction Counsel is therefore DENIED.
Rule 61 Motion
In the Rule 61 Motion, Movant asserts three (3) grounds for postconviction
relief. The first two grounds relate to the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
3
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3).
3
(“Trial Counsel”) as follows: (1) coercion of Movant by Trial Counsel to accept a
guilty plea, and (2) failure by Trial Counsel to appropriate the resources necessary
to investigate the charges and prepare for the guilty plea and sentence. The third
ground asserts that: (3) I illegally imposed an excessive sentence on Movant. I first
address grounds (2) and (3).
Ground (2) is stated in a very vague and conclusory manner, and sets forth no
objective facts to support its assertions. Under Rule 61, if it plainly appears to me
from the Rule 61 Motion and the record that Movant is not entitled to relief, I may
enter an order for the summary dismissal of the Rule 61 Motion. 4 In my view,
ground (2) fails to set forth a substantial claim that Movant received ineffective
assistance of Trial Counsel the resources appropriated to his defense. Therefore, I
summarily dismiss ground (2) and, with respect to ground (2), the Rule 61 Motion
is DENIED.
Ground (3) is really a Motion for Reduction of Sentence,5 and I will treat it
as such. However, it was filed more than 90 days after sentencing, and there are no
“extraordinary circumstances”,6 thus it is procedurally barred.7 Nonetheless, I note
4
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5).
5
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
6
11 Del. C. §4217
7
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
4
that the sentence which I imposed on Movant is exactly the sentence that he and the
State agreed to, is authorized by statute, and is in keeping with the applicable
sentencing guidelines. The Rule 61 Motion is therefore DENIED with respect to
ground (3).
With respect to ground (1), related to Movant’s guilty plea, this letter is to
advise Trial Counsel that he shall submit an Affidavit addressing ground (1) on or
before Friday, April 29, 2022.
Upon my receipt of Trial Counsel’s Affidavit, I will decide whether the record
needs to be further expanded to include a Response from the State and a Reply from
Movant, and whether an evidentiary hearing is required.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
/s/Craig A. Karsnitz, Resident Judge
cc: Prothonotary
5