19-3031
Singh v. Garland
BIA
IJ Poczter
A201 274 021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 1st day of April, two thousand twenty-two.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
8 MICHAEL H. PARK,
9 EUNICE C. LEE,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 HARJIT SINGH,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 19-3031
17 NAC
18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Genet Getachew, Esq., Brooklyn,
24 NY.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant
27 Attorney General; Russell J-E.
28 Verby, Senior Litigation Counsel;
1 John D. Williams, Trial Attorney,
2 Office of Immigration Litigation,
3 United States Department of
4 Justice, Washington, DC.
5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
8 is DENIED.
9 Petitioner Harjit Singh, a native and citizen of India,
10 seeks review of a September 13, 2019 decision of the BIA
11 affirming a January 30, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge
12 (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of
13 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
14 (“CAT”). In re Harjit Singh, No. A 201 274 021 (B.I.A. Sept.
15 13, 2019), aff’g No. A 201 274 021 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C.y Jan.
16 30, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
17 underlying facts and procedural history.
18 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the
19 BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d
20 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review
21 are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei
22 Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing
23 adverse credibility determination for substantial evidence).
2
1 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
2 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
3 determination on” inconsistencies within and between an
4 applicant’s statements and other evidence “without regard to
5 whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to
6 the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant
7 factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to
8 an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality
9 of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-
10 finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu
11 Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord
12 Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence supports
13 the adverse credibility determination here.
14 Singh alleged that Congress Party members attacked him
15 in October 2012 and February 2013 and the police did not act
16 on his complaint and instead protected the Congress Party
17 members. The agency concluded that his claim was not
18 credible. To arrive at this conclusion, it reasonably relied
19 on the cumulative impact of contradictions between Singh’s
20 claim and his corroborating evidence, a lack of corroboration
21 of material facts, and Singh’s admission that his father
3
1 prepared all the witness affidavits. First, Singh testified
2 that he was attacked by members of the Congress Party; but
3 Singh’s father stated that Singh had “been attacked two times
4 by the members of Congress party and the police.” The agency
5 was not required to accept Singh’s assertion that his father
6 spoke “figuratively.” See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160,
7 168 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[R]ecord support for a contrary
8 inference—even one more plausible or more natural—does not
9 suggest error.”); Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d
10 Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible
11 explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief;
12 he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be
13 compelled to credit his testimony.” (cleaned up)).
14 Second, Singh testified that he went to the police
15 following the October 2012 attack accompanied by his “father
16 and the head of the village.” His father’s affidavit states
17 only that “Singh went to the police station,” without
18 mentioning that he or the head of the village accompanied
19 him. This omission undermined Singh’s credibility as there
20 was no other evidence to corroborate the report to the police.
21 See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167–68 & n.3 (allowing reliance
4
1 on cumulative effect of inconsistencies and omissions “as
2 long as the ‘totality of the circumstances’ establishes that
3 an asylum applicant is not credible.” (quoting 8 U.S.C.
4 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii))); Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268,
5 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate
6 his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the
7 absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable
8 to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into
9 question.”).
10 Finally, Singh’s corroborating evidence undermined his
11 credibility because affidavits—ostensibly from his uncle, the
12 head of the village, and a local official—were nearly
13 identical to that written by his father. See Mei Chai Ye v.
14 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 519 (2d Cir. 2007) (“When
15 an asylum applicant himself has submitted two or more
16 affidavits in support of his application that, he says, have
17 been provided by different persons, but which are strikingly
18 similar in their structure or language, our court has allowed
19 an [IJ] to treat those similarities as evidence supporting an
20 adverse credibility finding.”). “[I]t is reasonable and
21 unproblematic for an IJ to infer that an applicant who
5
1 [himself] submits the strikingly similar documents is the
2 common source of those suspicious similarities.” Id.
3 Taking these findings cumulatively, “the totality of the
4 circumstances” supports the adverse credibility
5 determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu
6 Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The adverse credibility
7 determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of
8 removal and CAT relief because all three forms of relief were
9 based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales,
10 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
11 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
12 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
13 stays VACATED.
14 FOR THE COURT:
15 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
16 Clerk of Court
6