Case: 21-50210 Document: 00516264549 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/01/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 21-50210 April 1, 2022
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Armando Sauseda, Sr.,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 7:09-CR-252-1
Before Dennis, Elrod, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Armando Sauseda, Sr. is serving a life sentence for murder and an 87-
month sentence for drug trafficking. Sauseda suffers from obesity, asthma,
and severe hypertension—three conditions which significantly increase the
risk of hospitalization and death from COVID-19. In January 2021, Sauseda
filed a motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1).
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-50210 Document: 00516264549 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/01/2022
No. 21-50210
This provision allows a court to modify a sentence of imprisonment after
considering the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and finding
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” that warrant modification of the
sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Sauseda argued that his increased
risk of contracting a serious case of COVID-19 while confined at USP
Coleman II was an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting his
release. The district court denied Sauseda’s motion. In a four-sentence
order, the court stated in relevant part only: “After considering the
applicable factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, the Court DENIES the
Defendant’s Motions [sic] on its merits.” The court did not discuss its
weighing of the § 3553(a) factors, nor indicate whether it found Sauseda’s
risk of contracting COVID-19 an extraordinary and compelling reason.
Sauseda appealed. This Court reviews a denial of a motion for
compassionate release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chambliss, 948
F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020). However, we cannot say whether a district
court abused its discretion when an order does not contain reasons explaining
how it exercised its discretion. Therefore, we VACATE the district court’s
order denying Sauseda’s motion for compassionate release and REMAND
for reconsideration consistent with this opinion below.
I.
We have previously said that a “district court must provide specific
factual reasons, including but not limited to due consideration of the
§ 3553(a) factors, for its decision” on a motion for compassionate release. Id.
As the word “must” indicates, this is a mandatory requirement. The need
for specific factual reasons is in part due to the standard of review that a court
of appeals applies to a district court’s sentencing decisions. Id. The abuse of
discretion standard is highly deferential, but it “does not preclude an
2
Case: 21-50210 Document: 00516264549 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/01/2022
No. 21-50210
appellate court’s correction of a district court’s legal or factual error.”
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 n.2 (2014).
A legal or factual error must be identifiable by the appellate court in order for
appellate review, even deferential appellate review, to be meaningful. This
not only delivers litigants their statutory rights to an appeal, but it also allows
the appellate court to articulate usable standards for the district courts to
employ in the first instance. Additionally, it allows us to corral stray decisions
so as “to promote uniformity in sentencing imposed by different federal
courts for similar criminal conduct.” Hughes v. United States, ___ U.S. ___,
138 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our Court’s standard of review is not the only basis for a district
court’s obligation to provide reasons. There are also institutional reasons. A
thorough explanation of the district court’s sentencing decision “promote[s]
the perception of fair sentencing.” United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564
F.3d 357, 362 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50
(2007)). As the Supreme Court recently reiterated in the context of a
sentencing modification motion, a judge’s obligation to explain her decision
“reflects sound judicial practice. Judicial decisions are reasoned decisions.
Confidence in a judge’s use of reason underlies the public’s trust in the
judicial institution. A public statement of those reasons helps provide the
public with the assurance that creates that trust.” Chavez-Meza v. United
States, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1964 (2018) (quoting Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). When a district court renders a decision
without explanation, it raises questions whether the judge acted arbitrarily,
unconstrained by law and without due consideration of the parties’
arguments.
Of course, the obligation to provide reasons is not an obligation to
write a full opinion for every decision:
3
Case: 21-50210 Document: 00516264549 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/01/2022
No. 21-50210
The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when
to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances. Sometimes a
judicial opinion responds to every argument; sometimes it does not;
sometimes a judge simply writes the word “granted” or “denied” on
the face of a motion while relying upon context and the parties’ prior
arguments to make the reasons clear. The law leaves much, in this
respect, to the judge’s own professional judgment.
Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. So too can the district court record leave much for the
judgment of the appellate court. When a decision is rendered after a hearing,
the record of the hearing may be sufficient to show that the district court
considered the evidence and the parties’ arguments. This may suffice to
show the district court’s reasoning, and further written elaboration in some
particular cases may be unnecessary. See Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d at
362–64 (reviewing cases where record of hearing did, and did not, suffice).
Similarly, in the context of sentencing reconsideration decisions, the judge
deciding the motion to modify or reduce a sentence may often be the same
judge who originally sentenced the defendant. See Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at
1967. When this happens, it may be inferable from the original sentencing
decision how the judge weighed the § 3553(a) factors in a subsequent motion
for compassionate release. Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098,
1113–14 (6th Cir. 2020). However, when the record lacks any basis for
inference and the district court’s order provides no explanation, there is little
the appellate court can do to ascertain the judge’s reasons for her decision
but to remand the case for further proceedings.
Thus, “specific factual reasons” for a district court’s decision are
required, whether written in the order itself or reasonably inferable from the
record. Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693.
4
Case: 21-50210 Document: 00516264549 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/01/2022
No. 21-50210
II.
Turning to the order in this case, the district court’s order denying
Sauseda’s motion for compassionate release contains no articulated reasons
for its decision. It simply declares that, after considering the applicable
statutory factors and policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, it was
denying Sauseda’s motion “on its merits.” Sauseda’s motion was decided
on the papers without a hearing, as is often the case, and the Government did
not object or otherwise file any response. The judge deciding the motion was
not the judge who originally sentenced Sauseda. There is thus nothing in the
record on appeal to illumine how the district court determined that Sauseda’s
motion should be denied other than the bare conclusions of the order.
As mentioned above, a motion for compassionate release requires
both a consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and a determination whether
extraordinary and compelling reasons for release exist. 1 These are two
independent requirements, and a finding of one without the other does not
1
We have noted that Congress neither defined, nor provided examples of
“extraordinary and compelling reasons.” United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 391 (5th
Cir. 2021). “Instead, it delegated that authority to the Sentencing Commission,” which
has provided guidelines for compassionate release motions made by the Bureau of Prisons,
but not those made by federal prisoners themselves. Id.at 391–92. The Sentencing
Commission itself has noted that the absence of an applicable policy statement has led to
considerable variability in how courts decide these motions. See U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n, Compassionate Release: The Impact of the First Step Act
and COVID-19 Pandemic 4 (Mar. 2022). Yet no guidance appears likely to be
forthcoming as “the Commission currently lacks a quorum of voting members.” United
States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020). Instead, we have suggested that a
district court may look to the non-binding policy statement at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 and its
commentary to “inform[] [the court’s] analysis as to what reasons may be sufficiently
‘extraordinary and compelling’ to merit compassionate release.” United States v.
Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 2021). A district court is free, of course, to deviate
from the examples discussed in this policy statement. United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283,
288 (5th Cir. 2021).
5
Case: 21-50210 Document: 00516264549 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/01/2022
No. 21-50210
entitle the movant to relief. Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693. Here, we cannot tell
if, in the district court’s eyes, Sauseda failed to meet one, the other, or both
requirements for compassionate release. In fact, it is not even clear that the
district court asked itself whether Sauseda’s susceptibility to COVID-19
constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting release. 2
Especially given the unsettled state of the law around whether the COVID-
19 pandemic uniquely presents extraordinary and compelling reasons for
compassionate release, see United States v. Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 434 (5th
Cir. 2021), appellate review of a district court’s decision for legal or clear
factual errors is critical. But we cannot provide that on an order that fails to
present the reasons for the district court’s decision.
For these reasons we VACATE the district court’s order denying
Sauseda’s motion for compassionate release and REMAND for
reconsideration consistent with this opinion.
2
The district court’s order notes that the court considered “the applicable policy
statements,” which could refer to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s “extraordinary and compelling”
provision for release. Perhaps this could mean the court did analyze whether Sauseda’s
motion presented an extraordinary and compelling reason, as required by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c). But we hesitate to assume that it does. Strictly speaking, these policy statements
are not applicable to Sauseda’s motion. See Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 393. It is not clear then
what the district court’s order means when it refers to “applicable policy statements.”
More generally, the Sentencing Guidelines contain numerous policy statements ranging
widely in subject matter. It is not appropriate for an appellate court to guess what law the
district court applied when it is charged with the duty of reviewing for legal error.
6