NUMBER 13-21-00059-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
MONICA MEZA, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 28th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Longoria, Hinojosa, and Silva
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
Appellant Monica Meza appeals from a judgment convicting her of burglary of a
habitation with the intent to commit a felony other than theft, a first-degree felony, see
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a), (d), and cruelty to non-livestock animals, a third-degree
felony. See id. § 42.092(b)(1), (c-1). Following a bench trial, the trial court found Meza
guilty and sentenced her to concurrent prison terms of five years and two years,
respectively. In one issue, Meza argues there is legally insufficient evidence supporting
her conviction for cruelty to non-livestock animals. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Meza with intentionally or knowingly
entering the habitation of Patricia Silva without her consent and committing, or attempting
to commit, the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See id. § 30.02(a),
(d). The indictment further charged Meza with intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly killing
an animal in a cruel manner, “namely a dog by beating the dog with a stick.” See id.
§ 42.092(b)(1), (c-1). Meza waived her right to a jury trial, and the case was tried before
the bench.
At trial, Silva testified that she was making lunch at her home in Corpus Christi,
Texas, when she heard her dogs barking in her enclosed front yard. Silva went to the
front door and saw an unknown woman, identified as Meza at trial, standing outside. Silva
asked Meza if she could help her, and Meza yelled that her son was in Silva’s house.
Silva responded that Meza’s son was not in her house, and Meza then started throwing
bricks at Silva’s car. Silva went outside and told Meza to stop, and Meza started hitting
Silva with a pipe. Next, Meza pushed past Silva and entered her house, while yelling that
she was looking for her son. When Meza exited the residence, she continued to hit Silva
with the pipe. Meza later went to a neighbor’s house and proceeded to break the windows
of a car.
Meanwhile, Silva’s dogs escaped their enclosure. Meza killed one of the dogs by
hitting it with the pipe. Meza then reapproached Silva, who picked up a wooden staff to
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defend herself. However, Meza wrestled the staff away and struck Silva in the back of the
head. Silva stated that she went to the hospital to receive treatment for her injuries, which
included lacerations and a concussion.
Officer Andrew Argais with the Corpus Christi Police Department (CCPD) was
dispatched to Silva’s residence. Upon his arrival, Officer Argais learned from Silva’s
neighbor that a woman, later identified as Meza, was beating a dog with a stick. Officer
Argais then spoke to Silva who stated that Meza entered her home and assaulted her.
Officer Argais observed that Silva had a laceration on her right ring finger, a “busted” lip,
and a bump on her forehead. Officer Argais discovered a deceased dog near the
residence. He took photographs of the dog and Silva’s injuries, which the trial court
admitted into evidence. 1
CCPD Officer Rodriguez 2 also responded to the scene. Officer Rodriguez located
Meza at a nearby residence. His conversation with Meza was recorded by another
officer’s body camera, and the trial court admitted the video into evidence. During their
conversation, Meza told Officer Rodriguez that she recently used methamphetamine.
Officer Rodriquez stated that Meza was hallucinating, had rambling speech, and was
sweating profusely.
Meza testified that she was staying with an acquaintance down the street from
Silva’s house. Meza did not know Silva, but she knew Silva’s brother. Meza maintained
that she went to Silva’s house to ask if she had seen Meza’s son. On the day of the
1 The trial court also admitted a competency evaluation, in which a court-appointed psychologist
determined that Meza was competent to stand trial.
2 Officer Rodriguez’s full name does not appear in the record.
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incident, Meza claimed to be dehydrated, “under starvation mode,” and suffering from
various medical issues. Meza denied that she was under the influence of any drugs,
although she claimed that she was prescribed methamphetamine. Meza admitted that the
assault occurred as described by Silva, but Meza denied killing Silva’s dog. Meza claimed
that two people removed a dead dog from a car and placed it on the street.
The trial court found Meza guilty of both offenses, and, after hearing punishment
evidence, it sentenced Meza to five years’ imprisonment for burglary of a habitation, see
id. § 30.02(a), (d), and two years’ imprisonment for cruelty to non-livestock animals. See
id. § 42.092(b)(1), (c-1). This appeal followed.
II. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
In her sole issue, Meza argues her conviction for cruelty to non-livestock animals
is not supported by legally sufficient evidence.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational fact finder could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the
evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d
159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010) (plurality op.). The fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility
of witnesses, and the weight to be given their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. We
resolve any evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the judgment. Id.
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We measure the legal sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements of
the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286
S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997). “Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily
restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
which the defendant was tried.” Villarreal, 286 S.W.3d at 327 (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d
at 240).
A hypothetically correct jury charge in this case would require the State to prove
that: (1) Meza; (2) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; (3) killed an animal in a cruel
manner; 3 and (4) Meza’s conduct was not a generally accepted and otherwise lawful form
of conduct occurring solely for the purposes of or in support of fishing, hunting, trapping,
wildlife management, wildlife or depredation control, shooting preserve practices, animal
husbandry, or agriculture practice involving livestock animals. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 42.092(b)(1), (c-1), (f).
B. Analysis
Meza challenges only whether there was legally sufficient evidence that she killed
Silva’s dog. Meza argues that Silva’s testimony was controverted by her own, and
therefore the State was required to present further corroborating evidence. We disagree
with Meza on two fronts.
3 A person may also commit an offense if the person “intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly . . . without the owner’s effective consent, kills . . . an animal[.]” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 42.092(b)(2). The indictment did not charge Meza with violating this subsection of the statute.
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First, except for circumstances not applicable here, 4 there is no requirement that
the State present evidence corroborating a witness’s testimony. Rather, the testimony of
a single eyewitness to an offense may constitute legally sufficient evidence. Jackson v.
State, 530 S.W.3d 738, 742 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). Second,
Silva’s testimony that Meza killed her dog was corroborated by Officer Argais’s testimony
that a neighbor witnessed Meza beating a dog with a stick. Officer Argais took a
photograph of a deceased dog at the scene, which the trial court admitted into evidence.
See State v. Ambrose, 487 S.W.3d 587, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (explaining that when
required, corroborating evidence need not corroborate each element of the offense or
each aspect of a witness’s testimony). Finally, under a legal sufficiency review, it matters
not that Meza’s testimony contradicted Silva’s. “When, as here, the testimony of the
State’s witnesses conflicts with the testimony of the defendant’s witnesses, the [fact
finder] may believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony.” Caminorreal v. State,
374 S.W.3d 479, 483 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2012, no pet.).
We must presume that the trial court, as the finder of fact, found credible Silva’s
testimony that she witnessed Meza kill her dog. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.
Accordingly, we conclude that Silva’s eyewitness testimony constitutes legally sufficient
evidence establishing this fact. See Jackson, 530 S.W.3d at 742. Because Meza does
not challenge the other elements of the offense, we overrule her sole issue.
4 For instance, the State is required to present evidence corroborating the testimony of an informant
or an accomplice. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 38.14 (accomplice testimony), 38.141 (informant
testimony).
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III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
LETICIA HINOJOSA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed on the
31st day of March, 2022.
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