IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1525
Filed April 13, 2022
DANIEL J. LUND and SUSAN M. LUND,
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
vs.
BRIAN L. SIEGERT and PAULA M. WAGNER,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Amy
Zacharias, Judge.
Brian Siegert and Paula Wagner appeal the district court’s ruling on Daniel
and Susan Lund’s petition to establish a boundary by acquiescence. AFFIRMED.
Kyle J. McGinn of McGinn, Springer & Noethe, P.L.C., Council Bluffs, for
appellants.
William Bracker, Council Bluffs, for appellees.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and May, JJ.
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MAY, Judge.
This is a dispute between landowners over the boundary between their
adjoining properties. The district court found Daniel Lund and Susan Lund (the
Lunds) had established a boundary by acquiescence under Iowa Code
section 650.14 (2019). Their neighbors—Brian Siegert and Paula Wagner (the
Siegerts)1—appealed. We affirm.
I. Introduction & Background Facts
In 2018, the Lunds purchased property in rural Council Bluffs, Iowa (Lund
property). This land abutted a parcel to the north (Siegert property) that was owned
by the Siegerts. The two parcels appear to meet at a fence line. But a 1997 survey
revealed the fence line is actually about twenty feet north of the recorded boundary
line—on the Siegerts’ land. This case centers on that roughly twenty-foot-wide
strip of land between the fence and the surveyed boundary.
No one is sure when the fence was built or by whom. Aerial photos show
what appears to be the fence line from at least 1938 onward. The fence is old
enough that portions of it have deteriorated and become a “brush line,” with trees
and shrubbery growing forming a semi-natural boundary.
At trial, the parties presented conflicting evidence about the extent to which
the fence line was treated as an actual boundary. And much of the evidence about
the disputed land’s use was introduced through previous owners of the competing
parcels. Susan’s parents—Gary Haldeman and Catherine Haldeman (the
Haldemans)—first purchased the Lund property in 2003. They believed the fence
1In the caption of this case, Paula’s last name is listed as Wagner. But in the body
of their brief, she is named Paula Siegert.
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line was the true boundary. And they used the disputed land for driveway access
to their property as well as go-kart riding. The Haldemans also maintained the
area by keeping it mowed. Gary testified that he never saw the owner of the
Siegert’s property—or anyone else—mow the disputed property or otherwise use
it except for periodic driveway access to the adjoining field. “I mean it would have
been like a stranger mowing our yard,” he explained, “and I don’t recall that ever
happening.” Finally, Gary explained that he was never approached about his
family’s use of the disputed land until at least 2014.
The Siegerts presented a markedly different story. Before the Siegerts
purchased their property in 2015, it had been owned by Don Feekin since 1998.
And Feekin testified that, to his understanding, the disputed land was always part
of the Siegert property. Feekin also testified that the Haldemans knew where the
surveyed boundary line was because he had told them about it and, moreover, it
was sometimes marked with flags. Feekin also claimed that he frequently used
the disputed land as an access road. And he claimed he maintained the area by
mowing and spraying for weeds periodically. According to Feekin, the Haldemans
only mowed and maintained about half of the disputed land, maybe five or ten feet
of the twenty-foot-wide strip. Finally, Feekin claimed to have used the disputed
parcel to excavate soil periodically while he owned the land.
After hearing and considering all of the evidence, the district court found
that the parties and their predecessors had treated the fence line as the property
boundary since at least 2003. So the court established title to the disputed land in
the Lunds. The Siegerts appealed.
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II. Standard of Review
An action to establish a boundary by acquiescence “is considered on appeal
as an ordinary action. The district court’s judgment has the effect of a jury verdict,
and on appeal the only inquiry is whether the findings are supported by substantial
evidence.” Egli v. Troy, 602 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Iowa 1999) (internal citation
omitted).2 “[E]vidence is substantial if ‘reasonable minds would accept the
evidence as adequate to reach the same findings.’” Zaw v. Birusingh, No. 20-
0697, 2021 WL 5458049, at *12 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2021) (citation omitted).
As an appellate court, “it is not our province to solve disputed fact questions nor
pass on the credibility of the witnesses.” Concannon v. Blackman, 6 N.W.2d 116,
118 (Iowa 1942).
III. Discussion
Our boundary by acquiescence doctrine is statutory. Iowa Code
section 650.14 provides: “If it is found that the boundaries and corners alleged to
have been recognized and acquiesced in for ten years have been so recognized
and acquiesced in, such boundaries and corners shall be permanently
established.” Put another way, “[w]hen the acquiescence persists for ten years the
line becomes the true boundary even though a survey may show otherwise and
even though neither party intended to claim more than called for by his deed.” Egli,
602 N.W.2d at 333 (quoting Ollinger v. Bennett, 562 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Iowa
1997)). While both parties involved must have knowledge of the claimed boundary
2 Although we have sometimes engaged in de novo review when the parties agree
the case was tried in equity, we see no such agreement here. In any event, based
on our review of the record as a whole, we conclude that even if de novo review
were appropriate, we would reach the same conclusion as the district court.
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line, “[a]cquiescence may be inferred by the silence or inaction of one party who
knows of the boundary line claimed by the other and fails to dispute it for a ten-
year period.” Id. Finally, “[a] party seeking to establish a boundary other than a
survey line” must do so by “‘clear’ evidence.” Id.
Here, we think the district court’s finding was supported by substantial
evidence. Given the longtime use and maintenance of the property by the
Haldemans and the Lunds from 2003 onward, the owners of the Siegert parcel
should have been alerted they needed to take action to dispute the use of the land.
See Albert v. Conger, 886 N.W.2d 877, 884 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016). The property at
issue in this case was not hidden from view nor remote from its owners. And the
Haldemans and the Lunds did not conceal their use of the land when they openly
mowed it and rode go-karts over it. While Feekin claims to have told the
Haldemans where the surveyed line was when they purchased their property, he
never disputed the Haldemans’ use of the land at issue here. Nor did the Siegerts
attempt to oust the Haldemans or the Lunds from their use of the disputed land
until 2019. We think this inaction, coupled with the use of the land by the
Haldemans and the Lunds, establishes a boundary by acquiesce contemplated by
section 650.14. See id.
True, there was contradictory evidence on who maintained and used the
disputed land. “But to the extent the testimony diverged, it was the district court’s
prerogative to resolve the inconsistencies.” Jaeger v. Manemann, No.19-1022,
2020 WL 1888768, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020). And we have considered
the Siegerts’ argument that permissive use of land cannot amount to
acquiescence. But the use of the land by the Haldemans and the Lunds was not
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“permissive” because neither Feekin nor the Siegerts ever authorized the use.
Instead, Feekin testified that he merely notified the Haldemans of the surveyed
line. We think this—coupled with the lack of affirmative ouster for the statutory
period of years—instead demonstrates Feekin’s consent to the fence line as a
boundary. See Olson v. Clark, 109 N.W.2d 441, 444 (Iowa 1961) (“Acquiescence
which will establish a boundary line is consent inferred from silence . . . it exists
when a person who knows that he is entitled to impeach a transaction or enforce
a right neglects to do so for such a length of time that under the circumstances the
other party may fairly infer he has waived or abandoned his right.”).
IV. Conclusion
Substantial evidence supports the district court’s findings. So we affirm.
AFFIRMED.