NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 12 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LONGINO ALBERTO LAZO-FLORES, No. 16-70515
Petitioner, Agency No. A099-534-850
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 8, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and GRABER and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Longino Alberto Flores Lazo,1 also known as Longino Alberto
Lazo-Flores, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1
Petitioner has explained that his correct family name is Flores Lazo, and we refer
to him by this name in this memorandum disposition.
denial of asylum, withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)
relief. We review questions of law de novo, Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497
F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2007), and we review for substantial evidence all factual
findings, Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny the petition.
1. In the immigration context, “motions for recusal are governed by . . . the
constitutional due process requirement that the hearing be before a fair and impartial
arbiter.” Vargas-Hernandez, 497 F.3d at 925 (quoting Matter of Exame, 18 I. & N.
Dec. 303, 306 (BIA 1982)). Flores Lazo has not shown that he was denied a fair and
impartial hearing when the immigration judge (“IJ”) consulted the record to
determine whether it was complete. See Kaur v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 734, 737 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is an IJ’s duty to develop the record fully and fairly.”); see also
Acewicz v. I.N.S., 984 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the IJ’s
questioning regarding an element of petitioners’ claim was not evidence of bias).
Additionally, Flores Lazo has neither demonstrated that “an incorrect or incomplete
translation prevented him from presenting relevant evidence,” nor “that a better
translation would have made a difference in the outcome.” Acewicz, 984 F.2d at
1063. We therefore deny the petition as to Flores Lazo’s due process claims. See
id.
2. In determining whether an applicant for asylum has testified credibly, an IJ
considers “the totality of the circumstances,” including “the inherent plausibility of
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the applicant’s” account “and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements.” 8
U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(C). Substantial evidence supports the
BIA’s determination that Flores Lazo’s testimony was not credible. Flores Lazo
failed to mention in his declaration that he was beaten by his persecutors, even
though the beating represented Flores Lazo’s only allegation of physical harm. See
Alvarez-Santos v. I.N.S., 332 F.3d 1245, 1254–55 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that
substantial evidence supported the adverse credibility determination where
petitioner excluded from his declaration the “pivotal” event of his stabbing).
Further, Flores Lazo was unable to explain plausibly why his testimony about a
shooting he witnessed diverged significantly from a police report describing the
same incident, which Flores Lazo submitted as evidence. See Rizk v. Holder, 629
F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that substantial evidence supported the
adverse credibility determination where petitioner failed to explain plausibly why a
police report differed from his account of a break-in), abrogated on other grounds
by Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc). Because the
record does not compel a conclusion that Flores Lazo testified credibly, we deny the
petition as to his asylum and withholding claims. See Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050,
1052 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying petition for review where substantial evidence
supported BIA’s adverse credibility findings and petitioners therefore failed to carry
their burden of showing entitlement for relief).
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3. “An adverse credibility determination is not necessarily a death knell to
CAT protection.” Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010)). Where a petitioner has
been found not credible, his “CAT claim rests on country conditions reports and
other corroborating evidence in the record including the letters from his family and
acquaintances.” Id. Here, the BIA’s determination that Flores Lazo did not establish
eligibility for CAT protection is supported by substantial evidence. Flores Lazo and
his relatives were never tortured, and Flores Lazo’s country conditions evidence
does not evince a particularized risk of torture. See Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d
1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (concluding that human rights reports
did “not indicate that [petitioner] would face any particular threat of torture beyond
that which all citizens of” his home country face). Accordingly, we conclude that
substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief, and we also deny
the petition as to this claim. See id. at 1053.
PETITION DENIED.
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