UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4782
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HARVEST MAURICE SLOAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Greenville. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (6:17-cr-00628-MGL-1)
Submitted: April 20, 2022 Decided: May 12, 2022
Before MOTZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: John M. Ervin, III, ERVIN LAW OFFICE, P.A., Darlington, South Carolina,
for Appellant. Maxwell B. Cauthen, III, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Harvest Maurice Sloan appeals his conviction and 120-month sentence imposed
after a jury found him guilty of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), finding no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether
the district court erred by denying Sloan’s motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. Sloan filed a pro se brief asserting his conviction was invalid because
the police lacked probable cause to initiate the stop and search that revealed the firearm
and ammunition forming the basis for the charge, and claiming the Government violated
its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Sloan also argues the district
court erred by imposing a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. Sloan filed a
supplemental pro se brief challenging his conviction in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139
S. Ct. 2191 (2019), and moved to file an additional brief supplementing his Brady and
Rehaif claims. The Government declined to file a responsive brief. After an examination
of the record in accordance with Anders and for the reasons that follow, we affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand for resentencing.
Sloan challenges the search of the car in which he was a passenger and the seizure
of a backpack and its contents, which included, among other items, a firearm and Sloan’s
identification. However, “[a] passenger in a car normally has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in an automobile in which he asserts neither a property interest nor a possessory
interest . . . .” United States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 421 (4th Cir. 2002). The person
challenging the search bears the burden of establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy
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in the searched area. United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 653 (4th Cir. 2019). Sloan
did not establish an ownership or possessory interest in the vehicle, and he did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or its contents. He therefore lacks standing
to challenge the search.
Sloan next challenges his conviction, alleging that the Government committed a
Brady violation. “Brady requires the disclosure by the [G]overnment of evidence that is
both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.” United States v.
Caldwell, 7 F.4th 191, 207 (4th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). However, “the mere suppression
of favorable evidence [does not necessarily] entitle the defendant to relief.” United States
v. Higgs, 663 F.3d 726, 735 (4th Cir. 2011). “[S]trictly speaking, there is never a real
Brady violation unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable
probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “No due process violation occurs as long as Brady
material is disclosed to a defendant in time for its effective use at trial.” United States v.
Smith Grading & Paving, Inc., 760 F.2d 527, 532 (4th Cir. 1985).
During Sloan’s cross-examination of one of the responding officers, Sloan
discovered that the driver of the vehicle in which he was riding at the time of his arrest
made a statement to the police claiming ownership of the firearm, and that the statement
had been recorded. The Government was unaware of the recording, and it had not been
disclosed to Sloan during discovery. The district court paused the proceedings and told the
Government to secure the recording from the arresting officer and to promptly turn it over
to Sloan. The Government did so. Sloan used the recording upon resuming his cross-
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examination of the officer and during his direct examination of the officer during the
defense’s case. Sloan also introduced the recording into evidence and played it for the
jury. We conclude that the recording was disclosed in time for Sloan to use it effectively
at trial and, therefore, that he is not entitled to relief under Brady.
Counsel questions whether the district court erred when it denied Sloan’s motion
for a judgment of acquittal. A district court, “on the defendant’s motion[,] must enter a
judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). “We review de novo a district court’s denial of a Rule
29 motion.” United States v. Moody, 2 F.4th 180, 189 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation
marks omitted). We must “draw[] all reasonable inferences from the facts” “in the light
most favorable to the prosecution.” United States v. Denton, 944 F.3d 170, 179 (4th Cir.
2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We will uphold the verdict if . . . it is supported
by substantial evidence.” United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence “is evidence that a reasonable
finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
relevant “legal question [is] whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “[a] defendant who brings a sufficiency
challenge bears a heavy burden, as appellate reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence
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is confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” Savage, 885 F.3d at 219
(internal quotation marks omitted).
At trial, Sloan stipulated that he had previously been convicted of a felony and that
the firearm and ammunition had traveled in interstate commerce. Our review reveals that
the district court did not err when it denied Sloan’s motion for a judgment of acquittal
because sufficient evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that Sloan possessed the
firearm and ammunition. See United States v. Al Sabahi, 719 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir. 2013)
(discussing constructive possession). Further, we conclude that Sloan’s conviction is valid
after Rehaif. See 139 S. Ct. at 2200 (holding that the Government must “prove both that
the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant
category of persons barred from possessing a firearm”). To obtain relief based on a Rehaif
error, the defendant must demonstrate that “if the [d]istrict [c]ourt had correctly instructed
the jury on the mens rea element of a felon-in-possession offense, there is a reasonable
probability that he would have been acquitted.” Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090,
2097 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Sloan does not allege that that there was
a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted him if it had been instructed on
the mens rea element. And, in light of Sloan’s prior felon-in-possession convictions, we
conclude that Sloan has not made “a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that
. . . he did not in fact know he was a felon” Id. at 2100; see id. at 2097-98, and, therefore,
that he is not entitled to relief. See id. at 2096-97 (stating plain-error standard of review).
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Our review of the entire record in accordance with Anders has revealed reversible
error in the imposition of discretionary conditions of supervised release at sentencing. ∗
Because the discretionary conditions of supervised release orally announced by the district
court are inconsistent with those listed in the written judgment, in violation of United States
v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), we vacate the sentence in its entirety and remand
for the district court to resentence Sloan, United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 346
(4th Cir. 2021).
In accordance with Anders, our review of the entire record has uncovered no other
meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm Sloan’s conviction, vacate his
sentence, and remand for resentencing. Because we vacate the sentence, we do not address
at this juncture Sloan’s challenge to his sentencing enhancement. See id. at 346-47
(declining to consider additional challenges to original sentence). Further, we grant
Sloan’s motion to file a supplemental pro se brief and deny his motions to relieve counsel.
This court requires that counsel inform Sloan, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Sloan requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Sloan. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
∗
The district court did not have the benefit of Rogers and Singletary when it
sentenced Sloan.
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legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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