In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-20-00031-CR
___________________________
MADISON CHANDLER SCHROEDER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 3
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR-2018-07419-C
Before Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.; and Lee Ann Dauphinot (Senior Justice, Retired,
Sitting by Assignment)
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Dauphinot
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Upon her open plea of guilty during trial, the trial court convicted Appellant
Madison Chandler Schroeder of driving while intoxicated and assessed her
punishment at six-months’ confinement and a $500 fine. Imposition of the
confinement portion of the sentence was probated for twelve months. Appellant
brings three issues on appeal, arguing
1. The trial court erred when it refused to suppress the stop and seizure of
Appellant because the traffic stop was improper;
2. The trial court erred in determining that the detaining officer was
unavailable during trial; and
3. The trial court erred in not suppressing the testimony given during trial
about the DWI investigation that occurred after the original stop for failure to follow
a traffic-control device because no evidence supported conducting a DWI
investigation.
Because the trial court committed no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Brief Facts
At a little after midnight, Officer Urbano Rodriguez saw a black Jeep Wrangler
pass a “no through traffic” sign at the edge of a two-block-long construction zone.
Officer Rodriguez followed the Jeep through the construction zone and pulled it over
after it had driven through the zone without stopping at one of the houses within the
2
zone. He explained to the driver the reason he had pulled her over. As he spoke with
her, he smelled a strong odor of alcohol and otherwise suspected that she might be
intoxicated. He asked her to get out of the Jeep and then spoke with her. She
became very emotional and exhibited what Officer Rodriguez considered indications
of intoxication.
Officers Rachel Valarezo and Blake Jackson were called to the scene. Officer
Valarezo had Appellant perform various field sobriety tests. She concluded that
Appellant was intoxicated and placed her under arrest. Appellant refused a blood test.
Officer Jackson found an empty wine bottle in the front seat of Appellant’s car and
two empty wine bottles in the backseat. All three were cold to the touch. Appellant’s
blood was drawn pursuant to a search warrant. Her blood alcohol content was .14.
Denial of Appellant’s Pre-trial Motion to Suppress
In her first issue on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it
refused to suppress the evidence obtained after the stop and seizure of Appellant for
the traffic offense of disregarding a traffic-control device. She contends that Officer
Rodriguez had no reasonable suspicion that a criminal offense had or was about to
occur because he had no information whether Appellant was a resident of the portion
of the street within the no-through-traffic prohibition. She argues that residents of
this construction area were not subject to the prohibition against through traffic and
were free to use the street for through traffic.
3
At the suppression hearing, Officer Rodriguez testified he saw a black Jeep
Wrangler pass a “No Through Traffic” sign on West Hickory Street in Denton. The
sign protected a two-block-long construction zone. Only residents of the area who
were going to their homes were allowed beyond the sign. He followed the Jeep
through the zone and stopped it after it had driven through the zone. Officer
Rodriguez identified Appellant as the driver of the Jeep. The trial court admitted
Officer Rodriguez’s dash camera’s and body camera’s recorded video footage of the
stop into evidence and watched it before ruling on the motion to suppress. The trial
court denied Appellant’s motion and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The court found Officer Rodriguez had “both reasonable suspicion and probable
cause” to detain Appellant for a violation of Section 544.004 of the Transportation
Code.
As Appellant correctly states, “In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress evidence and its determination of the reasonableness of either a temporary
investigative detention or an arrest, appellate courts use a bifurcated standard of
review.”1 An appellate court must give almost total deference to the trial court’s
determination of historical facts supported by the record, especially when the trial
court’s findings of fact are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.2 We
Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
1
Id. (quoting Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
2
4
must also defer to a trial court’s ruling on application of law to fact questions or
mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of those questions turns on an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor. But appellate courts review mixed questions
of law and fact that do not depend upon credibility and demeanor by a de novo
standard.3
Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, arguing that Officer Rodriguez
had no reasonable suspicion that Appellant had committed a traffic offense when he
stopped her because he had no prior knowledge of whether Appellant was a resident
of the street controlled by the No Through Traffic sign. On appeal, she argues that
because Officer Rodriguez did not determine whether Appellant was a resident of the
street controlled by the sign, his stop of Appellant was based on “a mere hunch or
suspicion that she was not a resident of the street.” Appellant argues that the sign did
not prohibit a resident’s using the street as a through street.
As we understand Appellant’s argument, because the sign provided, “No Thru
Traffic, Residents Only,” it created a private road for residents of the blocked-off
portion of the public road. That is, she argues that it provides unrestricted use of the
blocked-off portion of the road to all residents and does not limit their use of the
road to that necessary to reach their homes. Otherwise, she argues, the sign would
say only, “No Thru Traffic.” There would be no need to include the phrase,
Id.
3
5
“Residents Only.” That is, the sign appears to instruct drivers that through traffic is
prohibited except to residents, who may use the road for through traffic. We find no
case discussing this concept, and neither Appellant nor the State directs us to such a
case. We, therefore, treat this as a case of first impression.
Appellant is correct in stating that the sign would be clearer if it provided only
“No Thru Traffic.” The addition of “Residents Only” confuses matters. Nor would
it be reasonable to expect a sign to cover every possible exception to the prohibition
of general traffic on the road. But the essence of the traffic control is to prohibit
through traffic. Officer Rodriguez did not detain Appellant within the restricted area
but waited until she had cleared the restricted area. That is, she had clearly violated
the “No Thru Traffic” provision of the sign. A common-sense reading of the sign
suggests that, since only through traffic was prohibited, residents traveling on the road
to reach their homes were not in violation of the through traffic prohibition. We do
not agree with Appellant’s attempted interpretation of the sign as creating a private
road for residents. But even if she were correct, in the absence of some indication on
the vehicle that it belonged to a resident, the fact that the person is a resident is more
properly a defense to violating the prohibition of through traffic.4
4
See Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“[A]
defense would matter only if the facts establishing it were so obvious that an objective
officer viewing the situation would be unreasonable in failing to realize that the
person’s conduct was allowed by law.”).
6
We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in holding that Officer
Rodriguez’s detention of Appellant was properly based on, at a minimum, reasonable
suspicion that she had violated a traffic law. “A police officer has reasonable
suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational
inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person
detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.”5 A police officer
has the authority to stop and temporarily detain a driver who has violated a traffic
law.6
We agree with the trial court’s conclusion of law and hold, “Officer Rodriguez
[had] both reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop the Defendant for a
traffic violation pursuant to Texas Transportation Code Section 544.004.”
Consequently, we overrule Appellant’s first issue on appeal.
Propriety of Determining Officer Rodriguez Was Unavailable and Allowing
His Prior Testimony to Be Read into the Record before the Jury, and Propriety
of Admission of DWI Investigation Evidence
In her second issue on appeal, Appellant argues the trial court reversibly erred
in holding Officer Rodriguez was unavailable to testify during her trial and in allowing
his testimony from the pre-trial motion to suppress hearing to be presented to the
jury. She contends in her third issue that because the parts of his testimony read to
Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
5
Lemmons v. State, 133 S.W.3d 751, 756 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2004, pet.
6
ref’d).
7
the jury did not establish reasonable suspicion for Officer Valarezo’s continued
detention, the trial judge should have granted her trial objection to suppress the
evidence of Officer Valarezo’s continued detention and investigation.
Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress “any and all evidence seized or
obtained as a result of the government’s acts.” Before trial, the court heard and
denied the motion. On July 22, 2019, at the pre-trial hearing on the motion, Officer
Rodriguez testified to the original detention. The video recordings of the detention
were admitted into evidence and watched by the trial judge. We also have closely
watched these video recordings. One shows Officer Rodriguez speaking to Appellant
through a lowered window, returning to his car, and then commenting to another
officer, “It just reeks in there . . . .” Later, Appellant admitted that she might have
had a shot.
During the pre-trial hearing, the State attempted to ask Officer Rodriguez
questions about evidence of intoxication he might have observed. Appellant objected
that such inquiry was beyond the scope of the hearing on the propriety of the original
stop. That is, Appellant orally informed the trial court that her motion to suppress
was limited to the propriety of the original stop of her Jeep. The trial court sustained
the objection and limited the testimony to the grounds for Officer Rodriguez’s traffic
stop of Appellant.
In October––after he had testified at the pretrial hearing in July, but before the
trial the following January––Officer Rodriguez was shot in the leg and in the head
8
during an unrelated traffic stop. At trial, the State offered the transcription of Officer
Rodriguez’s pre-trial testimony regarding the traffic stop. Appellant objected that the
testimony was hearsay and that she was being denied the right to cross-examination.
She argues on appeal that Officer Rodriguez’s testimony does not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 804 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, which provides in pertinent
part:
(a) Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be
unavailable as a witness if the declarant:
....
(4) cannot be present or testify at trial or hearing because of death or
a then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness . . . .
(b) The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule
against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony that:
....
(B) when offered in a criminal case:
(i) was given as a witness at a trial or hearing of the current or
different proceeding; and
(ii) is now offered against a party who had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect
examination . . . .7
Tex. R. Evid. 804(a)(4), (b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii).
7
9
Appellant also challenges the testimony under Crawford v. Washington, which
provides that “the Sixth Amendment demands what common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”8 She points out that
this opportunity must be a complete and adequate opportunity to cross examine the
witness regarding that witness’s testimony as explained by the United States Supreme
Court in Pointer v. Texas.9 She argues that the evidence of Officer Rodriguez’s
unavailability is insufficient and that she was not given a full, complete, and adequate
opportunity to cross-examine Officer Rodriguez.
We must again note that, in the pre-trial hearing on the motion to suppress, the
State attempted to introduce evidence of Appellant’s suspected intoxication.
Appellant objected that any evidence of intoxication or other criminal misconduct was
beyond the scope of the hearing, which was limited to the sufficiency of the grounds
for the original detention. The trial court correctly sustained Appellant’s objections to
the State’s attempts to ask questions beyond the limited scope of the hearing.
On appeal, both Appellant and the State appear to suggest the trial court erred
in limiting the hearing on the motion to suppress to the announced scope of the
hearing: the traffic stop. Appellant argues that the trial court’s sustaining her
objections to questions beyond the limited scope of the hearing denied her the right
8
541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004).
9
380 U.S. 400, 407, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 1069–70 (1965).
10
to fully question Officer Rodriguez. The State argues the trial court’s sustaining
Appellant’s trial objections to the questions that exceeded the scope of the hearing on
the motion to suppress was error, but it was invited error.
Specifically, relying on Vennus v. State,10 the State contends on appeal,
Since Schroeder invited error by making meritless objections that
prevented the State from showing why her traffic stop became a DWI
investigation, she may not make this complaint on appeal.
Schroeder cannot repeatedly prevent the State from admitting
evidence to show why her traffic stop became a DWI investigation and
then complain on appeal that the State failed to prove a constitutional
basis for its DWI investigation. The invited error doctrine stands in her
way.
The law is well established that a search cannot be justified by what it
uncovers.11 Nor is a trial court required to allow every motion hearing to become a
general fishing expedition or a practice trial of the entire case. The record reflects that
the pre-trial hearing was understood by the State, Appellant, and the trial court to be
limited to a determination of the propriety of the initial stop of Appellant. The issue
before the trial court was Appellant’s contention that the traffic-control sign limited
only non-resident motorists’ ability to travel freely through the construction area
governed by the traffic-control sign. The record is also clear that Appellant was not
challenging evidence of intoxication in the pre-trial hearing. The trial court,
10
282 S.W.3d 70, 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
State v. Garcia, 569 S.W.3d 142, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Brown v. State,
11
481 S.W.2d 106, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
11
consequently, did not allow the State to offer evidence of grounds for the intoxication
investigation during the pre-trial hearing. No one could have anticipated Officer
Rodriguez’s injuries that prevented his testifying on that issue at trial.
The fact that at trial, Officer Rodriguez was seriously injured and still required
in-patient rehabilitation treatment in an out-of-state facility was uncontested. Officer
Rodriguez’s pre-trial testimony that was read into evidence before the jury at trial was
limited to his testimony regarding the grounds for the stop of the Jeep and his
detention of Appellant. Officer Rodriguez’s interaction with Appellant was before
the court in the pre-trial hearing on Appellant’s motion to suppress, and Appellant
had the opportunity for full cross-examination of the officer at that time. The video
and audio recording of the stop and the interaction between Appellant and Officer
Rodriguez was offered, admitted, and viewed during the pre-trial hearing.
At trial, Appellant contended for the first time that the original detention was
unduly extended beyond the purpose of the stop. She contends she was denied the
opportunity to question Officer Rodriguez about the length and the purpose of the
detention after the original stop. But all of Officer Rodriguez’s actions, the arrival of
the other two officers, and the conduct of Appellant are all captured on the video
recordings that are part of the record and that have been viewed by the trial court, the
attorneys, and this court. The recordings clearly show the length of time Appellant
was detained both before and after evidence of her intoxication arose, why Officer
Rodriguez thought Appellant was driving while intoxicated and his communication of
12
that reason to Officer Valarezo, and the length of time between Appellant’s original
detention and when Officer Valarezo performed the field sobriety tests.
At trial, the evidence of intoxication was offered through the testimony of
Officer Rachel Valarezo, who performed the field sobriety tests. She was present at
trial and available for cross-examination. The recordings of her interaction with
Appellant were admitted into evidence before the jury and were played for the jury,
with portions muted by agreement between Appellant and the State.
The trial court properly overruled Appellant’s trial objections to the admission
of Officer Rodriguez’s pre-trial testimony regarding the original detention of
Appellant. That testimony was limited to the grounds for the traffic stop of
Appellant. Because the evidence showed that Officer Rodriguez was unavailable,
because the testimony of Officer Rodriguez admitted at trial was limited to his
testimony offered in opposition to Appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress the
original detention, and because Appellant had full opportunity to confront and cross-
examine Officer Rodriguez regarding that testimony and full opportunity to challenge
the admission of that testimony at the pretrial suppression hearing, we hold that the
trial court committed no error in allowing Officer Rodriguez’s pre-trial testimony to
be read into evidence before the jury.
Additionally, because the record shows the reason for and length of Appellant’s
continued detention of Appellant, the trial court did not commit error by overruling
Appellant’s trial objections to admission of the DWI evidence.
13
We overrule Appellant’s second and third issues on appeal.
Conclusion
Because we have overruled Appellant’s three issues on appeal, we affirm
Appellant’s conviction.
/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot
Lee Ann Dauphinot
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: May 12, 2022
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