Appellate Case: 22-3008 Document: 010110686556 Date Filed: 05/19/2022 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 19, 2022
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 22-3008
(D.C. No. 6:21-CR-10004-JWB-1)
TRAYON L. WILLIAMS, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, KELLY, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Trayon L. Williams pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. See
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He has appealed even though his plea agreement included a
waiver of his appellate rights. The government moves to enforce Mr. Williams’s
appeal waiver and to dismiss this appeal under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315
(10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). In response, Mr. Williams’s attorney moves
to withdraw, asserting that it would be frivolous to oppose the government’s motion.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We invited Mr. Williams to
respond himself. The response deadline has passed, and we have not received
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-3008 Document: 010110686556 Date Filed: 05/19/2022 Page: 2
anything from him. After examining the proceedings ourselves, see id., we enforce
the appeal waiver.
We will enforce an appeal waiver if (1) “the disputed appeal falls within the
scope” of the waiver; (2) “the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
appellate rights”; and (3) enforcing the waiver would not “result in a miscarriage of
justice.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325.
Mr. Williams’s docketing statement says that he intends to argue on appeal
that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. 1 That argument falls
within the scope of his waiver of the right to appeal “any matter in connection
with . . . his conviction.” R. Vol. 1 at 26.
Still, “if the defendant did not voluntarily enter into the agreement, the
appellate waiver subsumed in the agreement also cannot stand.” United States v.
Rollings, 751 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 2014). The defendant has the burden to
show that a waiver was not knowing and voluntary. United States v. Tanner,
721 F.3d 1231, 1233 (10th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). To assess whether a waiver was
knowing and voluntary, we typically focus on two factors: “whether the language of
the plea agreement states that the defendant entered the agreement knowingly and
voluntarily” and whether the district court conducted “an adequate Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. “[E]ither the express
1
In her response to the government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver,
defense counsel likewise says that Mr. Williams “takes issue with the voluntariness
of his plea.” Resp. at 11.
2
Appellate Case: 22-3008 Document: 010110686556 Date Filed: 05/19/2022 Page: 3
language of the plea agreement, if sufficiently clear, detailed, and comprehensive, or
the probing inquiry of a proper Rule 11 colloquy could be enough to conclude the
waiver was knowing and voluntary. But the synergistic effect of both will often be
conclusive.” Tanner, 721 F.3d at 1234.
Mr. Williams asserted in his plea agreement that he “knowingly and
voluntarily” waived his right to appeal, R. Vol. 1 at 26, that the plea agreement was
“not the result of any threats, duress or coercion,” id. at 28, and that he entered his
guilty plea “freely, voluntarily, and knowingly,” id. During the plea colloquy,
Mr. Williams said that he understood that he gave up the right to challenge his
conviction on appeal, that he entered his plea freely and voluntarily, and that no one
had forced or threatened him in any way to get him to plead guilty. Based on these
statements, the district court found that Mr. Williams made his plea freely and
voluntarily with a full understanding of the consequences. This strong evidence that
Mr. Williams knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea and waived his right to
appeal is not overcome by his claim at sentencing that he had been “manipulated”
into accepting the plea agreement, R. Vol. 3 at 14. See Tanner, 721 F.3d at 1233
(“A properly conducted plea colloquy, particularly one containing express findings,
will, in most cases, be conclusive on the waiver issue, in spite of a defendant’s
post hoc assertions to the contrary.”). So we conclude that he knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to appeal.
3
Appellate Case: 22-3008 Document: 010110686556 Date Filed: 05/19/2022 Page: 4
And our examination of the proceedings has not given us any reason to think
that enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice, as Hahn defines
that phrase. See 359 F.3d at 1327.
We grant defense counsel’s motion to withdraw, grant the government’s
motion to enforce the appeal waiver, and dismiss this appeal.
Entered for the Court
Per Curiam
4