NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 31 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM RAMIREZ; STACEY L. No. 20-16786
RAMIREZ,
D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00632-KJM-CKD
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF EL DORADO; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 17, 2022**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
William and Stacey L. Ramirez appeal pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in their 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 action alleging
various claims in connection with their eviction. We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appellants’ request for oral
argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and summary judgment. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.
2003). We affirm.
To the extent appellants’ claims are based on the premise that the state court
erred or that they were unlawfully evicted, the district court properly dismissed the
claims as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1155-58
(Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars de facto appeal of a state court judgment or claims
“inextricably intertwined” with that judgment).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
Gerhart and Elledge on the basis of qualified immunity because it would not have
been clear to every reasonable officer at the time that referencing their guns while
ordering an individual to open the door during an eviction and making a comment
about not “being nice” violated the constitution under the circumstances. See
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (discussing qualified
immunity and explaining that a “clearly established right is one that is sufficiently
clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing
violates that right” and “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)). Appellants have not provided a case where an officer acting under
similar circumstances as those here was held to have violated the Fourth
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Amendment, and they have not established that this is a “rare ‘obvious case’”
where the defendants’ conduct was clearly unlawful. District of Columbia v.
Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (citation omitted).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
Seligsohn and Harwood because appellants failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether these defendants had a duty under the Fourteenth
Amendment to take action against appellants’ former landlord. See Patel v. Kent
Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 971-72 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining the “special-
relationship” and “state-created danger” exceptions to the general rule that a state
actor is not liable for an omission or failure to protect).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
Brzezinski, Shaw, and Petri because appellants failed to raise a triable dispute as to
whether these defendants violated their constitutional rights in connection with the
seizure of appellants’ pets. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that liability under § 1983 requires a showing of personal
participation in the alleged rights deprivation); see also Brower v. County of Inyo,
489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989) (explaining that to state a Fourth Amendment claim,
plaintiffs must show that a seizure was “unreasonable”); Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City
of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that a Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim requires a plaintiff to show a “denial of adequate
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procedural protections”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the municipal
entity defendants because appellants failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether
their alleged constitutional deprivations were the result of an official policy, a
long-standing practice or custom, or a decision of a final policymaker. See Castro
v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(discussing requirements to establish liability under Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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