NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 14 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 21-50151
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:14-cr-00560-LAB-1
v.
VICTOR HUGO AVALOS, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 10, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH, BADE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Victor Avalos appeals his 24-month sentence for violating conditions of his
supervised release. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount
them here, except as necessary to provide context to our ruling. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Avalos contends that the district court procedurally erred by not considering
all the mandatory sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Because Avalos did
not raise this specific issue before the district court, we review for plain error. See
United States v. Jackson, 697 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). To
succeed on plain error review, the alleged error must be clear or obvious such that it
affected Avalos’s substantial rights. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734–
35 (1993). The district court identified two sentencing factors as most relevant—
deterrence and protection of the public—but the record does not reasonably suggest
that its analysis was limited to those factors. “The district court need not tick off
each of the § 3553(a) factors to show that it has considered them. We assume that
district judges know the law and understand their obligation to consider all of the
§ 3553(a) factors . . . .” United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted). We conclude there is no plain error.
Avalos also argues that the district court interpreted the federal Sentencing
Guidelines incorrectly by categorically rejecting his drug addiction as a mitigating
factor. Because Avalos clearly raised this issue before the district court, we review
it de novo. See Jackson, 697 F.3d at 1144 (“We review de novo a district court’s
interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines.”). As the hearing
transcript makes clear, the district court considered Avalos’s drug addiction
throughout the sentencing, but decided that it was not a mitigating factor in this case.
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The district court’s reasoning was adequate and leaves no ambiguity about whether
it misapprehended relevant law.
Avalos next contends that the district court did not adequately consider his
allocution statements about prison conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic and
how the time in custody justified a mitigated sentence. We review for plain error
because Avalos did not raise this mitigation objection in the district court. See
Jackson, 697 F.3d at 1144. The district court listened to and considered Avalos’s
brief statement about the difficult pandemic prison conditions. Although the district
court did not specifically address prison conditions in its sentencing rationale,
“[w]here a matter is [] conceptually simple . . . and the record makes clear that the
sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law
requires the judge to write more extensively.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
359 (2007).
Finally, Avalos contends that the district court did not adequately explain why
it imposed an upward variance from the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range of
12 to 18 months. Review of the sentencing transcript makes clear that the district
court provided specific and adequate reasons for imposing a higher sentence. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2); United States v. Musa, 220 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2000).
We find no plain error.
AFFIRMED.
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