Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed June 15, 2022.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D21-1728
Lower Tribunal No. 20-195-A-K
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Aquilino Mayorga,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the County Court for Monroe County, Peary S. Fowler,
Judge.
Robertson & Hunter, LLP, and Dustin S. Hunter, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and EMAS and SCALES, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See § 316.605(1), Fla. Stat. (2020) (providing: “Every
vehicle, at all times . . . shall . . . display the license plate or both of the
license plates assigned to it by the state . . . and all letters, numerals, printing,
writing, the registration decal, and the alphanumeric designation shall be
clear and distinct and free from defacement, mutilation, grease, and other
obscuring matter, so that they will be plainly visible and legible at all times
100 feet from the rear or front”); English v. State, 191 So. 3d 448, 450 (Fla.
2016) (“When the statutory language is clear or unambiguous, this Court
need not look behind the statute's plain language or employ principles of
statutory construction to determine legislative intent”); State v. Burris, 875
So. 2d 408, 413-14 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting State’s argument that the plain
language of the robbery statute would lead to an unreasonable result or one
clearly contrary to legislative intent: “As the State argues here, . . . we could
infer that the Legislature would intend to deter a robber from using an
automobile as a weapon and, thus, that the statute should penalize a robber
who uses an automobile as a weapon. However, this interpretation would
extend the reach of section 812.13(2)(a) beyond its express language based
solely upon a very broad inference rather than any clear indication of
legislative intent. Attractive as this interpretation may be from a policy
standpoint, we must resist the temptation to so expand the statute. To
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construe the statute in a way that would extend or modify its express terms
would be an inappropriate abrogation of legislative power.”)
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