[Cite as State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-2089.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-21-61
v.
PRENTICE JONES, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Lima Municipal Court
Trial Court No. 21CRB02182
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: June 21, 2022
APPEARANCES:
F. Stephen Chamberlain for Appellant
David Osborne, Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 1-21-61
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Prentice Jones (“Jones”), brings this appeal from
the December 10, 2021, judgment of the Lima Municipal Court sentencing Jones to
180 days in jail, with 135 suspended, after Jones was convicted in a bench trial of
domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a first degree misdemeanor. On
appeal, Jones argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to convict him,
and that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Background
{¶2} On November 11, 2021, Jones was living at the Travelodge in Lima
with his girlfriend, T.S. While T.S. was sleeping, Jones struck her in the foot,
causing her pain. When she awakened, T.S. was angry and the two argued. The
police were eventually called and Jones was arrested.
{¶3} Jones was charged in trial court case 21CRB02182(A) with domestic
violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a first degree misdemeanor, and in trial
court case 21CRB02182(B) with assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), a first
degree misdemeanor.
{¶4} Jones was released from jail a couple of days after the incident and he
went right back to the Travelodge to stay with T.S. despite a no contact order being
in place. Jones and T.S. were together over the weekend, but on November 14,
2021, T.S. called the police, making numerous accusations against Jones. Those
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accusations led to Jones being charged in trial court case 21CRB02198 with
numerous other criminal offenses.1
{¶5} Jones pled not guilty to the charges in both trial court cases and he
proceeded to a bench trial on December 9, 2021. Ultimately Jones was convicted in
21CRB021282(A) of domestic violence; however, he was acquitted of all other
charges against him in both cases.
{¶6} The case proceeded directly to sentencing with Jones being ordered to
serve 180 days in jail, with 135 suspended. A judgment entry memorializing Jones’s
sentence was filed December 10, 2021. It is from this judgment that Jones appeals,
asserting the following assignments of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. 1
The trial court erred in denying defendant/appellant’s motion for
acquittal and the evidence was insufficient to support the
conviction of defendant/appellant for the crime of domestic
violence in violation of [the] Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, and Section 16, Article I of the
Ohio Constitution.
Assignment of Error No. 2
The Court’s verdict finding defendant/appellant, guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the crime of domestic violence is against the
manifest weight of the evidence in violation of [the] Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
1
As Jones was acquitted of all charges in trial court case 21CRB02198, we will not discuss those charges.
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First Assignment of Error
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Jones argues that there was insufficient
evidence presented to convict him.
Standard of Review
{¶8} “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a
question of law.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997); State v. Groce,
163 Ohio St.3d 387, 2020-Ohio-6671, ¶ 6. Therefore, our review is de novo. In re
J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961, ¶ 3. In a sufficiency-of-the-evidence
inquiry, the question is whether the evidence presented, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to find the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus (superseded by constitutional
amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102,
(1997), fn. 4) following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979).
“In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy.” Thompkins at 386.
Controlling Authority
{¶9} In this case, Jones was convicted of domestic violence in violation of
R.C. 2919.25(A), which reads, “No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to
cause physical harm to a family or household member.”
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{¶10} As relevant to this case, “physical harm to persons” is defined in R.C.
2901.01(A)(3) as, “any injury, illness, or other physiological impairment, regardless
of its gravity or duration.”
Evidence Presented by the State
{¶11} T.S. and Jones started a romantic relationship in June of 2021. At the
beginning of their relationship, the couple lived with T.S.’s mother; however, T.S.’s
mother, Jacqueline, was already caring for five of T.S.’s children in the home and
Jacqueline did not want T.S. and a “complete stranger” living in her home, so
Jacqueline had them evicted.
{¶12} T.S. and Jones then began staying at the Travelodge motel in Lima.
T.S. had a number of health issues including liver failure, chronic pancreatitis,
anemia, diabetes, and chronic neuropathy. T.S. testified that while she and Jones
were living at the Travelodge, on November 11, 2021, she was asleep and Jones
slapped her foot, “hard,” causing her foot pain. (Tr. at 20). T.S. specifically
testified, “I mean it wasn’t a—a light slap. It was a hard slap.” (Id. at 11). T.S.
indicated that she took medication for the pain in her feet already, “the max dose,
three times a day[.]” (Id. at 22).
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{¶13} T.S. was “upset” at being awakened and, due to the slap and the
“nature of the way” Jones was talking to her, T.S. “got scared,” so she called the
police. (Id. a 9, 20).2
{¶14} Jones was convicted of domestic violence for slapping T.S.’s foot.
Analysis
{¶15} In arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict
Jones of domestic violence, Jones contends that the State did not establish that
“harm” was caused that would meet the statutory definition when Jones slapped
T.S.’s foot. Further, he argues that to the extent any “harm” was caused, the State
did not establish that it was caused by Jones rather than T.S.’s medical conditions.
{¶16} Contrary to Jones’s argument, T.S. did testify to each element of the
crime of domestic violence. She testified that she lived with Jones at the
Travelodge, that Jones struck her foot “hard,” and that the strike caused her pain.
{¶17} Importantly, physical harm to persons consists of “any injury * * *
regardless of its gravity or duration.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2901.01(A)(3).
Physical harm “does not require evidence of visible injuries.” State v. Boldin, 11th
Dist. Geauga No. 2007-G-2808, 2008-Ohio-6408, ¶ 40.
{¶18} Given that T.S. specifically testified that the slap caused her pain, we
cannot determine that the State presented insufficient evidence to support Jones’s
2
The remaining witnesses for the State testified primarily regarding the November 14, 2021, incident and
that testimony is not relevant to this appeal.
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conviction for Domestic Violence. See State v. Wyland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
94463, 2011-Ohio-455 (upholding assault conviction where physical harm was
caused by kick that merely grazed a shin, but reversing an assault conviction where
no physical harm was testified to by being spit upon). For these reasons, Jones’s
first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶19} In his second assignment of error, Jones argues that even if there was
sufficient evidence presented to convict him, his conviction was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
Standard of Review
{¶20} In reviewing whether a verdict was against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and examines the conflicting
testimony. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52. In doing
so, this Court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all of the
reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether
in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder “clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a
new trial ordered.” Id.
{¶21} Nevertheless, a reviewing court must allow the trier-of-fact
appropriate discretion on matters relating to the credibility of the witnesses. State
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v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight
standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against
the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State
v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter,
131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
Testimony Presented by the Defense
{¶22} Regarding the November 11, 2021 incident, Jones testified that he
went to work on the day in question and missed multiple calls from T.S. When he
was on break he called her back and learned that T.S. was sick and that the building
was being “evacuated” due to fire alarms. (Tr. at 79). Jones was given permission
to leave work early and he went to the Travelodge.
{¶23} When he arrived, T.S. was “half asleep,” but she indicated that the
Travelodge had let them back inside. (Id. at 80). Jones testified that he was hungry
since he skipped lunch at work in order to come home, prompting him to start
looking for the forks. When he did not find the forks, he asked T.S. about them but
she did not answer. Jones testified that he then “tapped” T.S.’s foot.
{¶24} According to Jones, T.S. was very angry at being awakened and an
argument ensued. Jones testified that T.S. was intoxicated and she tried to leave
with a bottle of alcohol in her bag. Jones testified that he stopped T.S. from driving
away while intoxicated, but then T.S. called the police and he was arrested.
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{¶25} Jones’s mother testified as well, indicating that T.S. had texted her
after the incident in question, claiming that Jones had just “hit her to wake [her] up.”
(Tr. at 102, 104).
Analysis
{¶26} Through Jones’s testimony, and the testimony of his mother, it became
clear that Jones did, in fact, strike T.S.’s foot. Jones also acknowledged that he was
living at the Travelodge. Thus the only real question remaining was whether the
trial court’s determination that Jones knowingly caused physical harm to T.S. was
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶27} We note that Jones was aware that T.S. had various ailments, yet he
struck her foot anyway. Regardless, the trial court, acting as trier-of-fact, was free
to disbelieve Jones’s claim that he merely “tapped” T.S.’s foot, particularly given
that T.S. apparently sent a text message to Jones’s mother shortly after the incident
indicating that Jones had “hit” her.
{¶28} A reviewing court must allow the trier-of-fact appropriate discretion
on matters relating to the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio
St.2d 230, 231 (1967). The trier-of-fact is best able “to view the witnesses and
observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use these observations
in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio
St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 24. The trier-of-fact may take note of any
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inconsistencies and resolve them accordingly, “believ[ing] all, part, or none of a
witness’s testimony.” State v. Raver, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-604, 2003-
Ohio-958, ¶ 21, citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964).
{¶29} Here, the trial judge believed T.S.’s story and her claim that she was
harmed by Jones’s actions and we will not second-guess the trial court’s judgment.
Moreover, when the trial court conducted its analysis on the record to render its
decision with regard to the various charges, the trial court established that it was
discerning and paying particular attention to the details. The trial court acquitted
Jones of other domestic violence/assault charges at the trial, noting that things like
“grabbing someone’s shoulder” while impolite, was not automatically domestic
violence unless there was harm or injury. (Tr. at 116). The trial court thus
distinguished the incident wherein T.S. testified to pain after the foot slap from the
other incidents wherein there was physical contact between T.S. and Jones but T.S.
did not identify any pain or other harm.
{¶30} We note that some appellate cases have held that certain instances of
knowing physical contact do not satisfy “physical harm to persons” unless there is
specific testimony regarding an injury. For example, “pushing” someone may
constitute force for a robbery but it does not necessarily satisfy the element of
causing physical harm. See State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91943, 2009-
Ohio-3894, ¶ 38. Similarly it has been determined that the act of pushing a stroller
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over a person’s toes does not meet the definition of an “injury” for a robbery,
although it may have been force. See State v. Frunza, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
82053, 2003-Ohio-4809.
{¶31} However, unlike those cases, we have specific testimony that the
“hard” slap caused T.S. pain. Given that the definition for physical harm to persons
indicates “any injury” regardless of gravity or duration, we cannot find that Jones’s
conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore his second
assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶32} For the foregoing reasons, Jones’s assignments of error are overruled
and the judgment of the Lima Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
/jlr
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