Case: 21-51111 Document: 00516368633 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/23/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
June 23, 2022
No. 21-51111
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Terrance Darrell Johnson,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 7:04-CR-155-2
Before Davis, Jones, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Terrance Darrell Johnson appeals the 24-month sentence imposed
following the revocation of his supervised release. His sentence exceeded the
suggested sentencing range but was not greater than the statutory maximum.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-51111 Document: 00516368633 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/23/2022
No. 21-51111
Johnson contests the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. He
argues that the sentence was greater than necessary to achieve the sentencing
goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and contends that the district court erroneously
applied the sentencing factors. Because he preserved his claim, we apply the
plainly-unreasonable standard. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140
S. Ct. 762, 766-67 (2020); United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir.
2011).
The record reflects that the district court’s justification for imposing
the revocation sentence was reasoned, fact-specific, and consistent with the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. See United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 332-
33 (5th Cir. 2013). The district court undertook an individualized assessment
of the facts and concluded that a sentence of 24 months in prison was proper
to satisfy the aims of § 3553(a). There is no indication that the district court
did not account for a factor that should have received significant weight, gave
significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or made a clear error of
judgment in balancing the sentencing factors. See Warren, 720 F.3d at 332.
Johnson complains that the district court lacked a full understanding
of his history and circumstances because no presentence report (PSR) had
been prepared since his initial sentencing. His claim that a PSR was required
is substantially undermined by our caselaw, see Warren, 720 F.3d at 327-28 &
n.1, and he has not shown that the lack of an updated PSR, a purported error
that he asserts initially on appeal, justifies reversal on plain-error review, see
United States v. Urbina-Fuentes, 900 F.3d 687, 691 (5th Cir. 2018). The
record otherwise supports that the district court was aware of and considered
the history and characteristics reflected in the information before the court.
Further, Johnson asserts that his sentence was more severe than other
defendants sanctioned for similar supervised-release violations. He contends
that the district court did not consider any unwarranted sentencing disparity,
2
Case: 21-51111 Document: 00516368633 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/23/2022
No. 21-51111
in contravention of § 3553(a)(6). However, he does not present any apposite
comparison between himself and a similarly situated defendant and therefore
has failed to allege or establish that his sentence is disparate relative to any
comparable defendant. See United States v. Waguespack, 935 F.3d 322, 337
(5th Cir. 2019); § 3553(a)(6).
His assertion that the sentence does not reflect an accurate evaluation
or application of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors or is improper in light of the
nature of his violation reflects nothing more than his disagreement with the
district court’s weighing of the factors. His displeasure with the weight given
to particular factors does not justify reversal. See Warren, 720 F.3d at 332.
The fact that we could reasonably have held that a different sentence was
proper does not render the sentence unreasonable. Id. The record otherwise
reflects that the decision to impose a sentence above the suggested guidelines
range was not an abuse of discretion. See id. at 332-33.
The judgment is AFFIRMED.
3