— Presently before the Court are the preliminary objections filed by condemnees, John Corcoran and Madalyn Corcoran.
On June 6, 1986, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation (hereafter PennDOT), filed a declaration of taking for a portion of property owned by condemnees located in Manheim Township, Lancaster County, Pa., for
Section 2003(e)(1) of the Administrative Code, supra, states, inter alia:
The Department of Transportation in accord with appropriation made by the General Assembly, and grants of funds from Federal, State, regional, local or private agencies, shall have the power, and its duty shall be:
(e)(1) To acquire, by gift, purchase, condemnation or otherwise, land in fee simple or such lesser estate or interest as it shall determine, in the name of the Commonwealth, for all transportation purposes, including marking, rebuilding, relocating, widening, reconstructing, repairing and maintaining State designated highways and other transportation facilities, and to erect on the land thus acquired such structures and facilities, including garages, storage sheds or other buildings, as shall be required for transportation purposes . . . (Emphasis added.)
71 P.S. §513(e)(l), supra.
Condemnees note that provisions of a statute confering-the power of . eminent domain shall be
“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded . . 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).3 The clear language of section 2003(e)(1) of the Administrative Code, supra, empowers PennDOT to acquire land by condemnation for all transportation purposes. The statute enumerates acquisitions for the benefit of “state-designated highways” as one transportation purpose and acquisitions for the benefit of “other transportation facilities” as another.
Nowhere is the phrase “all transportation purposes” limited to acquisitions for the benefit of state-designated highways. To the contrary, the phrase “transportation purpose” has been broadly construed. See E-Z Parks Inc. v. Larson, 91 Pa. Commw. 600, 498 A.2d 1364 (1985); Miller v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 91 Pa. Commw. 622, 498 A.2d 1370 (1985). In Miller, supra, wherein the condemnee argued that the proposed use of the property as a parking garage was not a “transportation purpose” and that, therefore, PennDOT lacked authority to condemn the subject property, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court stated:
“[i]n accordance with the broad construction given to the phrase ‘transportation purpose’ in other contexts we must also conclude that, for purposes of
Instantly, PennDOT’s acquisition of a right-of-way over that portion of condemnees’ land which borders Roseville Road is an integral part of the reconstruction project to Legislative Route 442 and is necessary for the proper completion of the safety improvement to the intersection of the two roadways. (See answer to preliminary objections’ paragraph 2, and drawings authorizing acquisition of right-of-way attached thereto.) Since the taking of that portion of condemnees’ land which borders Roseville Road is for a “transportation purpose” within the meaning of section 2003(e)(1) of the Administrative Code, supra, we find that PennDOT is authorized to condemn the subject property.
Accordingly, we enter the following
ORDER
And now, September 22, 1986, the preliminary objections filed by condemnees, John Corcoran and Madalyn Corcoran, are hereby dismissed.
1.
Administrative Code, Act of June 7, 1923, P.L. 498, art. I, §1, as amended; 71 P.S. §513(e)(l), supplement.
2.
Statutory Construction Act of 1927, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, §3; 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(4), supplement.
3.
Statutory Construction Act of 1927, supra; 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b), supplement.