This is certainly .a case of first impression. We are not aware that any similar action has been sustained in England, or in any of the courts of this country. It is founded on no statute. It is an action on the case, at common law, brought by an individual holder of shares in an incorporated bank, against the directors, not including the president, setting forth various acts of negligence and malfeasance, through a series of years, in consequence of which, as the declaration alleges, the whole capital of the bank was wasted and lost, and the shares of the plaintiff became of no value. The circumstance that no such action has been maintained, would certainly be no decisive objection, if it could be shown to be maintainable on principle. But the fact, that similar grievances have existed to a great extent, and in numberless instances, where such an action would have presented an obvious and effective remedy, affords strong proof, that in the view of all such suffering parties, and their legal advisers and guides, there was no principle on which such an action can be maintained.
If an action can be brought by one stockholder, it may be brought by the holder of a single share; so that for one and the same default of these directors, thirty five hundred actions might be brought. If it may be sustained by proof of an act, or series of acts, of carelessness, neglect, and breach of duty, in managing the affairs of the bank, by which the whole value of the stock is destroyed, it may, on the same principle, be maintainéd on any act or instance of such negligence, by which the shares are diminished in value fifty, ten, five, or *384one per cent. Still, notwithstanding these consequences, if the plaintiff has a good right of action, upon recognized and sound legal principles, his action ought to be sustained.
But the court are of opinion that the action cannot be maintained; and that on several grounds, a few of the more prominent of which may be alluded to.
1. There is no legal privity, relation, or immediate connexion, between the holders of shares in a bank, in their individual capacity, on the one side, and the directors of the bank on the other. The directors are not the bailees, the factors, agents or trustees of such individual stockholders. The bank is a corporation and body politic, having a separate existence as a distinct person in law, in whom the whole stock and property of the bank are vested, and to whom all agents, debtors, officers and servants are responsible for all contracts, express or implied, made in reference to such capital, and for all torts and injuries diminishing or impairing it. The very purpose of incorporation is, to create such legal and ideal person in law, distinct from all the persons composing it, in order to avoid the extreme difficulty, and perhaps it is not too much to say the utter impracticability, of such a number of persons acting together in their individual capacities. The practical difficulty would be nearly as great, whether it were held that all must join in an action to recover damage for an injury to the common property, or that each might sue separately.
The stockholders do, indeed, ordinarily elect the directors; but it is as parts and members of the corporation, in their corporate capacity, in modes pointed out by the charter and by-laws, so that the directors are the appointees of the corporation, not of the individuals. Indeed, I believe there is a provision in the bank charters — there certainly was formerly — which is equally to the present purpose; namely, that the Commonwealth shall be at liberty to add a certain amount to the capital of various banks, and appoint a proportional number of directors. Such directors, so appointed, pursuant to the charter regulating the legal organization of the body, *385would stand in all respects on the footing of directors chosen by the stockholders. If these 'were liable to the action of individual stockholders, those would be, in like manner.
2. The individual members of the corporation, whether they should all join, or each act severally, have no right or power to intermeddle with the property or concerns of the bank, or call any officer, agent or servant to account, or discharge them from any liability. Should all the stockholders join in a power of attorney to any one, he could not take possession of any real or personal estate, any security or chose in action; could not collect a debt, or discharge a claim, or release damage arising from any default; simply because they are not the legal owners of the property, and damage done to such property is not an injury to them. Their rights and their powers are limited and well defined. They are members of an organized body, and exercise such powers as the organization of the institution gives them. Stockholders in banks have a separate right to dividends, when declared, and to a distributive share of the capital stock, if any remains when the charter of the bank is at an end, and its debts paid.
3. But another important consideration is, that the injury done to the capital stock by wasting, impairing and diminishing its value, is not, in the first instance, nor necessarily, a damage to the stockholders. All sums which could, in any form, be recovered on that ground, would be assets of the corporation, and when collected and received by directors, receivers, or any other persons entitled to receive the same, they would be held in trust, first to redeem the bills and pay the debts of the' bank; and it would be only after these debts were paid, and in case any surplus should remain, that the stockholders would be entitled to receive any thing. It is, therefore, an indirect, contingent and subordinate interest, which each stockholder has, in damages so to be recovered against directors. If, upon such indirect, contingent and remote interest, individual stockholders could recover for the defaults of directors, and especially, as is alleged in this case, where these defaults have been so great as to sink the capital,. *386a fortiori would the creditors of the bank individually have a right to maintain similar actions ; because their claim upon the funds, being prior to that of stockholders, would be somewhat more immediate and direct.
In the same connexion, it is obvious to remark, that a judgment in favor of one stockholder would be no bar to an action by a creditor, nor a judgment by both, to an action by the corporation.
4. But it is said, that although the real and personal estate, the securities and capital stock, are, in legal contemplation, vested in the corporation, yet the individual has a separate and distinct property and interest in his particular shares, by any injury to which he may have a separate damage. To some extent, it is true that he has a several interest in his shares; but it is to be taken with some qualifications. Strictly speaking, shares in a bank do not constitute a legal estate and property ; it is rather a limited and qualified right which the stockholder has to participate, in a certain proportion, in the benefits of a common fund, vested in a corporation for the common use; it is a qualified and equitable interest, a valuable interest, manifested usually by a certificate, which is transferable. To the extent of this separate and peculiar interest, a stockholder, no doubt, might maintain his separate and special action, according to the nature of the wrong done to him in respect’to it; as trover or trespass, for the conversion or tortious taking of his certificate ; trespass on the case for refusing to make a transfer on a proper occasion; assumpsit for a dividend declared, and the like. But an injury done to the stock and capital, by negligence or misfeasance, is not an injury to such separate interest, but to the whole body of stockholders in common. It is like the case of a common nuisance, where one who suffers a special damage, peculiar to himself, and distinguishable in kind from that which he shares in the common injury, may maintain a special action. Otherwise, he cannot. Co. Lit. 56 a. 3 Steph. N. P. 2372, Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146.
But we axe pressed with the argument, that for everv *387damage which one sustains, which is caused by the wrongful act of another, he ought to have a remedy. This is far from being universally true. Another maxim in regard to claims for damage is, causa próxima, non remota, spectatur. Thousands of instances occur, in which one sustains cor sequential and incidental damage from the misconduct of another, without a remedy at law. By the misconduct of the officers or agents of a parish, town, county, or even of the State or the Union, defalcations may take place, treasure be squandered and wasted, and all the members of the respective aggregate bodies suffer damage, for which the law, from the nature of the case, can afford no direct remedy. But the true answer to the objection is, that stockholders have a remedy, a theoretic one indeed, and perhaps often inadequate, in the power of the corporation, in its corporate capacity, to obtain redress for injuries done to the common property, by the recovery of damages; and each individual stockholder has his remedy, through the powers thus vested in the corporation, for the common benefit.
On the whole, the court are of opinion that the demurrer is well taken, and that the action cannot be maintained.