The court are of opinion, that the judgment of the court of common pleas ought to be affirmed, and the trustee discharged. The trustee was an officer charged with the service of criminal process, issued on the complaint of this plaintiff. He acted by color -of his office, and, as incidental to the service of the process, took from the trustee the money and property in question, declaring it to be in performance of his official duty, which was to carry the defendant before the examining magistrate. The prisoner could make no resistance, and in no other way express his objection and dissent, than by protesting, which he did. We think that both the officer, and the plaintiff who claims through him, are estopped to dery that in this respect he acted officially. He is there*259fore within the spirit, if not within the letter of the Rev. Sts. c. 109, § 30, clauses 2 and 3. The property was taken by him as a public officer, performing an official duty. We should fear that any other construction would lead to a gross abuse of criminal process. Such process might be used to search the person, or otherwise, under color of lawful authority, to get possession of the property of a debtor, in order to place it in the hands of the officer, and thus make it attachable by trustee process.
The receipt, disclosed in the last examination, given by the officer to the person arrested after the arrest, appears to us to make no difference. It was a mere certificate of the fact that he had taken the property, to give the defendant the benefit of it as proof, and' also exempt himself from the charge of any unlawful intent in taking it.
Trustee discharged