The main ground on which the plaintiff rests his claim to equitable relief is, that the condition annexed by the original owner and grantor to his grant of the entire tract of land, of which the plaintiff and defendant now by mesne conveyances severally hold distinct parcels, constitutes a perpetual restriction on the use of the part now owned by the defendant, in the nature of a servitude or easement, on the observance of which the plaintiff, as the owner of the other part of the original parcel, has a right to insist.
It is doubtless true that such may be the effect of a condition in a class of cases where it is apparent that the condition was annexed to a grant for the purpose of improving or rendering more beneficial and advantageous the occupation of the estate granted, when it should become divided into separate parcels and be owned by different individuals, or when the manifest object of a restriction on the use of an estate was to benefit another tract adjoining to or in the vicinity of the land on which the restriction is imposed. But, in the absence of any fact or circumstance to show such purpose or object, a condition annexed to a grant can have no effect or operation either at law or in equity beyond that which attaches to it by the rules of the common law. The benefit of the condition would in such cases enure only to the grantor and his heirs or devisees, and the burden of it would rest on the estate to which it was annexed, and on those who held it or any part of it subject to the condition. Indeed, no restriction on the use of land and no condition annexed to its possession and enjoyment can be for the benefit of the grantee or those holding his estate in the granted premises, unless it be as a consideration of some restriction on other land, which may operate as an advantage or convenience in the use and occupation of the granted premises. Inasmuch as a grantee can restrict the use of land of which he is the owner according to his own will and pleasure, it is clear that he can derive no *150benefit from a restriction or condition as such imposed on its use or enjoyment by any prior grantor.
There is nothing in the case before us which in any degree tends to show that there was any intent on the part of the grantor and grantee in the original deed by which the condition was annexed to that grant of the land now owned by the parties to this suit, to give any other or different effect to the condition than that which would result from it at common law. It does not appear that the original grantor had in contemplation the division of the land into separate lots or parcels which would be held by different owners, or that the condition was inserted in the grant for the purpose of creating a restriction on the use of the land as between subsequent grantees of different lots or parcels thereof. And this constitutes the precise distinction between the case at bar and that of Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen, 341, on which the plaintiff mainly relies in support of his case. There it was made to appear that a condition annexed to a grant of an estate was imposed in order to render the occupation of adjacent estates more convenient and advantageous, and that the existence of such condition entered into and formed part of the consideration of the grant of estates which were intended to be benefited thereby. See also Badger v. Boardman, 16 Gray, . So far as we are able to see, there is nothing to indicate that the original grantor of the premises, in annexing the condition, had any intent to regulate or control the possession or enjoyment of the premises for the benefit of subsequent owners or grantees of the estate, or any part of it, but that it was imposed by him solely for his own private and personal benefit, as the owner of other lots in the vicinity, in which the present plaintiff has no interest whatever.
To the other ground on which the plaintiff asks for equitable relief, we think there are two sufficient answers. In the first place, it is shown that the devisee and sole heir at law of the grantor in whom the possibility of reverter is vested had done acts which operated as a temporary waiver of the forfeiture of the condition by reason of placing the building on the premises by the defendant. Certainly the encouragement which *151was held out to the latter, that the former would release the condition on the faith of which expense and trouble were incurred, was sufficient ground for equitable relief against forfeiture in favor of the plaintiff in case an attempt had been made to enforce it. It is not shown however that at the time of the filing of the bill any such forfeiture was contemplated or threatened. In the next place, the subsequent release of the condition by the devisee and heir at law of the grantor operates to take away all claim which the plaintiff might otherwise have had to relief. Bill dismissed