It is the policy of the law, for the advantage of the public, to encourage and protect invention and commercial enterprise. If a man establishes a business and makes it valuable by his skill and attention, the good will of that business is recognized by the law as property. If he adopts and publicly uses a trade mark, he has a remedy, either at law or in equity, against those who undertake to use it without his permission. If he makes a new and useful invention of any machine or composition of matter, he may, upon filing in a public office a description which will enable an expert to understand and manufacture it, and thus affording to all persons the means of *458ultimately availing themselves of it, obtain letters patent from the government securing to him its exclusive use and profit for a term of years. If he invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has not indeed an exclusive right to it as against the public, or against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it; but he has a property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one who in violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to disclose it to third persons. The jurisdiction in equity to interfere by injunction to prevent such a breach of trust, when the injury would be irreparable and the remedy at law inadequate, is well established by authority.
In the earliest reported case of this class, Lord Eldon indeed refused to grant an injunction against imparting, in violation of an agreement, the secret, not only of a patent which had been obtained and had expired, and which the whole public was therefore entitled to use ; but also that of making a certain kind of pills, for which no patent had been procured; and stated, as a reason for the latter, that, if the art and method of preparing them was a secret, the court could not, without having it disclosed, ascertain whether it had been infringed. Newbery v. James, 2 Meriv. 446. But the same learned chancellor afterwards considered the general question as still an open one, whether a court of equity would restrain a party from divulging a secret in medicine, which was not protected by patent, but which he had promised to keep; and in such a case dissolved an injunction of the vice-chancellor, upon the sole ground that the defendant made affidavit that the secret was not derived from the plaintiff. Williams v. Williams, 3 Meriv. 157. And in a later case he unhesitatingly granted an injunction against one who by the terms of his agreement with the plaintiff was not to be instructed in the secret, and who had obtained a knowledge of it by a breach of trust. Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 Jac. & Walk. 394.
Sir John Leach decreed, in one case, specific performance of an agreement by a trader to sell the good will of a business ana the exclusive use of a secret in dyeing; and, in another, an ac* *459count of the profits of a secret for making a medicine against a son of the inventor, holding it in trust for his brothers and sisters. Bryson v. Whitehead, 1 Sim. & Stu. 74. Green v. Folgham, Ib. 398.
In a more recent case, Morison, the inventor and sole proprietor of a medicine, for which no patent had been obtained, entered into partnership with Moat, to whom he communicated the secret of making the medicine, but did not make the secret a part of the assets of the partnership, and reserved it to himself as against all other persons, and Moat covenanted not to reveal it to any person whomsoever; by subsequent agreement Morison’s sons and a son of Moat were admitted as partners in the business; and the secret was surreptitiously obtained from Moat by his son. After the death of both the original parties, on a bill brought by Morison’s sons, who were also legatees of the secret, against Moat’s son, Vice-Chancellor Turner, in an elaborate judgment reviewing all the English authorities, granted an injunction restraining the defendant from using the secret in any manner in compounding the medicine; and refused to restrain him from communicating the secret, simply for want of any allegation or evidence of an intention to communicate it. Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare, 241. The defendant appealed; but the order was affirmed; and Lord Cranworth, delivering the opinion of the court of appeal, said : “ The principles that were argued in this case are principles really not to be called in controversy. There is no doubt whatever, that when a party who has a secret in trade employs persons under a contract express or implied, or under duty express or implied, those persons cannot gain the knowledge of the secret and then set it up against their employer.” 21 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 248.
Mr. Justice Story states the doctrine in the broadest terms, that “ courts of equity will restrain a party from making a disclosure of secrets communicated to him in the course of a confidential employment; and it matters not, in such cases, whether the secrets be secrets of trade or secrets of title, or any other secrets of the party important to his interests.” 2 Story Eq. § 952. In this court, it is settled that a secret art is a legal *460subject of property; and that a bond for a conveyance of the exclusive right to it is not open to the objection of being in restraint of trade, but may be enforced by action at law, and requires the obligor not to divulge the secret to any other person. Vickery v. Welch, 19 Pick. 523. Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen, 373, 374. In Jarvis v. Peck, 10 Paige, 118, such a bond was held valid in equity. And by the Gen. Sts. c. 113, § 2, this court has not only jurisdiction in equity of suits for enforcing and regulating the execution of trusts, or for the specific performance of written contracts by and against either party and his representatives and assigns, but also full equity jurisdiction, according to the usage and practice of courts of equity, in all other cases where there is not a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law.
The contract between Peabody and Norfolk was, on the part of Norfolk, to serve Peabody as engineer in his jute factory so far as required, and particularly in the construction and running of the machinery, and not to give any third person information directly or indirectly in regard to any portion of the machinery, but to “ consider all of said machinery as sacred to be used only for the benefit of said Peabody or his assigns, and by all means in his power prevent other persons from obtaining any information in regard to it such as would enable them to use it;” and, on the part of Peabody, to pay Norfolk an annual salary “ in full compensation for the above described services,” provided he should render his services acceptable to Peabody as he had theretofore, and Peabody or his assigns should continue the business of manufacturing jute goods. The “ above described services ” clearly include, not only the affirmative promise' to serve as an engineer, but the negative promise not to disclose the secret, and to do his best to conceal it; and the salary is a legal and sufficient consideration for all the agreements of Nor folk.
The plaintiffs do not ask for specific performance of Norolk’s promise to serve as engineer. It is therefore unnecessary o consider whether that promise is limited in point of time oi determinable at pleasure, or is capable of being specifically *461enforced. Whatever may be the limit or effect of his obligation to serve, he is bound by his contract never to disclose the secret confidentially imparted to him during the term of his actual service. And this part of his agreement may be specifically enforced in equity, even if the other part could not. Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex, Macn. & Gord. 604.
The bill alleges that the invention and the process of manufacture have been kept secret, and that the secret is the property of the original plaintiff and of great value to him, and was confidentially imparted to Norfolk; and on demurrer these allegations must be taken to be true. Although the process is carried on in a large factory, the workmen may not understand or be intrusted with the secret, or may have acquired a knowledge of it upon the like confidence. A secret of trade or manufacture does not lose its character by being confidentially disclosed to agents or servants, without whose assistance it could not be made of any value. Even if, as is argued in support of the demurrer, the process is liable to be inspected by the assessor of internal revenue or other public officer, the owner is not the less entitled to protection against those who in, or with knowledge of, violation of contract and breach of confidence, undertake to disclose it or to reap the benefit of it. The danger of divulging the secret in the course of a judicial investigation affords in our opinion no satisfactory reason why a court of equity should refuse all remedy against the wrongdoers.
The supplemental bill alleges, and the demurrer admits, that Cook, with notice of the relations between Peabody and Norfolk, has made arrangements to have the secret communicated to him by Norfolk, and together with him to use it for their own benefit. Upon such a state of facts, Cook has no better equity than Norfolk.
The executors of the will of the original plaintiff succeed to his rights, and appear on the allegations of the bills to be entitled to the relief prayed for. Morison v. Moat, above cited.
Demurrer overruled.