The only question argued by the defendant, upon these exceptions, is whether the action for loss of the property can be maintained by and in behalf of Finn. It is contended that if there was a delivery, with proper directions for the transportation, so as to charge the defendant with responsibility as carrier, then the title in the property had passed to Clark, the consignee; and the right of action for injury to it was in him alone. On the other hand, if proper directions for its transportation had not been given, then the defendant is not liable at all aa *529carrier, according to the former decision in 102 Mass. 283. It is not contended that the defendant is liable as warehouseman. In either aspect of the case, upon this view of the law, no recovery could be had by Finn.
The jury having found that the defendant became responsible as carrier, the case is now presented only in that aspect. We think also that the facts, as disclosed by the present bill of exceptions, show that the title to the property had passed to Clark before the loss occurred; leaving in Finn at most only a right of stoppage in transitu.
The liabilities of a common carrier of goods are various; and, when not controlled by express contract, they spring from his legal obligations, according to the relations he may sustain to the parties, either as employers, or as owners of the property. Primd fade, his contract of service is with the party from whom, directly or indirectly, he receives the goods for carriage ; that is, with the consignor. His obligation to carry safely, and deliver to the consignees, subjects him to liabilities for any failure therein, which may be enforced by the consignees or by the real owners of the property, by appropriate actions in their own names, independently of the original contract by which the service was undertaken. Such remedies are not exclusive of the right of the party sending the goods, to have his action upon the contract implied from the delivery and receipt of them for carriage. This, in effect, we understand to be the result of the elaborate discussion, of the principles applicable to the case in Blanchard v. Page, 8 Gray, 281. That decision may not be precisely in point, as an adjudication, to govern the case now before us; for the reason that there was a written receipt or bill of lading for carriage by water, and the plaintiffs were acting in the transaction as agents for the owners of the goods; yet the general principles evolved do apply, and are satisfactory to us for the determination of the present case.
When carrying goods from seller to purchaser, if there is nothing in the relations of the several parties except what arises from the fact that the seller commits the goods to the carrier as the ordinary and convenient mode of transmission and delivery, in *530execution of the order or agreement of sale, the employment is by the seller, the contract of service is with him, and actions based upon that contract may, if they must not necessarily be in the name of the consignor. If, however, the purchaser designates the carrier, making him his agent to receive and transmit the goods; ' or if the sale is complete before delivery to the carrier, and the seller is made the agent of the purchaser in respect to the forwarding of them, a different implication would arise, and the contract of service might be held to be with the purchaser. This distinction, we think, must determine whether the right of action upon the contract of service, implied from the delivery and receipt of goods for carriage, is in the consignor or in the consignee. In the case of Blanchard v. Page the action was maintained in the name of the consignors, who were merely the agents of the owners in forwarding the goods. But that was explicitly on the ground of the express contract with them, embodied in the receipt or bill of lading.
As already suggested, the consignee, by virtue of his right of possession, or the purchaser, by virtue of his right of property, may have an action against the carrier for the loss, injury or detention of the goods, though not party to the original contract. Such action is in tort for the injury resulting from a breach of duty imposed by law upon the carrier; or, in the language of the early cases, upon “ the custom of the realm.”
There are many cases, both in England and in the United States, in which the doctrine appears to be maintained that, except when there is a special contract, a remedy for injury resulting from breach of duty by a carrier can be had only in the name and behalf of some one having an interest in the property at the time of the breach, which is injuriously affected thereby.
The rule might well be conceded, if the exception were not too restricted. It will hold good in actions of tort, because they are founded upon injury to some interest or right of the plaintiff. And the cases which support this view are mostly, if not altogether, actions of tort. This is true of the leading early case from which the doctrine is mainly derived: Dawes v. Peck, 8 T. R. 330; also of Griffith v. Ingledew, 6 S. & R. 429; Green v *531Clark, 5 Denio, 497, 13 Barb. 57, and 2 Kernan, 343; and does not appear from the report to be otherwise in Krulder v. Ellison, 47 N. Y. 36. In discussing the grounds of decision it seems to have been assumed by various judges, as we think, erroneously, that the right of recovery necessarily involved the question with whom the original contract of service was made. And the effort to make the inference of law as to that contract conform to what was deemed the proper decision as to the right to recover for the injury, has led to some statements of legal inference which appear to us to be somewhat overstrained. Thus in Dawes v. Peck, it is said by Lawrence, J., that, in the payment of freight by the consignor, he is to be regarded as the agent of the consignee ; that the carrier generally knows nothing of the consignor, but looks to the person to whom the goods are directed. In Freeman v. Birch, 1 Nev. & Man. 420, it is said by Parke, J., “ In ordinary cases the vendor employs the carrier as the agent of the vendee.” In Green v. Clark, 13 Barb. 57, it is said by Allen, J., that when the consignee is the legal owner, or the property vests in him by the delivery to the carrier, “ it is an inference of law, and not a presumption of fact, that the contract for the safe carriage is between the carrier and consignee, and consequently the latter has the legal right of action.” But in the same case in the Court of Appeals, 2 Kernan, 343, it was regarded as immaterial by whom the contract was made, and whether the plaintiff was consignor or consignee, for the purposes of an action of case for negligence by which his property was injured.
In Griffith v. Ingledew, the dissenting opinion of Gibson, J., assuming that the contract of carriage formed the basis of the action, combats with great force of reasoning the proposition that a contract with the consignee is the legal result of the receipt of goods by a carrier, when no privity with or authority from the consignee is shown, and none professed by the consignor at the time, unless the direction of the goods to the address of the consignee can be taken to be such profession.
The whole force and effect of the reasoning in Blanchard v. Page is in the same direction. The ordinary bill of lading or re*532ceipt, given to the consignor by the carrier, simply expresses what is the real significance of the transaction independently of the writing. There is no reason for giving a different interpretation to, or drawing a different inference from, the acts of parties, because of a writing which is nothing but a voucher taken to preserve the evidence of those acts.
Whatever remedy is sought in contract must necessarily be sought in the name of the party with whom the contract is entered into, whether it be special, that is, express, or implied. The question then is simply this: In the absence of an express agreement, with whom is the carrier’s contract of employment and service in respect of goods delivered to him by the seller to convey to the purchaser, when there is no privity or relation of agency between the carrier and the purchaser save that which springs from possession of the goods, and the seller has no authority to make a contract for the purchaser except what is to be implied from the agreement of purchase or the order for the goods ?
The law imposes upon the carrier the duty to transport the goods, allows him a reasonable compensation, and gives him a lien upon the goods for security of its payment. It also implies a promise on the one part to carry and deliver the goods safely, and, on the other, to pay the reasonable compensation. These two promises form the contract. Each is the counterpart and the consideration of the other. If the contract of carriage is with the consignee, the reciprocal promise to pay the freight must be his also. Against this inference are the considerations that the seller is acting in his own behalf in making the delivery, and the goods remain his property until the contract with the carrier takes effect. The title of the purchaser does not exist until that contract is made. It follows as a result. The carrier is not agent for either party, but an intermediate, independent principal. If made an agent of the consignee, his receipt of the goods cuts off the right of stoppage in transitu on the one hand, and satisfies the statute of frauds on the other. He has a right to look for his compensation to the party who employs him, unless satisfied from his lien. The fact that, as between seller and purchaser, the purchaser must ordinarily pay the expenses of transportation as a *533part of the cost of the goods, does not affect the relations of contract between the carrier and either party. We discover nothing in the nature of the transaction, and we doubt if there is anything in the practice or understanding of the community, which will justify the inference that one to whom goods are sent by carrier, without direction or authority from him, other than an agreement of purchase or consignment, is the party who employed the carrier and is bound to pay him ; unless he assumes such liability by receiving the goods subject to the charge.
The contract is made when the goods are received by the carrier. If it is then the contract of the consignee, it will not cease to be so, and become the contract of the consignor, by reason of subsequent events. Suppose, then, the seller exercises his right of stoppage in transitu. Is the purchaser still liable to the carrier for the unpaid freight ? Suppose the contract of sale to be without writing and within the statute of frauds. The contract of the carrier is not within the statute, and the authority to the seller to make such contract in behalf of the purchaser need not be in writing. Is the carrier to look to the purchaser or to the seller for the freight ? Or does it depend upon the contingency whether the contract of- sale is affirmed or avoided ? And if affirmed, and the carrier should deliver the goods without insisting on his lien, of whom must he collect it ? The authorities hold, when the agreement of sale is within the statute of frauds, that the contract of the carrier is with the consignor. Coombs v. Bristol & Exeter Railway Co. 3 H. & N. 510. Coats v. Chaplin, 3 Q. B. 483.
We do not think the carrier’s contract and right to recover his freight can be made to depend upon what may prove to be the legal effect of the negotiations between consignor and consignee upon the title to the property which is the subject of transportation. His contract must arise from the circumstances of his employment. He has a right to look for his compensation to the party who required him to perform the service by causing the goods to be delivered to him for transportation. And that party, unless he is the mere agent of some other, may enforce the contract, and sue for its breach by the carrier.
*534One who forwards goods in execution of an order or agreement ■for sale is not a mere agent of the purchaser in - so doing. He is acting in his own interest and behalf, and his dealings with the carrier are in his own right and upon his own responsibility, unless he has some special authority or directions from the purchaser, upon which he acts.
The plaintiff in this case is therefore entitled to maintain his action upon the contract; and we think there is no sufficient reason shown to prevent his recovering the full value of the property destroyed. If Clark was the owner at the time, and his interest has been in no way satisfied or discharged, the plaintiff will hold the proceeds recovered in trust for his indemnity. Clark might have prosecuted an action of tort in his own name, and recovered the value of his property lost; in which event the damages in Finn’s suit would have been nominal, or reduced to whatever amount of actual loss he suffered. But it is not pretended that Clark has ever brought any suit or made any claim upon the defendant, although knowing of the pendency of this suit, and having testified as a witness in the same ; and all claim by him is long since barred. It is to be presumed that he acquiesces in the recovery by Finn. If there were any doubt upon this point, we might order a new trial upon the question of damages inly. As there is none, the judgment must be upon the verdict.
Exception* overruled
This case was argued at Boston, January 9, 1874, before all the judges but Colt and Ames, JJ.