The carpets bought by the plaintiff’s intestate covered four floors, consisting of twelve rooms, besides the hall and stairs, in a dwelling-house. The number of yards of material contained in' them was an important element in determining their value, which might be the subject of a fraudulent representation. The representation of the defendant was not a mere estimate, but a statement purporting to be made as of her own knowledge; and there was evidence tending to show that it was known by her to be false. There was also evidence that the purchaser relied upon it; and if the testimony introduced by the plaintiff was true, the defendant was liable for fraud, unless the purchaser was bound to measure the carpets for himself, or to avail himself of his other opportunities of ascertaining the quantity.
Upon the evidence presented, it could not properly have been ruled, as matter of law, that the facts were so obvious or so easily discoverable that the plaintiff’s intestate had no right to rely on the defendant’s representations. In this Commonwealth, and in other American States, in regard to representations by a vendor in a sale of land, it has been held that, in the absence of other fraud, a vendee to whom boundaries are pointed out has no right to rely on the vendor’s statements as to quantity, but if he deems the quantity material, he should ascertain it for himself. Gordon v. Parmelee, 2 Allen, 212. Noble v. Googins, 99 Mass. 231, and cases cited. Parker v. Moulton, 114 Mass. 99. We are of opinion that this rule should not be extended so as to include a case like the present, and that the instructions under which the questions were submitted to the jury were correct and sufficient.
Exceptions overruled.