This is a bill in equity for the cancellation of a mortgage, but containing an offer to pay any sum that may be found due upon it. The defendant Davis took an indorsement of the note and an assignment of the mortgage for value before maturity, and without notice. Before he did so the mortgagor had given the mortgagee a second mortgage for a sum including that due on the first mortgage and in satisfaction of it, but had left the first mortgage in the mortgagee’s hands. On the same day the plaintiff bought the second mortgage.
Payment of the mortgage note on the day when it falls due is performance of the promise, and very possibly would discharge the note even as against one who took it for value and without notice later on the same day. But payment before the day, or a satisfaction like that in the present case, is a defence which binds only the party receiving payment and those who stand in his shoes. Burbridge v. Manners, 3 Camp. 193, 194. Morley v. Culverwell, 7 M. & W. 174, 181, 182. Kernohan v. Durham, 48 Ohio St. 1, 7. Head v. Cole, 53 Ark. 523, 524. Palmer v. Marshall, 60 Ill. 289, 293. See Wheeler v. Guild, 20 Pick. 545, 552, 553, 555.
It commonly is assumed that the mortgage follows the note, and that if the holder can recover on the note he may avail himself of the mortgage. Taylor v. Page, 6 Allen, 86. Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. 271. Jones, Mort. (4th ed.) §§ 834-840. We are of opinion that this is the law where the note has been paid in full in advance. As is pointed out in Morley v. Culverwell, ubi supra, payment before the day is not performance of the contract, and it follows, notwithstanding the language often used, that in a strict sense it does not satisfy the condition of the mortgage. If we are right in our concession as to the effect of a payment on the day, we have here the technical reason for the different effect of an earlier payment. The note still stands unperformed, and therefore secured, subject only to a personal *100defence, as it is happily called by Mr. Ames. 2 Ames, Bills & Notes, 811. But the very meaning of a personal defence is, that it does not accompany the note into all hands, but only into those which are in no better position than the person against whom it has accrued. Like fraud or duress by threats, it leaves the legal transaction still in full force, and only furnishes a reason why a particular person should not be allowed to insist upon it. It “ all proceeds upon an argumentum ad hominem. It is saying, you have the title, but you shall not be heard in a court of justice to enforce it against good faith and conscience.” Eyre, C. J., in Collins v. Martin, 1 B. & P. 648, 651, cited by Shaw, C. J., in Wheeler v. Guild, 20 Pick. 545, 551.
Another argument draw.n from the registry laws deserves consideration. A mortgage cannot be extinguished more effectually than by a release. Yet we presume that it hardly would be argued that an unrecorded release would be valid as against a purchaser of the mortgage before maturity and without notice. As was said in a case which settled the law for Massachusetts, “ a prior unrecorded deed has no effect except as between the parties to it, and others having notice of it. . . . It is the policy of our laws that a purchaser of land, by examining the registry of deeds, may ascertain the title of his grantor. If there is no recorded deed, he has the right to assume that the record title is the true title. The law has established the rule, for the protection of creditors and purchasers, that an unrecorded deed, if unknown to them, is as to them a mere nullity.” Dow v. Whitney, 147 Mass. 1, 6. It might be thought that the same considerations apply to a quasi discharge by payment of the ‘whole amount in advance. The mortgagor may have an entry made on the margin of the record of the mortgage. Pub. Sts. c. 120, §§ 24, 25. When no such entry is made, and the registry contains no notice of payment of any kind, it would seem that one to whom the mortgagee produces the note not yet due and the mortgage for sale has the same right to assume that the record title is the true title that he would have had in the case of an unrecorded release. If the note were overdue, that would be notice, or would put the purchaser in the position of one having actual notice, and therefore in that case the registry laws would not help him.
In Grover v. Flye, 5 Allen, 543, the demandant claimed title *101under a sale of an equity of redemption on execution. In fact, the mortgage had been paid in full before it was due, but the record did not disclose the payment, and neither the officer nor the demandant had notice of it. The court held that the rule wras the same that it would have been between the original parties. In such a case the purchaser, of course, does not claim as indorsee or holder of the mortgage note. We accept the authority of the decision so far as it goes. But if it is not to be distinguished satisfactorily from one like the present, so far as the argument from the registry laws is concerned, it has no bearing on the considerations first stated, and those are sufficient to dispose of the case. It follows that the decree sustaining the mortgage in the hands of the defendant Davis, and limiting the plaintiff to a right to redeem, was correct.
Decree affirmed.