The plaintiff has appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court which confirmed the award of an arbitrator which was based on his determination that a past practice of granting compensatory time off to the members of the union’s grievance committee for time spent by them in processing grievances on their scheduled days off was a condition of employment which, although not expressed in the collective bargaining agreement, constituted a part thereof. See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580, 581-582 (1960); Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 1116-1117 (1950). 1. There is no merit to the contention that the award exceeded the scope of the reference. Although the arbitrator twice answered in the negative the specific, narrow question which was posed in the written submission, it is clear from his summaries of the respective positions of the parties that the ultimate question which he answered was one of those put to him (without apparent objection) during the course of the hearing before him. See Morceau v. Gould-Natl. Batteries, Inc., 344 Mass. 120, 121-127 (1962); Greene v. Mari & Sons Flooring Co., 362 Mass. 560, 563 (1972); Cape Cod Gas Co. v. United Steelworkers, Local 13507, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 265 (1975). Compare Milwaukee Professional Firefighters, Lo
Judgment affirmed.