ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
HANNA, J.Appellant has filed a motion for rehearing, in which he sets forth several reasons for his contention that the former opinion in this case is erroneous.
[2] First, he argues that the construction placed by this court upon the closing words of section 1, chapter 78, Laws 1915, which read as follows, “Such sale of said certificates or duplicate certificates, or such redemption by the owner, shall release said property from the lien of all delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs standing against the same at the date of such sale or redemption,” operates to release the property from the lien of all such taxes, penalties, interest, and costs upon the sale of the certificate, and the purchaser of the same simply holds a piece of paper without security'of any kind or character.
' That the statute does operate to release the property from the lien of the delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, and costs cannot be doubted from the language used; but appellant is mistaken in his further contention that the purchaser of the certificate has no security whatever, for under the statute he is entitled to retain the certificate until the property is redeemed by payment by the owner to the treasurer of the amount paid by the purchaser for the certificate, plus the interest authorized by the statute, and if such owner does not redeem within three years the holder of the certificate is entitled to a deed for the property. The reason for the provision r=.t,n,01iig the property from the lien of delinquent taxes,^ etc., upon the sale of the certificate is apparent. The board of countjr commissioners is authorized to fix a minimum price at which the certificate may be sold at public auction, which may be, and presumably is, less than the amount of taxes, penalties, interest, and costs. If the sale of the certificate under such circumstances did not operate to release the property from the lien of the delinquent taxes,-penalties/ interest and costs, or if such property is redeemed by the owner on payment of the price so fixed, the delinquent taxes, etc., or the difference at least between the minimum price so fixed and the amount of such delinquent taxes, etc., appearing upon the books of the treasurer, would continue as a lien upon the property which the county could enforce and the purchaser of the certificate would be required to eventually pay this amount, even though he might have purchased the certificate for much less. Hence we are satisfied that the construction placed upon this clause in the former opinion is correct.
In his motion for rehearing appellant further contends, first, that a sale to the county constitutes a sale for taxes, the same as though it were to a private individual; second, that the county becomes invested with the same title that is acquired by the individual; and, third, that a certificate issued to a county constitutes a contract or obligation which, in the hands of the county, cannot be violated by any subsequent act of the Legislature.
For the sake of argument, all of these contentions may be assumed to be correct, and yet the act in question, as construed in the former opinion, does not violate any of the principles contended for. In the first place, it does not require the county to sell the certificates for less than their face value, but merely gives legislative sanction to such a. proceeding in case the board of county commissioners so elect to proceed. This being true, no discussion of the power of the Legislature to constitutionally so legislate, had the law in' question arbitrarily directed a sale of these certificates for less than the full amount of the taxes, etc., is necessary.
But, if we should assume that the Legislature had no authority to authorize the counties to sell the certificates for less than the full amount of the taxes, etc., or to permit a redemption from such sale without the payment to the county of such amount, we fail to see how appellant would be benefited. His contention is that the owner of the property must pay to the county treasurer the full amount of the delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, and costs, up to the time of sale, plus the interest provided by statute, which accrues after a sale, and that this money so paid to the county goes to the purchaser of the certificate and not to the county, so that in either event the county would receive only the amount for which .the certificate had been sold. The reason for the provision giving the owner the right to redeem by paying to the county treasurer the amount for which the certificate is sold, plus the interest provided by statute, is readily apparent, when we consider the fact that the certificate may have been sold for many times the amount of the original taxes, penalties, interest, and costs. The minimum amount for which the certificate may be sold is fixed, whereupon such certificate is offered for sale to the highest bidder for cash. Suppose, for example, that the amount of delinquent taxes, etc., due on a parcel of real estate, was $100, and the board should fix $50 as the minimum amount for which the certificate might be sold, and at the auction several bidders should be present, and the purchaser of the certificate should pay $150 for the same. If appellant’s argument be sound, the owner of the real estate could redeem the property by paying to the county treasurer, for the use and benefit of the owner of such certificate, $100, and the purchaser of the certificate would be minus $50, as there is no provision in the statutes by which he could recover the overplus so paid by him.
We are satisfied that the construction placed upon this statute in our former opinion is correct, and the motion for rehearing will therefore be denied; and it is so ordered.
Koberts, C.J., and Parker, J., concur.