Simpson v. Lykes Bros. Inc.

                    United States Court of Appeals,

                            Fifth Circuit.

                             No. 93-7403.

                           Summary Calendar.

            Claibon SIMPSON, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                  v.

               LYKES BROS. INC., et al., Defendants,

                   Texaco, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.

                             June 9, 1994.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas.

Before GARWOOD, DAVIS and JONES, Circuit Judges.

     PER CURIAM:

     Simpson appeals the district court's judgment dismissing his

Jones Act suit against the defendant, Texaco.     We affirm.

                                  I.

     In 1992, Claibon Joseph Simpson, Sr., filed a Jones Act suit

against Texaco and others alleging that he suffered hearing loss

due to exposure to excessive noise during his seagoing employment

from 1965 through 1984.

     Texaco filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. In support of its

motion, Texaco submitted an excerpt from Simpson's deposition

testimony and a copy of a release signed by Simpson in October

1989.   Pursuant to the release, Simpson and his wife settled with

Texaco for $398,000 for a 1984 back injury.    Simpson did not submit

an affidavit or other evidence in opposition.

     The district court granted Texaco's motion and stated that the

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"Plaintiff's present claims against Texaco, Inc., for loss of

hearing are barred due to Plaintiff's signing of the FULL AND FINAL

RECEIPT AND RELEASE."         All other defendants were dismissed.

                                         II.

     On appeal, Simpson argues that the district court incorrectly

interpreted the scope of the 1989 release.             Simpson argues that the

release is specifically limited to the back injury.                 He argues that

he did not appreciate the consequences of the release because he

did not know of the hearing loss until after he signed the release.

     "Seamen are wards of admiralty and any release or settlement

involving    their      rights     is    subject      to     careful   scrutiny."

Stipelcovich v. Sand Dollar Marine, Inc., 805 F.2d 599, 606 (5th

Cir.1986).   "The ultimate concern in these cases, however, is not

whether the seaman has received what the court believes to be

adequate consideration, but rather whether the seaman relinquished

his rights with an informed understanding of his rights and a full

appreciation of the consequences when he executed a release."                   Id.

      The shipowner bears the burden of proof in establishing the

validity of a seaman's release.                Castillo v. Spiliada Maritime

Corp., 937 F.2d 240, 244 (5th Cir.1991).              "The shipowner must show

that the seaman's release was executed freely, without deception or

coercion,    and    that      it   was   made    by    the    seaman   with     full

understanding      of   his   rights."         Id.   (internal     quotations   and

citation omitted).       The burden is heavier on a motion for summary

judgment because the shipowner must conclusively demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.                 Id.


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      This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo.

Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir.1991).           Factors

relevant to an appraisal of a seaman's understanding of his rights

include the nature of the legal advice available to the seaman at

the time of signing the release, the adequacy of the consideration,

whether the parties negotiated at arm's length and in good faith,

and whether there was the appearance of fraud or coercion.       Borne

v. A & P Boat Rentals No. 4, Inc., 780 F.2d 1254, 1256-57 (5th

Cir.1986).

     The release clearly stated the terms of the agreement and

Simpson's rights against Texaco. In exchange for the consideration

given, the Simpsons agreed to "fully hold harmless" Texaco from

     any and all liability of any sort ... arising from deleterious
     or detrimental exposures, events or occurrences sustained by
     CLAIBON JOSEPH SIMPSON, SR., and all consequences thereof,
     whether known or unknown while I, CLAIBON JOSEPH SIMPSON, SR.,
     worked aboard or about the properties, personnel and or
     vessels of ... [Texaco], including but not necessarily limited
     to even my death and/or that which form the basis of the [back
     injury suit] ...

     We further understand that this Release and the aforesaid
     consideration covers [sic] all future and unknown damages, as
     well as such damages as are now known to have occurred ...

     Simpson concedes that the release was not signed under duress.

The Simpsons acknowledged that they had been advised by counsel and

that they understood the advice.       They stipulated that "[a]s part

of the consideration hereof, we sign this Release after we have

consulted with attorneys of our own choice and with full knowledge

that we are giving up all our rights against the said ... TEXACO,

INC. ..."    It was Simpson's counsel who negotiated the settlement

in apparent good faith at arm's length.

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      The consideration of $398,000 received by Simpson does not

support a finding that he was uninformed of his rights or that he

did   not    recognize     the    consequences       when   he   settled.      See

Stipelcovich, 805 F.2d at 606.

      The district court analyzed the release in light of the Borne

factors and determined that "it is difficult to see how Mr. Simpson

can now argue that he did not understand the release, or believed

that it was limited to the injuries to his back and nervous

system." The district court did not err in concluding that Simpson

was informed of his rights and of the consequences of signing the

release.

      The district court correctly rejected Simpson's argument that

the release does not cover his hearing loss because he was unaware

of this injury when he signed the release.              The release expressly

covers unknown events and exposures as well as future damages both

known and unknown.

      Texaco met its burden of establishing that there are no

material facts at issue in this case.             Simpson offered no evidence

establishing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.                       The

release     bars   suit   by     Simpson   against    Texaco,    and   the   court

correctly granted summary judgment as to Texaco.

                                        III.

      Simpson argues that if there was a general release, it is void

as a matter of public policy because Texaco drafted the release and

because there was unequal bargaining power between Simpson and

Texaco.       Simpson     does    not   support      this   argument   with    any


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controlling case law or evidence, therefore, this argument is

without merit.

     Simpson signed the release with assistance of counsel.    He

does not complain about the adequacy of that representation. "When

a seaman is acting upon independent advice and that advice is

disinterested and based on a reasonable investigation, there being

no question of competence, a settlement agreement will not be set

aside."   Borne, 780 F.2d at 1258.

     AFFIRMED.




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