OPINION OF THE COURT BY
This is a bill in equity for an accounting. The Circuit Judge found for the plaintiff and decreed accordingly. The defendant appealed.
It appears from the record that the plaintiff and her husband, A. A. Montano, in December, 1899, were indebted to the defendant in the sum of sixteen thousand dollars, over-due, and secured by trust deed on their property; that the defendant was authorized as agent., for a commission of one thousand dollars, to sell one tract of land belonging to the plaintiff and included in the trust deed for the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars; that a sale was effected and á deed prepared by the defendant reciting the consideration as paid and was, sent to the plaintiff by a Notary Public and the plaintiff and her husband executed the same; that no part of the consideration was paid in cash; that the purchaser assumed the $16,000 mortgage and secured it by a mortgage on the land and the balance of the consideration ($9,000.00) was evidenced by two promissory notes, one for six thousand dollars and the other for three thousand dollars, due in three years, bearing 7 Jc interest, payable semi-annually and secured by chattel mortgage on a dairy property; that about the
The principal question in the case is one of fact and the. testimony is at variance. The agency to sell is conceded but the authority to sell on credit or to accept the six thousand dollars of ■the proceeds in the chattel mortgage, is denied.
It is contended by the plaintiff that she only authorized a sale for the cancellation of the sixteen thousand dollars mortgage and the balance cash; that she did not authorize a sale on credit or the investment in the chattel mortgage or agree to accept such mortgage; that she neyer ratified that investment but specifically repudiated it as soon as she learned that it had been made; that she did not accept the seven hundred dollars payment or the interest with the idea or intention that she was ratifying or approving the investment and only thought that by accepting said sums she was taking a. part of the. balance of the. purchase money due on the sale of her property and on deposit with the defendant.
The defendant contends that lie was specifically authorized to make the sale as it was made and to accept the chattel security by the plaintiff’s husband who was duly authorized to act as her
The defendant had no written power but acted on oral instructions given by A. A. Montano and relies on this and subsequent ratification by plaintiff.
The evidence justifies the inference that the plaintiff knew of the entire transaction on January 3rd, 1900, that the mortgage was exhibited to her then and she read it carefully and the only objection made at that time was to one item of the property set out in the schedule; that in February following a statement of account from the defendant showdng this mortgage as an investment made at his request was delivered to A. A. Montano in whose name the account had been kept in defendant’s books up to that time; that on May 24th, 1900, she accepted $700 on.the principal of the debt and accepted the interest for the first six months and that the rate of interest on the note was changed from 7% to S% at her solicitation; that if the plaintiff did not authorize the taking of the mortgage she afterwards with full lcn owl-edge of the facts ratified the acts of the defendant in accepting it.
If the plaintiff was dissatisfied with the security it was certainly her duty when the facts came to her knowledge ou January 3rd, to have" made her objections knowm and if they were not satisfied to have repudiated the entire sale. She cannot ho permitted to accept the benefit of the sale so far as she may consider it to her advantage to do so and repudiate the remainder.
We do not think that the evidence sustains the finding and decree of the Circuit Judge.
The decree appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded with direction to dismiss the bill.