DISSENTING OPINION OF
WILDER, J.The surety in this case agreed to pay “such sum as may, for any cause, be recovered against” Hutchins. The limit of that obligation was stated in the bond to be $30,000. Plaintiff having recovered against Hutchins the sum of $22,000, the surety is bound by his obligation to pay that sum. The conclusion of the majority of the court that the surety is discharged is based on the assumption that the surety’s risk was increased by the amendments in the replevin action raising the value of the property from $15,000 to $22,000. That assumption very properly requires that the risk or obligation of the surety should be stated differently from what it is in the bond under the statute. If the obligation of the surety was as stated by the majority, then the conclusion they reach logically follows. If, on the other hand, it was as stated in the bond and in the statute, that conclusion does not and cannot logically follow. To be sure the obligation and the limit of that obligation are different things. The obligation is to pay such sum as may be recovered, while the limit provides that in no event can that sum, so far as the surety is concerned, be more than $30,000.
From the cases referred to by the majority it appears that the courts in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and, possibly Michigan, to which should be added Ohio, Indiana and Vermont, (Jaynes v. Platt, 47 Oh. St. 262; Sherry v. Bank, 6 Ind. 397; Wright v. Brownell, 3 Vt. 436,) would hold that in this case the surety Avas not discharged, while in Maine it Avould be held the other Avay. The two cases *410of Sage v. Strong, 40 Wis. 515, and Tyler Mining Co. v. Last Chance Mining Co., 90 Fed. 15, are easily distinguishable from the case at bar. In the first one the surety obligated himself to see that a judgment which had already been rendered would be paid, while in the second case the obligation of the surety was to pay any damages caused by an injunction which had already issued. The surety in each case knew when he signed the bond that the judgment or injunction could be modified by the court, but he never agreed to be bound by a modification any more than he agreed to be bound in case a different judgment or injunction was thereafter entered. That is something entirely different from the case where a surety knows when he executes the bond that he is to be liable if at all to pay a judgment to he rendered in the future and, it must be remembered, in the usual course of procedure, which would include amendments of the kind made.
The majority opinion being in my opinion contrary to both principle and the great weight of the decided cases, I am compelled to dissent therefrom.