NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2523-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JERYL MIDDLETON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted March 21, 2022 – Decided June 23, 2022
Before Judges Rothstadt and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 18-01-
0101.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jeryl Middleton appeals from a judgment of conviction that
was entered on November 14, 2018, after defendant pled guilty to one count of
second-degree witness tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(b), and second-degree
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). The trial
court sentenced defendant consistent with his plea agreement to an aggregate
seven-year term with a forty-two-month period of parole ineligibility.
On appeal, defendant challenges his conviction by arguing the trial court
erred by denying his motion to suppress the inculpatory, custodial statement he
gave to law enforcement. Specifically, defendant argues the following one
point:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS
STATEMENT BECAUSE THE RECORD CLEARLY
DEMONSTRATES THAT HIS PROLONGED
CONFINEMENT AMONG CO-DEFENDANTS WHO
PRESSURED HIM TO TALK RENDERED HIS
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
INVOLUNTARY.
Having carefully reviewed the record, we disagree with defendant's
contention and affirm.
The facts leading to defendant's arrest and conviction are well-known to
the parties and for our purposes need not be set forth at length in this opinion.
A-2523-19
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Suffice it to say that defendant was arrested after pointing a handgun at an
individual in order to scare that person into not reporting him to police about an
unrelated alleged criminal act. A day after his August 16, 2017 arrest, defendant
provided an inculpatory statement to police in response to their interrogation.
Thereafter, a grand jury issued an indictment charging defendant with various
offenses, including the two to which he ultimately pled guilty.
Prior to pleading guilty, defendant filed a motion to suppress the statement
he gave to police. In response, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
at which the only witnesses were Perth Amboy Police Officers George Irizarry
and Davis Salazar, and defendant. Prior to considering the testimony, the trial
court reviewed the video tape of defendant's interrogation, portions of which
were played back again during the hearing.
Officer Irizarry was the first to testify. He confirmed that he and other
officers like him who are assigned to desk duty are responsible for checking
holding cells prior to a prisoner being placed inside and ensuring that all
dangerous items are removed from prisoners before they are placed in the cell .
They are also responsible for performing inspections of the prisoner every thirty
minutes while he or she is inside the holding cell. When not conducting those
A-2523-19
3
inspections, the on-duty officer has cameras at the desk that provide the officer
with the ability to see the holding cell area at all times.
As to defendant, Irizarry testified about the completion of the confinement
report for defendant and the monitoring records that were prepared during his
incarceration in the holding cells. According to the records that were admitted
into evidence, defendant was placed in a cell at 6:41 p.m. on August 16 by
another police officer. The next morning, Irizarry assumed responsibility for
defendant and made various entries in the monitoring records, indicating notes
about his observations of defendant.
Those records indicated that defendant received food once and was lying
in his cell at various times during the night. Irizarry had no recollection of
whether defendant was sleeping soundly or if defendant ever asked for any
medical attention. If he had, then an ambulance would have been called to attend
to defendant and the request would have been noted on the records. There were
no such notations.
The records also did not indicate that defendant got sick to his stomach or
vomited in his cell. If he had, it would have been notated in the records and he
would have been removed from his cell so that it could be cleaned.
A-2523-19
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Officer Salazar testified next. He was the desk monitor prior to Irizarry
beginning his shift. According to Salazar, he conducted the inspections every
thirty minutes between 3:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., and defendant appeared to be
sleeping the entire night. Although Salazar could not be sure defendant was
sleeping, he did note that his eyes were closed during the inspections. Salazar
did not notice whether defendant got sick or vomited.
Salazar also confirmed his notations in the monitoring records that were
made during his shift, which did not include any indication that anyone removed
defendant from the cell or went into the cell. Salazar also confirmed that
defendant never made any complaints.
Defendant was the last witness to testify. According to defendant, prior
to being taken for interrogation, he was intimidated by detectives and his
codefendants, who were incarcerated in the next cell, in an effort to pressure
him to give a statement to the police. Defendant began to become anxious and
eventually started feeling sick. He confirmed that he was given a "fast-food
meal" that made him vomit in his cell within an hour after eating the meal.
Thereafter, he requested medical attention but was told that it would not be
provided until he gave a statement.
A-2523-19
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Defendant disagreed with the officers' testimonies that he was lying down
in his cell during the night. According to defendant, he spent most of the time
on his feet, feeling exhausted and ill. Defendant also claimed that he got into
an altercation with one of the police officers who was conducting inspections of
his cell and, despite his request for medical attention, he did not receive any
until he gave his statement, just before he was taken to the county facility.
According to defendant, it was only after being in custody for nineteen
hours under these conditions that he finally gave the statement to police because
he believed that was the only way he could be released from custody. Although
he still felt ill at the time, defendant confirmed that at 9:32 a.m. on August 17
he signed the Miranda1 waiver form and provided a statement to the police. 2
Notably, defendant did not dispute that he received the correct warnings or that
he understood them. And, in response to questions posited by the trial court,
defendant confirmed that he made no request for medical attention during the
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
There were inconsistencies between the monitoring records' time entries as
compared to the interrogating officers' recording of the times defendant was
questioned and returned to his cell. Those inconsistencies are not pertinent to
the appeal.
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time that he was giving his statement to police or otherwise indicate he was not
feeling well during that time.
After the completion of the testimony, counsel presented closing
arguments to the trial court. Defendant specifically argued that
under the totality of the circumstances [defendant's]
statement [could not] be considered to be knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent[ as] [h]e was deprived of
sleep after a too lengthy detention, and it certainly, in
any objective person, would create the impression I'm
not going to get out of here until I tell them what they
want to hear. . . . .
Additionally, [the police] added the extra layer of
pressure of obviously agitating his co-defendants
against him . . . with the theory of . . . you're only here
because of [defendant]. So he had the pressure of both
the codefendants and law enforcement pressuring him.
He wasn't feeling well. . . . . He reacted poorly
to the . . . food . . . . No sleep, feeling ill, asked for
medical attention, pressured by law enforcement and
his co-defendants who strategically placed them by him
so he could be pressured without any hope of ever
leaving until he gave the statement.
Counsel was also concerned about the State's failure to produce the video
of the holding cell taken during the defendant's confinement.
After considering the parties' arguments, the trial court placed its reasons
on the record. The court found that both officers were credible; and as to
defendant there was not "anything to corroborate" defendant's self-serving
A-2523-19
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statements that he was deprived of sleep, felt ill after he ate at 12:40 a.m., and
that he vomited, which were contradicted by the confinement records. The court
noted defendant testified that an ambulance arrived there after he gave his
statement, but it was determined that he was not sick and he was transferred to
the county jail.
After reviewing the case law, the court found that defendant was subject
to custodial interrogation and that, based on its review of the video tape,
"defendant was properly advised of his Miranda warnings" and confirmed that
he understood them verbally as well as when he signed the waiver certificate at
9:32 a.m.
The court turned next to the issue about whether the waiver was
"voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." The court observed that the defendant
gave two statements, one that lasted from approximately 9:30 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.
and then he was briefly brought back for additional questioning for "just several
minutes." The court also noted that defendant was initially given his Miranda
warning, and at the second interrogation he "was informed that his Miranda
rights still apply and [asked] if he had any questions regarding his Miranda
rights" to which defendant confirmed "he understood."
A-2523-19
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The court was satisfied from the video tape that the State met its burden
of proof. The court highlighted that there was no indication that "defendant
[was] in any distress at the time of the questioning." The court rejected
defendant's contentions, finding "for the majority of the time [d]efendant was in
the cell, he was at least lying down and not in any discomfort or distress." Based
on that evidence, the court found that defendant's contentions were "not only
disingenuous, but frankly without merit."
According to the court, in the video, defendant appeared "relaxed,
somewhat comfortable." The court found there was no "pressure applied or any
deception involved, and at no point [did] . . . defendant ever ask for an attorney
during the interview," and "it[ was] evident that he[ was] not tired, even though
he had been detained for some time there."
Turning to defendant's demeanor during his interrogation, the court
observed that defendant was "calm, willing to describe the assault in question "
and "[h]e [gave] some significant details as to the reason behind, [the]
motivation in . . . assaulting the victim. The officers don't appear to intimidate
the defendant in any manner."
A-2523-19
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered an order memorializing
its decision. Thereafter, defendant pled guilty as noted earlier and was
subsequently sentenced. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant argues that, while the trial court found insufficient
evidence that defendant was ill or deprived of sleep, the court did not make any
findings that, as defendant argued, his waiver was involuntary because he spent
nineteen hours in confinement, was subjected to pressure from his co-defendants
who were in adjacent cells, or because "he was suffering from anxiety and was
repeatedly pressured by police to waive his right to remain silent." According
to defendant, if the trial court had accounted for those circumstances, it could
not have found that defendant's waiver was "knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary." We disagree.
Our "review of a trial court's factual findings at an evidentiary hearing is
limited." State v Cotto, ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2022) (slip op. at
20) (citing State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 269 (2015)). We give deference to
a trial court's findings of fact on pre-trial suppression motions and will not
reverse unless the findings are so mistaken and unsupported by the evidence that
it is necessary to intervene. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017); see also
State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189, 210 (2022) (stating "we defer to the factual findings
A-2523-19
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of the trial court if those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence
in the record"). Of particular significance to this case, in S.S., the Supreme
Court held that this deferential standard of review applies to the interpretation
of video and documentary evidence, as well as to live testimony taken at pretrial
hearings. 299 N.J. at 374. "In contrast to the deference we owe to a trial court's
factual findings, a trial court's interpretation of the law and 'the consequences
that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'"
Cotto, ___ N.J. Super. at ___ (slip op. at 20) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J.
412, 425 (2014)).
In reviewing whether a trial court correctly denied a motion to suppress
an inculpatory statement given to police by a defendant while in custody, we
weigh the facts found by the trial court against the well-settled ideal that "[t]he
privilege against self-incrimination, as set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, is one of the most important protections of the
criminal law." Id. at ___ (slip op. at 19) (alteration in original) (quoting Sims,
250 N.J. at 211). As the Supreme Court has explained, "New Jersey law
'maintains "an unyielding commitment to ensure the proper admissibility of
confessions."'" Ibid. (quoting Sims, 250 N.J. at 211).
A-2523-19
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Here, the question before the court was not whether the defendant waived
his rights, but whether "the State [proved] beyond a reasonable doubt that the
waiver was given knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently in light of all the
circumstances." Id. at ___ (slip op. at 20-21). When a trial court determines the
State met its burden and admits the statement into evidence, "[we] engage in a
'searching and critical' review of the record to ensure protection of a defendant's
constitutional rights." Id. at ___ (slip op. at 19-20) (quoting State v. Hreha, 217
N.J. 368, 381-82 (2014)). In doing so, we hew to our already noted mixed
standard of review. Like the trial court, we consider "the totality of the
circumstances," based on the facts as found by the trial court that were supported
by the evidence, to determine whether the trial court correctly admitted an
inculpatory custodial statement. State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 42-43 (2019).
Here, we conclude the trial court properly considered the totality of the
circumstances in deciding whether defendant's statement was given knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently based on the evidence presented at the hearing,
including the video tape. We agree with the trial court's conclusions that no
evidence demonstrated defendant's statement was coerced as there was no
indication in the record that his will was overborne or that his statement was
otherwise given involuntarily.
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We affirm therefore for the reasons stated by the trial court in its cogent
oral decision. We conclude defendant's argument to the contrary is without
sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-
3(e)(2), as there is nothing in the record to support defendant's allegations that
his statement was given as a result of being harassed by police or co-defendants
or the result of being ill, either while incarcerated or while he gave his
statement.3
Affirmed.
3
We note that we also conclude that defendant's reliance on State v. Kelly, 61
N.J. 283, 286-87, 294 (1972), is inapposite because there the issue was whether
defendant was entitled to a hearing on the admission of inculpatory statements
given to private citizens, as compared to law enforcement personnel, in response
to alleged physical coercion.
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