NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2472-20
IN THE MATTER OF
SALADIN STAFFORD,
COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
POLICE LIEUTENANT
(PC2070U), ESSEX COUNTY
__________________________
Argued June 9, 2022 – Decided June 30, 2022
Before Judges Haas and Alvarez.
On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
Commission, Docket No. 2021-470.
Catherine M. Elston argued the cause for appellant
Saladin Stafford (C. Elston & Associates, LLC,
attorneys; Catherine M. Elston, of counsel and on the
briefs).
Jeanne-Marie Scollo, Assistant County Counsel,
argued the cause for respondent Essex County
Department of Corrections (Courtney M. Gaccione,
Essex County Counsel, attorney; Jill Caffrey, Assistant
County Counsel, and Jeanne-Marie Scollo, on the
brief).
Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney
for respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission
(Debra A. Allen, Deputy Attorney General, on the
statement in lieu of brief).
PER CURIAM
Saladin Stafford, a corrections sergeant, took and passed the Civil Service
promotional exam for the title of Essex County Corrections Police Lieutenant
on May 4, 2017. Unfortunately, he was convicted for the third time on
December 2, 2016, of driving while under the influence, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, and
lost his driving privileges for ten years. As a result, the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) on March 26, 2021, by way of final agency decision, deemed
him ineligible for the promotion, and he appeals. We affirm for the reasons the
CSC stated.
Upon Stafford's conviction, disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against him by Essex County. The parties reached a settlement in which Essex
agreed not to "consider the . . . discipline for reasons of promotion." When the
settlement was placed on the record, Stafford's counsel said that "the charges in
the underlying incident that were the predicate for the charges will not be used
or considered with respect to promotional -- my client's promotional
opportunities going forward." After serving the ninety-day suspension called
for by the settlement, completing an outpatient alcohol treatment program, and
passing a fitness for duty exam, Stafford returned to work. When he learned he
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was on the promotional list, he requested and was granted an interview. When
he returned for the second interview, he was informed that he was ineligible for
promotion because he had no valid driver's license. The CSC removed him from
the eligible list, and in its final decision, it commented that had it been "aware
that [Stafford] did not possess the required license at the time of the
determination of his eligibility, it would have determined him ineligible for the
subject examination."
The CSC concluded that Stafford had not met his burden of proof to be
reinstated on the police lieutenant eligible list because possession of a valid
driver's license was a CSC "requirement for appointment in the subject title
which cannot be waived by an appointing authority." The CSC considered
Stafford's arguments regarding equitable estoppel and the square corners
doctrine to be irrelevant because he and the County were equally responsible for
ignoring or not considering the license requirement. Regardless of the
agreement, the CSC had the authority to remove Stafford from the eligible list
for lacking basic job requirements. See N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.7(a)(1) and N.J.A.C.
4A:4-6.1(a)(1). The burden fell on Stafford to demonstrate by a preponderance
of the evidence that the CSC's decision to remove his name from the eligible list
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was mistaken. But the requirement was clearly included in the job description
formulated for the position, thus he could not carry the burden.
Now on appeal, Stafford contends that the County was aware that he had
taken the promotional examination prior to entering into the settlement, and by
agreeing to disregard the discipline, the County waived the driver's license
requirement. Stafford opined the County failed to establish that it adopted the
Civil Service job description. Stafford suggests that the CSC and the County in
some manner colluded in order to void the settlement agreement after it was
already executed.
Stafford contends:
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
II. THE [CSC]'s RULING THAT THERE WAS NO
BREACH OF THE PARTIES' SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT, IS ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
III. THE CSC'S REJECTION OF EQUITABLE
PRINCIPLES IS CONTRARY TO
PRECEDENT.
We find nothing "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable" in the CSC's
decision to remove Stafford from the list because he failed to meet a prerequisite
of the lieutenant position. See Burris v. Police Dep't W. Orange, 338 N.J. Super.
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493, 496 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571,
580 (1980)). It is Stafford's burden to establish a basis for us to decide that the
agency's final action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. See In re
Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443–44 (App. Div. 2006) (citing McGowan v. New
Jersey State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002); Barone v.
Dep't of Human Servs., 210 N.J. Super. 276, 285 (App. Div. 1986)). The
interpretation of the settlement agreement in this case is a question of law
subject to de novo review.
Article VII, Section 1, Paragraph 2 of our State Constitution prescribes
that, except for hiring preferences awarded to military veterans, appointments
and promotions in the civil service "shall be made according to merit and fitness
to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination, which, as far as
practicable, shall be competitive." In re Martinez, 403 N.J. Super. 58, 71 (App.
Div. 2008). The Civil Service Act, N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 to 12.6, implements this
provision. In re Johnson, 215 N.J. 366, 375 (2013). The Act binds the State as
well as its political subdivisions that choose to be bound by Civil Service
jurisdictions. See N.J.S.A. 11A:2-11(e); N.J.A.C. 4A:9-1.1. The CSC must
assign each position to a title, which "[e]stablishes the minimum education and
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experience qualifications necessary for successful performance." N.J.A.C.
4A:3–3.1(b)(2).
Given its duty to "provide a specification" and set "minimum . . .
qualifications" for each title, the CSC is authorized to, as it did here, impose a
licensure requirement for lieutenant corrections officers within Civil Service
jurisdictions. See In re Johnson, 215 N.J. at 376 (citing State v. State
Supervisory Emps. Ass'n, 78 N.J. 54, 90 (1978)) (recognizing that the CSC may
"classify positions and . . . prescribe qualifications for specific titles"). "When
the Commission exercises its authority to prescribe the qualifications for a
position, courts are loathe to interfere." Ibid.
The CSC is also responsible for "establish[ing] and supervis[ing] the
[employee] selection process." N.J.S.A. 11A:2-11(f). The selection process for
a civil service position "shall be subject to an examination." N.J.A.C. 4A:4-1.1;
N.J.S.A. 11A:4-2; In re Code Enf't Officer, 349 N.J. Super. 426, 430 (App. Div.
2002). Following the examination, the CSC produces an eligible list ranking
job candidates based on their scores and veteran status, among other
considerations. N.J.A.C. 4A:4-3.2. An appointing authority is required to either
hire from this list or leave the position vacant. N.J.S.A. 11A:4-5; In re Code
Enf't Officer, 349 N.J. Super. at 430.
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Persons "lack[ing] the job requirements" are deemed disqualified and may
be denied access to the examination. N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.1(a)(1). If such persons
were permitted to take the examination and placed on the eligible list, the CSC
may remove them from the list, again—as it did here. See N.J.A.C. 4A:4–
6.2(a)(5); N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.7 (a).
We conclude for the reasons stated by the CSC, that Stafford simply
cannot prevail by arguing without any support in the law that Essex had the
authority to alter the requirements of the lieutenant's position to comply with the
settlement.
Stafford cannot reasonably expect the agreement to give him greater
benefits than if he had not settled at all. Had the disciplinary proceedings been
decided in his favor, the law would have been the same—Stafford would still be
ineligible for the lieutenant's position because he does not have a valid driver's
license. To interpret the settlement agreement otherwise is to ignore justice and
common sense. See Phoenix Pinelands Corp. v. Davidoff, 467 N.J. Super. 532,
648 (App. Div. 2021).
Nor is Stafford entitled to relief under the "turn square corners" doctrine
or other equitable considerations. In this case, Essex was not the entity that
controlled the job promotion Stafford sought. Only the CSC had that power.
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Thus, even if Essex had agreed to disregard Stafford's license suspension (and
we do not find that it did), the reality remains that only the CSC can eliminate
the requirements for a promotion within the Civil Service.
Finally, equitable estoppel cannot be invoked against a government entity
except to prevent manifest injustice. Bridgewater-Raritan Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of
Educ. of Bridgewater-Raritan Sch. Dist., Somerset Cnty., 221 N.J. 349, 364
(2015). There was nothing unjust about removing Stafford's name from the list
since he did not meet one of the basic requirements of the position.
Affirmed.
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