Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC20-506
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ROBERT VELAZCO,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
June 30, 2022
POLSTON, J.
Petitioner Robert Velazco argues that his convictions for
driving under the influence causing damage to property and serious
bodily injury to a person under section 316.193(3)(c), Florida
Statutes (2014), are degree variants of the same criminal offense so
that double jeopardy is violated. We agree.
Because the convictions are variants of the same offense
under section 775.021(4)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2014), we hold that
his dual convictions for both offenses as to the same victim arising
from a single episode violate the prohibition against double
jeopardy. Accordingly, we quash the underlying Third District
Court of Appeal’s decision in Velazco v. State, 305 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2020), and approve the certified direct conflict decision of
Anguille v. State, 243 So. 3d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), to the extent
it is consistent with this decision.1
I. BACKGROUND
In 2014, Velazco drove his pickup truck through a red light
and collided with a scooter operated by Alexander Concepcion
Rodas. Rodas sustained serious bodily injuries, and his scooter
was also damaged. Velazco fled the scene, but police soon after
made contact with Velazco at his residence where he exhibited signs
of alcohol impairment. Velazco’s breath alcohol test results
exceeded the legal limit, and his urine sample tested positive for
cocaine. Velazco was charged with leaving the scene of a crash
involving serious bodily injury, driving under the influence (DUI)
causing serious bodily injury, DUI causing damage to property or
person, and failure to obey a traffic control device. The DUI causing
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We
decline to address the non-conflict evidence issue.
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serious bodily injury count alleged that Velazco caused serious
bodily injury to Rodas, and the DUI causing damage to property or
person count alleged that Velazco caused damage to the property or
person of another, i.e., “damage to the motorcycle and/or scooter
and/or moped of” Rodas. Velazco proceeded to trial and was found
guilty as charged and sentenced accordingly.
On appeal, Velazco challenged his dual convictions under two
subsections of section 316.193, which provides in relevant part:
(3) Any person:
(a) Who is in violation of subsection (1);
(b) Who operates a vehicle; and
(c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes or
contributes to causing:
1. Damage to the property or person of another
commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable
as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
2. Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s.
316.1933, commits a felony of the third degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
775.084.
§ 316.193(3). Velazco was convicted of DUI causing damage to
property or person in violation of section 316.193(3)(c)1. (a first-
degree misdemeanor) and DUI causing serious bodily injury in
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violation of section 316.193(3)(c)2. (a third-degree felony). Velazco
argued that his dual convictions arising from a single episode
violate double jeopardy.
The Third District affirmed, holding that Velazco’s convictions
did not violate double jeopardy. Velazco, 305 So. 3d at 82. The
Third District concluded that the offenses of DUI causing damage to
property or person and DUI causing serious bodily injury satisfied
the same-elements test set forth in section 775.021(4)(a) and that
none of the three exceptions to the same-elements test set forth in
section 775.021(4)(b) applied. Velazco, 305 So. 3d at 78-81. As to
the degree-variant exception in section 775.021(4)(b)2., the Third
District concluded that “a faithful textualist approach to
interpretation belies the proposition that the offenses ‘are degrees of
the same offense as provided by statute’ ” because “the legislature
chose not to classify any DUI-related crimes by ‘degree.’ ” Velazco,
305 So. 3d at 79 (quoting § 775.021(4)(b)2.). The Third District
further “conclude[d] that, as the resultant injuries are entirely
distinguishable and do not overlap, ‘neither offense is an aggravated
form of the other,’ and the crimes do not constitute degree-
variants.” Id. at 81 (quoting Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067, 1077
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(Fla. 2009)). The Third District also certified direct conflict with the
Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Anguille, which held
that “where there is a single victim and the charges arise from a
single episode, dual convictions for DUI with serious bodily injury
and DUI with property damage . . . violate the prohibition against
double jeopardy” because the offenses “are degrees of the same
offense.” 243 So. 3d at 411, 415.
Judge Emas dissented from the Third District’s holding in
Velazco “that principles of double jeopardy do not prohibit dual
convictions and sentences for DUI property damage/bodily injury
and DUI serious bodily injury arising from the commission of a
single act.” Velazco, 305 So. 3d at 82 (Emas, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Applying double jeopardy principles
and this Court’s precedent construing section 775.021(4)(b)2.,
Judge Emas “conclude[d] that these two offenses are degree-variant
offenses and aggravated forms of the basic DUI offense.” Id. at 82-
83. The dissent reasoned that, “[a]lthough the language of the [DUI]
statute may not include use of the term ‘degree’ to distinguish these
offenses,” the statute’s “framework nonetheless evinces a ‘degree
relationship.’ ” Id. at 87. The dissent also explained that the DUI
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statute provides graduated imprisonment sentences, increased
fines, and other escalating penalties based on the existence and
establishment of certain aggravating conduct. Id. at 87-88.
Accordingly, Judge Emas concluded that DUI causing damage to
property or person and DUI causing serious bodily injury “are
degree-variant offenses and aggravated forms of the basic DUI
offense”; therefore, the two offenses satisfy the degree-variant
exception in section 775.021(4)(b)2., and “double jeopardy bars
convictions and sentences for both offenses.” Id. at 82, 89.
II. ANALYSIS
Velazco argues that his convictions and sentences for DUI
causing damage to property or person and DUI causing serious
bodily injury violate double jeopardy because the two offenses are
degree variants of the same offense under section 775.021(4)(b)2.2
2. Velazco does not argue and we do not address whether his
convictions violate the Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299
(1932), same-elements test as codified in section 775.021(4)(a),
Florida Statutes.
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We agree and quash the Third District’s decision below to the extent
it is inconsistent with this decision. 3
It is well-settled that multiple convictions arising from a single
violation of the DUI statute do not violate double jeopardy where
injury results to several persons. See Melbourne v. State, 679
So. 2d 759, 765 (Fla. 1996) (“The DUI driver may sustain multiple
convictions because the violation causes injury to each victim.”).
However, Velazco’s dual convictions arise out of a single act of
driving under the influence, running into a single victim, and
causing serious bodily injury to the victim and damage to the
victim’s scooter. Velazco argues that his convictions are
impermissible under the second statutory exception to the same-
elements test, 4 section 775.021(4)(b)2., which prohibits dual
3. “Double jeopardy claims based on undisputed facts present
questions of law and are subject to de novo review.” Graham v.
State, 207 So. 3d 135, 137 (Fla. 2016).
4. Section 775.021(4) states in its entirety:
(a) Whoever, in the course of one criminal
transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which
constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon
conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced
separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing
judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently
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convictions for “[o]ffenses which are degrees of the same offense as
provided by statute.”
The Third District in Velazco concluded that the dual offenses
are not degree variants or aggravated forms of each other because
“the DUI statute omits any reference to ‘degree,’ and delineates
varying penalties for separate, distinct, non-overlapping harms.”
305 So. 3d at 80. However, we have explained that a statute need
not use the word “degree” for the degree-variant exception to apply.
See Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1076 (“It is not necessary for the Legislature
to use the word ‘degree’ in defining the crime in order for the degree
variant exception to apply. There are other statutory designations
or consecutively. For the purposes of this subsection,
offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an
element that the other does not, without regard to the
accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.
(b) The intent of the Legislature is to convict and
sentence for each criminal offense committed in the
course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to
allow the principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1)
to determine legislative intent. Exceptions to this rule of
construction are:
1. Offenses which require identical elements of
proof.
2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as
provided by statute.
3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory
elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.
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that can evince a relationship of degree—for example, when a crime
may have aggravated forms of the basic offense.”). And since
Valdes, this Court’s analysis of whether two offenses are degree
variants of each other under section 775.021(4)(b)2. has not
focused on whether the offenses cause “separate, distinct, non-
overlapping harms.” See Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1068-69, 1076-77
(abandoning the “primary evil” test that considered offenses to be
degree variants of the same core offense where both crimes
intended to punish the same primary evil). Instead, we have
considered factors such as whether the offenses are located in the
same statute, share a common name, contain similar formal
elements, and criminalize similar conduct. See, e.g., State v.
Maisonet-Maldonado, 308 So. 3d 63, 71 (Fla. 2020) (concluding that
the offenses of fleeing or eluding and vehicular manslaughter “are
clearly not degree variants of each other because they do not share
a common name, contain very different formal elements, and exist
in completely different chapters of Florida Statutes”); State v.
Marsh, 308 So. 3d 59, 62 (Fla. 2020) (“As to the second exception,
we have explained that this exception only applies when a criminal
statute itself provides for an offense with multiple degrees, which
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may be evidenced by the location within Florida Statutes and
whether the offenses are aggravated forms of one another or are
explicitly designated as degree variants.”); Tambriz-Ramirez v. State,
248 So. 3d 1087, 1096 (Fla. 2018) (concluding that the crimes of
burglary, assault, and sexual battery are not degrees of the same
offense because they “are different offenses, prohibited by different
statutes, and they criminalize different conduct”).
The dual offenses of DUI causing damage to property or
person and DUI causing serious bodily injury are both located in
the DUI statute. The statutory language and framework of the DUI
statute evinces a degree relationship. See Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1076
(stating that a crime that has aggravated forms of the basic offense
“can evince a relationship of degree”); see also Velazco, 305 So. 3d
at 88 (Emas, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Subsection (1) of section 316.193 sets forth the elements of the
basic DUI offense:
(1) A person is guilty of the offense of driving under
the influence and is subject to punishment as provided in
subsection (2) if the person is driving or in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state and:
(a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic
beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s.
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877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893,
when affected to the extent that the person’s normal
faculties are impaired;
(b) The person has a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 or
more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or
(c) The person has a breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or
more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
§ 316.193(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). Subsections (2), (3), and (4)
delineate varying penalties for certain aggravating conduct. For
example, repeat violations of the DUI statute correspond with
increased fines and increased terms of imprisonment. See, e.g.,
§ 316.193(2)(a) (providing for a $500-$1,000 fine and up to six
months’ imprisonment for a first conviction and a $1,000-$2,000
fine and up to nine months’ imprisonment for a second conviction).
Other provisions increase the amount of fines and terms of
imprisonment based on certain factors present during the DUI
episode. See, e.g., § 316.193(4) (providing for increased fines and
terms of imprisonment if the person, while driving under the
influence, had a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.15
or higher, or was accompanied by a minor); see also Velazco, 305
So. 3d at 87-88 (Emas, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (explaining that the DUI statute provides “graduated
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imprisonment sentences (six months, nine months, one year, five
years, fifteen years, thirty years), increased fines ($500-$1000,
$1000-$2000, $2000-$4000, $4000 or more), and other escalating
penalties (e.g., restriction, suspension or revocation of driving
privileges) based upon the existence and establishment of certain
aggravating conduct”).
Relevant to this case, section 316.193(3) contains several
provisions detailing certain aggravating conduct with corresponding
increases in punishment as the harm caused by the DUI driver
increases:
(3) Any person:
(a) Who is in violation of subsection (1);
(b) Who operates a vehicle; and
(c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes or
contributes to causing:
1. Damage to the property or person of another
commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as
provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
2. Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s.
316.1933, commits a felony of the third degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
775.084.
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3. The death of any human being or unborn child
commits DUI manslaughter, and commits:
a. A felony of the second degree, punishable as
provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
b. A felony of the first degree, punishable as
provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if:
(I) At the time of the crash, the person knew, or
should have known, that the crash occurred; and
(II) The person failed to give information and render
aid as required by s. 316.062.
§ 316.193(3) (emphasis added).
Velazco was convicted of DUI causing damage to property or
person in violation of section 316.193(3)(c)1. 5 and DUI causing
serious bodily injury in violation of section 316.193(3)(c)2. Both
offenses are found in the same subsection of the DUI statute, one
5. Section 316.193(3)(c)1. is an “alternative conduct” statute,
meaning “a statute that proscribes conduct in the alternative.”
Roughton v. State, 185 So. 3d 1207, 1210 (Fla. 2016). The statute
can be violated by causing property damage or bodily injury. See
§ 316.193(3)(c)1. “[W]hen considering a statute that proscribes
conduct in the alternative (offenses that can be committed in more
than one way), the [double jeopardy] analysis must consider the
entire range of conduct prohibited by the statute[], not the specific
conduct charged or proven at trial.” State v. Maisonet-Maldonado,
308 So. 3d 63, 70-71 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Tambriz-Ramirez v. State,
248 So. 3d 1087, 1094 (Fla. 2018)).
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after another. See § 316.193(3)(c)1.-2.; see also Gil v. State, 118
So. 3d 787, 794 (Fla. 2013) (concluding that driving with a
suspended license under section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2009),
and unlawful driving as a habitual traffic offender under section
322.34(5) qualified as variant offenses and noting as one
consideration the fact that the offenses were located in the same
statute). DUI causing serious bodily injury (a third-degree felony) is
also a more serious offense than DUI causing damage to property or
person (a first-degree misdemeanor). See Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1076
(explaining that an aggravated form of a basic offense can evince a
relationship of degree, with “degree” meaning “a level based on the
seriousness of an offense”). Further, the two offenses contain
nearly identical elements. Common to both offenses is the
requirement that a person first commit the basic DUI offense set
forth in subsection (1). See § 316.193(3)(a). DUI causing damage to
property or person requires the defendant to operate a vehicle,
while under the influence, and by reason of such operation, cause
damage to the property or person of another. See § 316.193(3)(c)1.
DUI causing serious bodily injury requires the defendant to operate
a vehicle, while under the influence, and by reason of such
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operation, cause serious bodily injury to another. See
§ 316.193(3)(c)2. The lone difference between the two offenses, as
Judge Emas explained below, is the final aggravating conduct—the
seriousness of the resulting harm, which “when viewed in the
context of section 316.193, most clearly establishes that the instant
offenses meet the degree-variant exception and compels the
conclusion that felony DUI serious bodily injury and DUI bodily
injury/property damage are merely aggravated forms of the basic
DUI offense.” Velazco, 305 So. 3d at 87-88 (Emas, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); see also Anguille, 243 So. 3d at 415
(“The separation of the enhancements for serious bodily injury from
personal injury or property damage delineates the degree of the
offense for which the defendant can be convicted, for the
causational damage inflicted upon one victim for the offense of
DUI.”).
III. CONCLUSION
Because the criminal offenses of DUI causing damage to
property or person and DUI causing serious bodily injury are degree
variants of the same offense under section 775.021(4)(b)2., we hold
that dual convictions for both offenses as to the same victim arising
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from a single episode violate the prohibition against double
jeopardy. We quash the Third District’s decision in Velazco as to
the double jeopardy issue, approve the Fourth District’s decision in
Anguille to the extent it is consistent with this opinion, and remand
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions
Third District – Case No. 3D18-165
(Miami-Dade County)
Michael Mirer, Miami, Florida,
for Petitioner
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Michael W.
Mervine, Bureau Chief, and Kseniya Smychkouskaya, Assistant
Attorney General, Miami, Florida,
for Respondent
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