IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCSC-89
No. 260A21
Filed 15 July 2022
IN THE MATTER OF: M.C., M.C., and M.C.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 9 April
2021 by Judge Resson O. Faircloth in District Court, Harnett County. This matter
was calendared in the Supreme Court on 1 July 2022 but determined on the record
and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
Duncan B. McCormick, Staff Attorney, for petitioner-appellee Harnett County
Department of Social Services.
Mobley Law Office, P.A., by Marie H. Mobley, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.
Wendy C. Sotolongo, Parent Defender, and Jacky Brammer, Assistant Parent
Defender, for respondent-appellant father.
HUDSON, Justice.
¶1 Respondent-father appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his
parental rights in M.C. (Michael), M.C. (Monica), and M.C. (Maxine).1 We affirm.
1 Pseudonyms are used in this opinion to protect the juveniles’ identity and for ease
of reading.
IN RE M.C., M.C., AND M.C.
2022-NCSC-89
Opinion of the Court
I. Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 Michael, Monica, and Maxine were born in February 2014, June 2015, and
August 2016, respectively. On 23 August 2017, the Harnett County Department of
Social Services (DSS) obtained nonsecure custody of Michael, Monica, and Maxine
and filed juvenile petitions alleging them to be neglected juveniles. The petitions
alleged a family history with DSS and Cumberland County Department of Social
Services dating back to 2015. On 12 May 2015, DSS began working with the family
after “several severe incidences of domestic violence between the parents” while in
Michael’s presence. Respondent-parents’ relationship “continued with the same
pattern of violence” over the next two years.
¶3 Domestic violence was not the only concern. The petitions further alleged that
respondent-parents “would use illegal drugs and non-prescribed medications while
caring for the children” and “would leave the children with family members . . . for
several months” without providing “information as to where they were going or when
they would return.” At Maxine’s birth in 2016, she tested positive for barbiturates,
and respondent-mother tested positive for marijuana, benzodiazepines, and cocaine.
On 17 March 2017, respondent-father “threatened to kill the children while they were
in his care” and “refused to return them” to respondent-mother. Shortly thereafter,
respondent-father was arrested on charges of identity theft and possession with
intent to sell and deliver cocaine. He was imprisoned at the Craven County
IN RE M.C., M.C., AND M.C.
2022-NCSC-89
Opinion of the Court
Correctional Institute and was expected to remain there for twelve to twenty-five
months.
¶4 After hearing the juvenile petitions on 22 September 2017, the trial court
entered an order the same day adjudicating the children to be neglected juveniles.
Both parents were ordered to enter into a family services agreement. Pertinent to
this appeal, respondent-father was required to comply with seven directives: (1)
contact DSS upon release from incarceration; (2) participate in any services or
programs available in jail or prison and provide documentation of his progress to DSS
and the trial court; (3) cooperate with a substance abuse assessment and follow all
recommendations; (4) complete a domestic violence assessment and follow all
recommendations; (5) obtain and maintain employment upon release from
incarceration and demonstrate an ability to financially care for his children; (6) obtain
and maintain appropriate housing upon release from incarceration; and (7) sign
releases for information as requested by DSS and the guardian ad litem.
¶5 Following a permanency planning hearing on 15 December 2017, the trial court
entered an order on 7 February 2018 finding that respondent-father remained
incarcerated with a projected release date of April 2018. The primary permanent plan
was set as reunification, with a secondary plan of guardianship. The trial court also
set a third permanent plan of adoption. The trial court granted respondent-father a
IN RE M.C., M.C., AND M.C.
2022-NCSC-89
Opinion of the Court
minimum of one hour of weekly supervised visitation upon his release from
incarceration.
¶6 Following a permanency planning hearing on 10 August 2018, the trial court
entered an order finding that although respondent-father had been released from
prison in April 2018, he was currently incarcerated in Harnett County on pending
charges dating from 2016. The trial court changed the primary permanent plan to
adoption, with a secondary plan of guardianship and a concurrent secondary plan of
reunification.
¶7 Following a permanency planning hearing on 2 November 2018, the trial court
entered an order on 11 January 2019 finding that although respondent-father was
“able to . . . send cards and letters” to his children while incarcerated, he had failed
to do so. Respondent-father’s projected release date from Harnett County was in
January 2019.
¶8 Following a permanency planning hearing on 29 March 2019, the trial court
entered an order on 23 May 2019 finding that respondent-father had been released
from prison in February 2019, that respondent-father had participated in two visits
with his children since his release, and that the “children know him” and the visits
“went well.” The court further found that on 12 March 2019, respondent-father had
completed a substance abuse assessment which recommended he abstain from
marijuana use; however, on 13 March 2019, he failed to appear for a drug screen. He
IN RE M.C., M.C., AND M.C.
2022-NCSC-89
Opinion of the Court
attended an intake session at HALT, a domestic violence treatment program, but
reported not being able to continue with the program because he could not afford the
program fees. Respondent-father further reported obtaining housing and
employment and earning about $250 per week. The trial court set the primary
permanent plan as adoption, with a secondary permanent plan of reunification with
respondent-father.
¶9 On 17 July 2019, DSS filed a motion to terminate respondent-father’s parental
rights to Michael, Monica, and Maxine on the grounds of neglect, willful failure to
make reasonable progress, and failure to pay for a reasonable portion of the cost of
care for the juveniles.2 See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3) (2021). Following a hearing
on 31 July 2020 on the motion to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights, the
trial court entered an order on 9 April 2021 determining that three grounds existed
to terminate his parental rights as alleged in the petition. The trial court also
concluded that it was in the children’s best interests that respondent-father’s
parental rights be terminated. See id. § 7B-1110(a) (2021). Respondent-father timely
appealed.
2 Although DSS also filed to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights, she is not
a party to this appeal. In November 2019, DSS dismissed the TPR motion as to respondent-
mother after she relinquished her parental rights.
IN RE M.C., M.C., AND M.C.
2022-NCSC-89
Opinion of the Court
II. Analysis
¶ 10 On appeal, respondent-father challenges the trial court’s adjudication of the
existence of grounds to terminate his parental rights in Michael, Monica, and Maxine.
When reviewing the trial court’s adjudication of
grounds for termination, we examine whether the court’s
findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and
convincing evidence and whether the findings support the
conclusions of law. Any unchallenged findings are deemed
supported by competent evidence and are binding on
appeal. The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo.
In re Z.G.J., 378 N.C. 500, 2021-NCSC-102, ¶ 24 (cleaned up). “[A]n adjudication of
any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient to support a termination of
parental rights.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395 (2019).
¶ 11 A trial court may terminate parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(3) when:
The juvenile has been placed in the custody of a county
department of social services, a licensed child-placing
agency, a child-caring institution, or a foster home, and the
parent has for a continuous period of six months
immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion
willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of
care for the juvenile although physically and financially
able to do so.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (2021). Regarding this ground for termination, this Court
has held:
The cost of care refers to the amount it costs the
IN RE M.C., M.C., AND M.C.
2022-NCSC-89
Opinion of the Court
Department of Social Services to care for the child, namely,
foster care. A parent is required to pay that portion of the
cost of foster care for the child that is fair, just and
equitable based upon the parent’s ability or means to pay.
In re J.M., 373 N.C. 352, 357 (2020) (cleaned up).
¶ 12 In the present case, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact
in support of its conclusion that grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3)
to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights:
65. The six-month period immediately preceding the filing
of the motion to terminate parental rights was January 17,
2019 to July 17, 2019.
66. The juveniles were in a foster care placement in the
relevant six-month period.
67. The room and board and child-care costs for each of the
juveniles exceeded $14,000 during the six-month period.
68. The father was in prison until mid-February 2019. He
returned to jail in June 2019.
69. The father was employed while he was out of prison
during the relevant six-month period. He earned about $8
per hour and $250 per week.
70. The father did not make any child support payments or
provide financial support for the children between January
17, 2019 and July 17, 2019.
71. The father did not make any child support payments or
provide financial support for the children at any time after
the filing of the underlying juvenile petitions.
....
73. The father had the ability to pay more than zero dollars
IN RE M.C., M.C., AND M.C.
2022-NCSC-89
Opinion of the Court
in child support or financial support of the children to
contribute to their cost of care in the six-month period
immediately preceding the filing of the juvenile petitions.
74. The father paid for a birthday party at Chuck E. Cheese
to celebrate [Monica]’s birthday in June 2019. He brought
toys for all of the juveniles. He brought shoes and clothing
for all of the juveniles.
¶ 13 Respondent-father challenges findings of fact 70 and 71, arguing that the trial
court’s findings that he did not provide any financial support after the underlying
juvenile petitions were filed or during the relevant six-month period are not
supported by the evidence. Specifically, respondent-father directs our attention to
finding of fact 74 and undisputed testimony demonstrating that he paid for lunch for
his children during a visitation, provided gifts, shoes, and clothes for his children on
more than one occasion, and paid for Monica’s birthday party at Chuck E. Cheese in
June 2019. Additionally, respondent-father argues that because he provided some of
this support during the relevant six-month period, the trial court was required to
make a finding that he “was able to pay more than he did, not just more than zero.”
We are not persuaded.
¶ 14 This Court’s recent holding in In re D.C., 378 N.C. 556, 2021-NCSC-104, is
instructive on this issue. There, the trial court made unchallenged findings that the
respondents were physically able to work, started a small business during the
relevant six-month period, and reported that the business earned enough income to
support themselves and their children. Id. ¶¶ 15–16. Although the trial court found
IN RE M.C., M.C., AND M.C.
2022-NCSC-89
Opinion of the Court
that the respondents “provided the juvenile with “some food and gifts at visitation”
and also gave the juvenile “some small amount of spending money,” the court also
found that they did not pay any child support or give DSS or the foster parents any
money that would cover a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juvenile. Id. ¶
15. On appeal, this Court affirmed termination of the respondents’ parental rights
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) because “[t]he trial court’s unchallenged findings of
fact demonstrate[d] that respondents had the ability to pay a reasonable portion of
[the juvenile]’s cost of care but failed to pay any amount to DSS or the foster parents
toward cost of care.” Id. ¶ 20 (emphasis added).
¶ 15 Here, there is similar uncontested evidence that respondent-father provided
lunch, gifts, and clothing for the children and paid for Monica’s birthday party in June
2019. But as in In re D.C., this sporadic provision of gifts, food, and clothing does not
preclude a finding by the trial court that respondent-father failed to provide a
reasonable portion of the cost of care for the children when he made no payments to
DSS or the foster parents during the relevant six-month period.
¶ 16 As noted above, “cost of care” under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) contemplates the
monetary cost of foster care that DSS is required to pay for the care of the children.
E.g., In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 113 (1984). Here, it is undisputed that the cost
of care for each child during the determinative six-month period was in excess of
$14,000. Unchallenged findings establish that respondent-father was employed and
IN RE M.C., M.C., AND M.C.
2022-NCSC-89
Opinion of the Court
earning about $250 per week while he was out of prison during the relevant six-month
period, such that he could have provided some amount of support payments during
this time. As in In re D.C., the findings and evidence here “demonstrate that
respondent[ ] had the ability to pay a reasonable portion of [the juveniles]’ cost of care
but failed to pay any amount to DSS or the foster parents toward cost of care.” In re
D.C., ¶ 20. Respondent-father’s failure to contribute any payments supports the trial
court’s challenged findings of fact. In turn, these findings support the trial court’s
conclusion that grounds existed under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) to terminate
respondent-father’s parental rights.
¶ 17 Because a finding of a single statutory ground is sufficient to support
termination of respondent-father’s parental rights, we decline to address his
arguments challenging the trial court’s adjudication of other grounds under N.C.G.S.
§§ 7B-1111(a)(1) and 7B-1111(a)(2). In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395. Respondent-father
does not challenge the trial court’s dispositional determination that it was in the best
interests of Michael, Monica, and Maxine to terminate his parental rights. See
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). Accordingly, the trial court’s order is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.